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Part 1

Analysis
and
Recoininendations

Introduction

Over the past eighteen months, the Commission on Government Integrity has devoted
considerable time and resources to investigating the fund-raising practices of candidates for
public office in New York. It has held a series of public hearings, computerized campaign disclosure statements for the first time, and issued a series of reports on the subject. 1 The
Commission's probing of the present campaign finance system, and its examination of the
concerns and practices of candidates, contributors, and the Board of Elections, has illuminated
serious interlocking problems in current practices:

*

Candidates for public office need enormous sums of money. Modern campaigns
for major office depend heavily on media, especially costly television advertising,
and expensive consultants. These financial pressures cause officeholders to
solicit money through the entire terms of their office, in order to raise the
needed totals.

*

Less than three tenths of one percent of the voters in New York make political
contributions. The vast majority of contributions comes from a small core group of
contributors, many with special interests to promote. These contributors give most
freely to those already in office, those in powerful positions, and those seen as likely
winners, in order to ensure access and influence and to protect against the spectre of
adverse action.

*

The constant need to raise funds makes it difficult for incumbents to separate their
fund-raising activities from their official activities. Their official staffs, many of whom
also often work on their campaigns, blur those distinctions even further.

*

Existing statutory limits on campaign contributions are absurdly high. Wealthy
contributors easily dominate the fund-raising scene.

*

Disclosure mechanisms are so ineffective that the contribution process is hidden from
the public and press. The Board of Elections, the nominal enforcement agency, is
actually subservient to the very groups it is meant to police. Even when the Board
takes steps to improve its enforcement procedures, it is hampered by a lack of needed
funds.

1 See Appendix One for a listing of all of these materials, which are available upon request from the
Commission on Government Integrity.
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Each of these problems contributes to the popular view that big gifts buy influence.
Although not the norm, some of the solicitation efforts we have investigated seem to invite
prospective contributors to believe that their contributions may help them or that their refusal
to give may hurt them. Even when officeholders attempt to prevent such impressions, they may
not be able to dispel the unexpressed uneasiness in the minds of prospective contributors that a
refusal to contribute may subtly influence decisions affecting their business interests. Candidates
cannot reduce their need for money, and they have great difficulty obtaining adequate funding
from those who are financially disinterested. They must inevitably solicit the bulk of their
campaign funds from those who have a financial stake in the business of government.
Earlier Commission reports have addressed each of these problems and laid out a
program of reform recommendations. But nowhere are these forces more powerful, or more
obvious, than in the case of our statewide elected officers. This report, while drawing on the
Commission's previous work and what has been learned about how candidates for other offices
raise money, focuses on the fund-raising practices of the Governor, Attorney General and
Comptroller of New York State during the periods of their incumbency.2 Their fund-raising
practices provide a compelling argument for the reforms needed to break the current cycles of
behavior that make political fund-raising so troublesome.
In public testimony before the Commission,3 our statewide political leaders all made

encouraging statements of support for various reform measures. Governor Cuomo promised to
sign any reform bill placed before him. Attorney General Abrams and Comptroller Regan
reiterated their longstanding endorsements of reform. All three pledged a number of voluntary
restraints in the interim until a reform statute is enacted. Both Assembly Speaker Miller and
Senate Majority Leader Marino, in public testimony before the Commission on March 17, 1989,
spoke of the need to strengthen the Board of Elections and adopt far more stringent
contribution limits. In addition, and most important, they indicated a willingness to explore the
possibilities for public funding of at least some elections in New York.
These statements bespeak recognition that it is not enough to rely on the good faith and
ad hoc controls of individual officeholders. These controls tend to break down in the face of
the overwhelming pressures both upon candidates seeking to gain or keep office, and upon
businessmen competing for lucrative business opportunities. One candidate cannot be expected

2 The fundraising practices of each of these three statewide elected officials are described separately in Part
2 of this report.

3 Comptroller Edward V. Regan testified on September
General Robert Abrams testified on March 10, 1989.
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23, 1988. Governor Mario M. Cuomo and Attorney

to hold back when an opponent is taking every advantage the law allows, and one business firm
cannot be expected to hold back when a competitor may be gaining advantage through
campaign contributions. The competitive nature of both politics and business tends to push
even the most conscientious participants to the limits of the law. Institutional safeguards must
be adopted and they must go far beyond any now in place in order to restore citizens'
confidence in the integrity of officeholders and institutions.

I. The Need for Money
Breeds a Constant Preoccupation with Fund-Raising

Every statewide officeholder testified that he abhorred fund-raising. This echoes the
sentiments of every other candidate whose testimony has been heard--all describe fund-raising as
the most distasteful of their activities. Yet they cannot escape it, even when the next election is
two or three years off.
Modern political campaigns are extremely expensive. To compete effectively, especially
for statewide office in New York, candidates must raise and spend millions of dollars. And as
the price of advertising--particularly television time--goes up, so does the cost of getting elected.
Air time alone for a single 30-second prime time television commercial can cost as much as
$30,000 today. In addition, candidates must hire an array of expensive pollsters, media
consultants, public relations advisors and the like.
The need for huge sums does not disappear when the election is over. In many cases,
the winner is left with a sizable campaign debt, and every officeholder must plan early in his or
her tenure to raise money for the next campaign, be it one for re-election or for some other
office. 4 This creates an unhealthy preoccupation with fund-raising throughout the election cycle.
Candidates continuously raise money, even when their war chests are full, and even in nonelection years. In 1988--two years before the next statewide elections in 1990--each of the
statewide officeholders held major fund-raising events:

4 The Attorney General entered the 1986 race seeking a two-tiered pledge from his major contributors:
$15,000 from each should he run for Attorney General; $50,000 from each should he run for Governor. Fundraisers for both Abrams and Regan spoke of raising extra money to protect against the possibility of some
wealthy candidate entering the race.
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Candidate

Date of
Fund-raiser

Cuomo
Abrams
Regan

November 30, 1988
January 12, 1988
May 2, 1988

Cash on
Hand Before
$3,591,000
$1,0005
$144,000

Amount
Raised
$1,158,040
$326,8506
$866,080

Off-year fund-raising is a particularly effective way to discourage potential challengers,
the political version of a "preemptive strike." Few challengers have the kind of name
recognition necessary to raise large amounts years before an election. As a result, incumbents
enjoy a tremendous advantage, and the voters may be denied an important choice. This attempt
to discourage future challengers is not limited to off-year fund-raising. Incumbents sometimes
campaign and spend heavily even when they are not opposed or when the opposition is feeble.
Campaigns are so expensive that despite constant fund-raising, even incumbents run out
of money.7 The more one candidate spends, the more his or her opponent feels compelled to
spend, and the costs escalate out of control. Frequently a candidate will hoard or borrow funds
for a surprise last-minute media blitz. In such a case, the opponent, too, often borrows money
from family, friends or from banks (with the loan personally guaranteed by key contributors).
The task of raising money to repay these debts is deferred until after the election in the
generally correct belief that victory will make the necessary fund-raising easier.
Modern political fund-raising generally requires repeated personal appeals by the
candidate to potential contributors. Only the Governor and the Mayor of New York City, by
virtue of the powers inherent in their offices, are in a position to delegate solicitation to others.
Their volunteer or professional fund-raisers function as their surrogates, using the Governor's or
the Mayor's name and position to attract crowds to huge events and to solicit money directly
from wealthy individuals. Candidates for less prominent office cannot afford the luxury of

5 This figure reflects cash on hand as of September 1, 1987, the point at which the campaign committee
began to organize the solicitation effort for the Janauary 12, 1988 tundraising event.
6 Abrams raised $282,000 from 7/14/87 to 1/11/88; he raised $44,850 from 1/12/88 to 7/13/88.
7 The proceeds of the Abrams' fund-raiser held in January, 1988, were used in part to pay off the campaign
committee's $58,000 outstanding debt from the 1986 campaign.
Regan likewise borrowed $290,000 in October, 1986 to meet unexpected, last-minute campaign expenses.
He held his annual Spring fund-raiser at Lincoln Center in New York City on June 8, 1987, and used the
proceeds in part to defray those costs.
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distancing themselves from personal involvement in fund-raising. For them, fund-raising is an
unending process requiring their personal attention.
Candidates make constant efforts to expand their network of potential contributors and
to cultivate the friendship of the wealthy and powerful. They and their representatives glean
names of potential contributors from various sources, including lists generated in the course of
their official duties. 8 Whether they meet such potential contributors in an official context or in
a social setting, many note and record names and pertinent details, and make sure their
campaign committees receive that information.9 And whether the work is done by the
campaign committee or the candidate or both, the actual fund-raising involves hard work.1 O

8 People who attended the Governor's Business Barbecue in 1984 (paid for by State funds) found
themselves invited to serve on his Dinner Committee, his core group of fund-raisers. In a memorandum to
Cuomo, Lucille Falcone (Counsel to Cuomo's Campaign Committee and the main organizer of the Committee's
fund-raising) asked him to provide the names to her, so that they could be recruited for the fund -raising team.
The Attorney General's official Department of Law Major Mailing List grew by some 433 names between

1986 and 1988. Although the stated purpose for the list was to communicate the views of the Attorney General
on issues of public importance to those in leadership positions in New York, 94% of the added names were
those of contributors.
9 Identifying such individuals was one of the assigned tasks of Joseph Palumbo, Comptroller Regan's
assistant.
10 Both the Ned Regan Support Committee and Friends of Mario Cuomo use the same techniques as the
most effective private philanthropies. In the Comptroller's case, Dinner Committee Chairs or Co-Chairs for the
annual spring dinner are selected on the basis of their "outreach" -- the ability to buttonhole large numbers of
friends and other contacts and to solicit pledges or purchases of tickets and tables. Thereafter follow-up calls are
assiduously made by campaign committee staff and volunteers. The Comptroller's administrative aide takes a
leave of absence from his official job to make these follow-up calls. In campaign years, or years when there is a
post-election debt, a second dinner may be held. Although the fund-raising goal is typically lower, the second
dinner is preceded by the same organizational efforts supporting the Spring dinner. The Comptroller is intimately
involved in the planning process.
The Governor's campaign committee follows the same model of fund-raising although the Governor is
less personally involved. The selection of Dinner Committee members is made with great care on the basis of
their ability to reach out to potential contributors, and each member is given goals to meet. Because of the
Governor's high visibility, he is able to raise substantially more money through fewer fund-raising events.
Attorney General Abrams, though perhaps more visible to the general public than the Comptroller, has a
more directly personal approach. Eschewing the formula of an annual fundraising event, he adopts a " one-onone" approach. Beginning almost two years in advance of the next election, he embarks on an organized
program of individual breakfast or luncheon meetings with prospective contributors of substantial sums. While
these may not be his only meetings with these individuals (many of whom he describes as friends) , they are the
occasions for a specific, and highly choreographed, request for substantial financial support. One of the
members of his Finance Committee is always present, charged with the responsibility of eliciting a pledge of
$15,000 (or $50,000 if the Attorney General were to run for Governor). In addition to this "one-on-one" program,
the Attorney General raised approximately $700,000 through a large fund-raising event on October 23, 1986 and a
series of smaller events whose hosts were, in many instances, first approached by the Attorney General himself.
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To make clear that they are not interested in these individuals solely for their money
and connections, the candidates, for example, host "non-political" dinners to show their
appreciation to key contributors and meet with the contributors throughout the year to discuss
issues and maintain relationships. The contributors, in turn, value the feeling of a special
relationship with a powerful official, a relationship that includes direct access to the officeholder
that is not available to the general, non-contributing public.
The preoccupation with fund-raising undermines the political process. There is no doubt
that to obtain or retain office, candidates must have access to vast sums of money. But those
funds should come from a broad base of support, not from the wealthy few, and all candidates
should be bound to reasonable spending limits. Officeholders could then devote more time to
their duties without the distraction of constant fund-raising. More important, the citizens of this
State could be assured that candidates' campaigns were not funded primarily by those with a
financial stake in governmental action. This is only possible with a system that provides for
public funding of campaigns.11

II. Special Interest Money Flows to
Powerful Incumbents and Likely Winners

As Governor Cuomo observed during his testimony before this Commission on March
10, 1989: "And let's be candid .... Practically, you know, [fund-raising] is easier for me now than
it has been for a long time." 12 He echoed the testimony of his former fund-raiser, William
Stern, who described the magic moment, after Cuomo had won the Democratic primary for
Governor in 1982, when prospective contributors' attitudes suddenly changed and people lined
up to thrust cash and checks into Stern's pockets, even as Cuomo walked to the podium to
claim his victory. Stern testified that these contributors, in his view, were attempting to ingratiate themselves with somebody who was to be Governor. 13

11 Lower contribution limits would go part way toward the goal of broad-based financial support of
campaigns, for candidates would, of necessity, appeal to a wider constituency for the funds they require.
12 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 18. Unless otherwise indicated, citations to ''Tr." refer to transcripts of the
Commissions' public hearings. Citations to "Hrg. Exh." refers to exhibits introduced at those public hearings;
"Dep. Tr." refer to Commission depositions.
13 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132.
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Every fund-raiser and every candidate with whom the Commission spoke described the
vast advantages which incumbency, in and of itself, confers on campaign fund-raisers. The most
commonly expressed theme was the euphemism that "everybody loves a winner." Incumbents
are, by definition, winners. As Senator Marino stated in his testimony, 14 contributors give to
incumbents

"because the incumbents generally win 99% of the time, and why
give to a loser.... [You give to a winner} because you are going to
be seeing that winner.... talking to that winner. You are not going to
be talking to the loser at all."
The more powerful and visible the office, the more easily the money flows to its
occupant's campaign committee. Governor Cuomo, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Mayor
Koch, are able to attract large sums despite self-imposed restrictions, whenever they decide to
hold a fund-raiser. The Governor's annual fund-raisers were suspended in 1986 and 1987; when
he resumed fund-raising in December, 1988, he was able to raise $1.15 million despite voluntary
limits on the size of contributions from individuals and corporations.15 Speaker Miller
testified 16 that:

"There is no question that as a party leader I could have raised
double that amount [about $80,000] if I wanted to. Any party
leader--the Governor can raise twenty times that amount. That is
the way the world is.
Mr. Schwarz: As the Governor said, "The money flows over

the transom. "
Speaker Miller: The money comes off the back of the

truck, right. "
By contrast, Lawrence Huntington, chairman of the Ned Regan Support Committee
described the fact that "nobody knows who the Comptroller is and what his job is" as the

14 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 122.
15 Governor Cuomo agreed to abide by the fund-raising constraints of the campaign finance bill that he
proposed and the Assembly passed in 1988. In somewhat the same vein, Mayor Koch restricted the size of
contributions he would accept in connection with his 1988 fund-raising "birthday" dinner; nonetheless he raised
about $700,000 through that one event.
16 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 61.

7

greatest handicap Comptroller Regan faces in his fund-raising. Groups that do business with
the Comptroller's office are targeted for fund-raising precisely because they are among the few
who know the Comptroller and the work of his office.
As important as the fact that they are likely winners, incumbents are in the position to
make or influence the decisions of government. As a result, contribution money flows in
especially large amounts from those groups over which the officeholder has authority, and
substantial proportions of the money which flows to the statewide officeholders come from
identifiable interest groups and from businesses. Analysis of campaign contribution patterns
confirms the dominant role of special interests over which the statewide officeholders exercise
discretion. 17 Across the board, and particularly in the statewide races, incumbents raised vastly
more money than their challengers, with heavy funding from special interests. 18
In certain industries, there appears to be an especially high correlation between those
who receive state business and those who give. For example, an overwhelming proportion of
Comptroller Regan's campaign funds are contributed by those who receive business from the
Comptroller's Office in connection with the annual Spring Borrowing 19 and investments of the
Common Retirement Fund.
Similarly, over 90% of engineers who receive contracts from the Department of
Transportation and from the Thruway Authority make contributions to Governor Cuomo's
campaign committee or to the State Democratic Party campaign committee. Notably,
engineers--even those contracting primarily with other state agencies and authorities--do not
typically contribute in significant amounts to other campaign committees. When asked to
explain the reasons for making these contributions, the engineers uniformly said that, while they
did not believe they received any particular benefits as a result of their contributions, they
wanted to protect against the possibility of some adverse decision, and were "not going to take
a chance and not contribute."20 Other contributors from various industries interviewed by
Commission staff also said that their gifts were not an expression of ideological support, but

17 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 1.
18 This pattern is repeated in the Legislature. There, it is the dominant party in each house that attracts the
most money; special interest money flows to the majorities in far larger amounts and proportions than to the
minorities. See, The Albany Money Machine, Charts F and G. In addition, as Exhibits 11 and 12 introduced at
the Commission hearing on March 17, 1989 show, when individual legislators achieve leadership positions, the
amounts contributed to them increase dramatically. Contributions to both Speaker Miller and Senator Marino, for
example, nearly tripled after their predecessors announced their retirements. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 3.
19 Spring Borrowing is the State's annual short-term borrowing against anticipated revenues.
20 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 24.
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rather, reflected a pragmatic understanding that the office-holder is in a position to affect them
by some official action, and their concern to protect against some possible but unspecified
adverse decision. Lobbyists said they give (usually through PACs) in order to obtain "access
and influence" rather than to support one ideology or political party. This is underscored by
the fact that they often give large amounts to members of both parties.21
Every fund-raiser and officeholder who testified or who was interviewed categorically
insisted that fund-raising and government decision-making were never linked, even indirectly.
Candidates differed, however, in the steps they took to ensure separation (such as adoption of a
policy against accepting contributions from those doing business with their offices or agencies),
and in the degree to which they actively targeted groups or individuals who might have business
with their offices.
Only the Attorney General has adopted any policy of restraint in accepting contributions
from some category of contributor who has business with his office, but that policy is so narrow
as to raise as many questions as it answers.22 Condominium and cooperative apartment plan
sponsors whose plans are in the narrowly delineated "red herring" (or initial application) phase
of the application process, and who have made a contribution during that phase, may inform the
Attorney General of the existence of the plan and ask for a refund of their contributions. All
contributors are informed of this policy through a notice stapled to the Attorney General's
personally signed thank-you note. This limitation is also discussed during the "one-on-one"
meetings between the Attorney General and prospective contributors.
This policy is flawed in several crucial respects.23 First, the campaign committee relies
on the contributor to come forward and demand the return of his or her contribution. The
very person who may be seeking to ingratiate himself with the officeholder is the one to whom
the campaign committee looks to police its ban. Second, the time period when contributions
from sponsors are subject to refunding is too narrow. It leaves out the critical period of time

21 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 27-28.
22 At the hearing on March 10, 1989, Abrams announced additional voluntary restrictions he would place on
his own fund-raising . He agreed to restrict corporate contributions from related corporations to the same levels
as the maximum that state law allows for individual contributions, although he conceded that this limit would still
far exceed the amount any one corporation could give. He also promised to refrain altogether from accepting
contributions from those with whom his office has contractual relationships, and to submit contributions from
attorneys representing clients with cases pending in his office to an independent body for a conflict of interest
review.
23 A detailed discussion of the problems with this voluntary ban is presented in Part 2, pages 45-48 below.
A statutory ban of a similar nature would, of course, suffer from the same flaws. See discussion of the New York
City experience with Election Law 14-114(9)(a), the so-called "Goodman Amendment," in the Commission report
Unfinished Business, at 23 et seq.
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following the "red herring" period during which the decisions of the Attorney General's office
continue to have an immediate economic impact on the sponsors, as well as the period
immediately prior to the submission of the "red herring," when the sponsor has taken steps to
file a plan, but has not yet done so. The Attorney General makes no provision for the return
of a contribution when it is followed in short order by the filing of a plan.
Finally and most important, the policy does not prohibit Abrams or his aides from
meeting with and personally soliciting--although not collecting--contributions from sponsors of
plans with pending red herrings. The campaign committee does not screen from its one-on-one
solicitation program potential contributors with pending plans. Although it may not be the
intent, a solicitation while a plan is pending, coupled with advice that the payment cannot be
made until the plan has been accepted, probably amounts to more inescapable and inherent
pressure than simple acceptance of a contribution during that period.
Although the Attorney General's step in the direction of self-restraint has its drawbacks,
it is, at least, a step in the right direction. The other statewide officeholders and their fundraisers aggressively solicit money from all categories of people who do business with their
offices. 24
While the Governor testified that he remains above the direct fund-raising fray, the chief
organizer of his fund-raising efforts estimated that one prominent lobbyist, Howard Rubenstein,
had alone been responsible for raising more than $200,000 on the Governor's behalf in
connection with each of the fund-raising events.25 The solicitation lists developed and used by
the Governor's campaign committee include lists of registered lobbyists, lists of attendees to the
Governor's Business Barbecue, and lists broken down by category: Banking, Insurance, Finance,
Attorneys, Engineers, Brokerage Houses and so on.
In the case of the Comptroller's fund-raising, the evidence suggests a deliberate targeting
of firms that his Office uses for Spring Borrowing26 or for pension fund investment. This
targeting focuses on industry groups and on names of particular firms with particular contracts.

24 Even the Attorney General has solicited contributions from a law firm representing a client with a pending
matter; his voluntary ban has, in the past, not barred soliciting contributions from attorneys in such cases. See
Part 2, pages 48-50 below.
25 At a Commission hearing on June 20, 1988, Rubenstein testified that he had decided, on his own
initiative, to refrain from political fund-raising in the future, because of the possible appearance of impropriety
involved in professional lobbyists engaging in such fund-raising efforts. (Tr. June 20, 1988, at 279 et seq.)
26 See fn.19 above.
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In light of the vast amount of money which flows from those who do business with
government, it is not surprising that no statewide elected official has endorsed an outright ban
on accepting contributions from those who do business with his office. Such a ban is typically
characterized by New York officials as unworkable, notwithstanding the adoption of such a ban
by the federal government and the state of California.27 Whether or not officials admit it, such
industry groups--so responsive to solicitations--have become a pillar of their campaign fundraising efforts.

III. Officeholders' and Candidates'
Roles Are Blurred
There is powerful pressure for even official transactions to become imbued with
something of the fund-raising agenda, despite efforts of officeholders to resist this. All three
statewide officeholders demonstrate keen awareness of the all-consuming nature of their official
roles. They all emphasize that they continue to be Governor, Attorney General, or Comptroller
twenty-four hours a day. If they seek re-election, they must then add candidate and fund-raiser
roles to their official roles.
To be effective, officeholders who are candidates must obviously delegate responsibilities
to key staff aides on whom they can rely to implement their policy directives. Moreover,
officeholders tend to use the same trusted aides for both official and political purposes. This
practice contributes to the perception that government decision-making is intertwined with
campaign matters, including the fund-raising process, and that contributions yield access and
influence.
Each of the elected officials separates, at least in his own mind, his official and political
roles. To some extent there is a degree of procedural separation as well; the officeholder may,
for example, leave his office to make campaign-related calls. But the wall of separation is not
solid, and it begins to break down when staff members play multiple roles, or when campaign
committee members hold important policy positions in government. Those close to the
officeholders have acknowledged that they cannot simply purge their minds of the knowledge

27 See Unfinished Business, at 28. Section 14-114(9)(a) of New York Election Law limits contributions from
those with business before New York City's Board of Estimate; a similar provision is in effect in the City of
Chicago. In Kentucky, no elected statewide official may solicit contributions to retire a campaign debt from any
person paid for services rendered under a state contract. See R.D. Michaelson, Campaign Finance Update:
Legislation and Utigation (Illinois State Bd. of Elections, Dec. 1988) at 19, 26-27.
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that a person with whom they are dealing concerning official matters is also a fund-raiser or
major contributor. When asked about this problem, Regan's campaign committee chairman
responded:

"I think you've hit the heart of what's wrong with our system, and it
cries out for reform. "28

In varying degrees, the fund-raising practices of all three statewide officeholders illustrate this
blurring of the officeholders' official and political roles.
More than any other candidate, Governor Cuomo distances himself personally from
direct fund-raising efforts. His volunteer and professional campaign staff puts together a Dinner
Committee which is charged with soliciting ticket purchasers. The Governor does not even stay
for the entire organizational meeting at which those groups are briefed, but leaves after a brief
"pep talk." He testified that he neither knows nor wants to know who contributes, or in what
amounts; at most, he testified, he is incidentally aware of who actually attends the dinners.
Thank-you letters to contributors are signed by staff.
Yet documents from the campaign committee, particularly memoranda to the Governor
from Lucille Falcone, suggest that she has worked closely with the Governor in selecting this
core group of fund-raisers, a group composed of leading representatives of many industries
which have a great deal of business with the State. Falcone stated plainly to Commission staff
who interviewed her that she deliberately cultivates the impression among the Dinner
Committee members that their efforts on the Governor's behalf are known, recognized and
appreciated by him. "Otheiwise," she said, "you would never get any money."
In addition, a number of the Governor's advisors participate in the fund-raising effort,
either as volunteers on their own time or as paid campaign staff while on leave from their state
jobs. 29 And, as discussed in more detail in Part 2, an employee of the Niagara Frontier Transit
Authority testified at a hearing before the Federal Merit Systems Protection Board that he

28 Huntington Dep. Tr. Sept. 19, 1988; Hrg. Exh. 1, Sept. 24, 1988.
29 William Hennessey represents a slightly different example of the blurring of roles of state officials.
Hennessey went from a position as Commissioner of the State Department of Transportation, to one as Chairman
of the State Democratic Committee, and then back into government as Chairman of the Thruway Authority. The
Commission's investigation discloses that engineering firms doing business with DOT and the Thruway Authority
appear as contributors to the State Democratic Party and to Friends of Mario Cuomo in larger percentages than
do similar firms who do business with other state agencies.
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believed that his job would be at stake if he did not buy a ticket to a fund-raising event for the
Governor's campaign.
Attorney General Abrams is deeply involved in his own fund-raising, relying as he does
to a large extent on the "one-on-one" program which involves his meeting at length with
individuals and asking for large sums from each of them. He does seek to separate these
meetings from the business of his office, carving them out of his official day, scheduling them at
places outside his office, and involving in each of them a senior member of his Finance
Committee. But virtually all of his key contributors are included--with pertinent information
about spouses, nicknames and employment--in the Attorney General's "Major Mailing List," a
list that was created and maintained at Department of Law expense, and which has been
increasingly composed of the names of Abrams' contributors. Those on the list received
personalized letters and "informational" packages of press clippings sent out by Abrams at
Department of Law expense, with statements of his stands on such issues as crime and the fight
against political corruption. The Major Mailing List itself found its way to campaign
headquarters for use by campaign staff.
Several Law Department employees played important roles in the Attorney General's
1986 campaign, though they did not, apparently, have a direct role in soliciting campaign
contributions. Both the campaign coordinator and the campaign office manager were employees
of the Law Department who took leaves of absence to work full -time on the 1986 campaign.
Both returned to the Law Department when the campaign was over. The Attorney General's
executive assistant took a six-month leave to serve as manager of the Attorney General's 1982
campaign, then returned to his official position at the Law Department. Although he did not
take a leave of absence in 1986, he participated in campaign strategy sessions, attended finance
committee meetings, and served as a liaison between campaign staff and the Attorney General.
Comptroller Regan has adopted no formal division between his role as a fund-raiser and
his role as Comptroller. Although he has declared that there is a "Chinese Wall" between the
personnel involved in these two functions, the Commission's investigation reveals no written or
otherwise memorialized policy to that effect, 30 as well as a number of fissures in the wall.
His campaign committee actively targets categories of contributors who have substantial
business with his office. Although the requests for pledges and contributions are organized

30 The only policy directive we have discovered states merely that:
No employee is to conduct political activities on paid State time.... In addition,
State equipment, vehicles and office space are to be used only for official
business. Office of the State Comptroller Employee Handbook, p.34.
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around the annual or twice-yearly dinners, Regan meets regularly with contributors throughout
the year. A number of members of the campaign committee hold unpaid positions on the
Mortgage Advisory Committee and Investment Advisory Committee, two bodies which guide the
Comptroller in connection with investment decisions for the Common Retirement Fund.
Regan's assistant, Joseph Palumbo, spent a substantial portion of the 1986 election cycle
as a state employee engaged in what were essentially fund-raising activities. 31 He targeted
potential contributors among those doing business with the Comptroller's Office; he arranged
meetings between Regan and potential fund-raisers; he met with key members and employees of
the campaign committee to plan fund-raising strategies, memorializing the meetings in
memoranda to Regan on official State Comptroller stationery. One witness from the investment
banking community even testified that Palumbo, virtually simultaneously, both solicited campaign
contributions from his firm and, on behalf of the Comptroller, invited a bid from his firm for a
contract managing Common Retirement Fund investments. Only in the closing days of the
campaign, and just before the major fund-raising events, did Palumbo take leaves of absence to
add his efforts to those of others making repeated follow-up calls to contributors who had not
yet made good on pledges.
These scenarios, when viewed together, reveal a troublesome picture. True, the elected
official has round-the-clock duties and requires the assistance of trusted staff in order to attend
to them effectively. True also, the same elected official must periodically campaign--at great
expense--for re-election, and needs trusted staff in that area as well. Raising the funds required
for an effective campaign is a monumental undertaking; again, trusted staff is needed. But it is
neither necessary nor advisable, particularly in the case of the very well-funded and
professionally run campaigns which characterize the statewide races, to employ the same cadre
of people as both fund-raisers and public employees. Without the strictest separation between
these functions, contributors may fear or hope that there may be a link between the decision to
give or not to give and the official treatment they will get.
It is not possible to prevent a certain blurring of roles in the case of officeholders
themselves. There, both the officeholder's good faith and the oversight of the voters must be
relied upon. But official staff should not be involved in any way in soliciting contributions from
those who have business with the officeholder for whom they work. Either there should be an
outright ban on contributions from those who have business with the State, or, alternatively, the
staff should be completely divorced from the fund-raising process, with fund-raising run by
employees who are totally separate from the official duties of the officeholder. These steps,

31 This conduct does appear to contravene the Comptroller's policy memorandum prohibiting political
activity on paid State time. See fn. 30.
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together with sharply reduced contribution limits and increased disclosure, would go a long way
toward restoring confidence in the integrity of the fund-raising process.

IV. Present Limits Amount to No Limits
Against this backdrop of the candidates' overwhelming need for money, the strong sense
that many contributors have that their campaign contributions to officeholders are good for
business, and the almost inevitable blurring of roles between officeholder, candidate and fundraiser, it is small wonder that current practices make contribution limits, as presently drafted,
illusory. Wealthy individuals with vested interests regularly contribute the maximum allowed by
law: $65,000 per statewide candidate,32 and a total of $150,000 annually to all candidates. Many
contributors, especially in the real estate business, also control a large number of separate
corporations, for each of which the $5,000 maximum allowable yearly corporate contribution is a
paltry sum. To many contributors, determining how much to contribute is mainly a business
decision, balancing how much the competitors are giving (the "going rate") against the potential
risk of refusing to contribute at all or at the going rate.
The challenge for some contributors, having once decided the optimum contribution
level in light of such factors, is to find ways to give--through family, employees, clients or
customers, P ACs, and so forth--more than even current limits permit for one individual.
Candidates are not shy about explaining how to accomplish this. 33

32 A contributor may give to a statewide candidate both $15,000 for the primary and $50,000 for the general
election.

33 The current state of the law in New York on corporate contributions was succintly summarized in a
memorandum from Abrams' campaign director Ethan Geto to Howard Milstein, a developer who, from time to
time, has submitted condominium and coop plans to the Law Department:
" [A]ny corporate entity, no matter how closely related to any other corporate entity, may
contribute up to $5,000 to political candidates in a calendar year. For example, if Milstein
Properties consists of ten buildings, and each building is separately incorporated, each building
may contribute up to $5,000, even though all of these corporations may have the same Board
of Directors, officers, etc.
In sum, any corporate entity that you or your family control may give up to $5,000 per calendar
year to political candidates for non-federal office. "
Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 90-91; Hrg. Exh. 22, Mar. 10, 1989.
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As a result, multiple contributions from related corporations are common:

*

On a single day, Drexel Burnham Lambert contributed $20,000 to
Cuomo in four $5,000 checks from affiliated corporations.

*

In one month, Merrill Lynch affiliated companies contributed a
total of $26,500 to Cuomo in six separate checks.

*

Ronald Perelman, chairman of McAndrews & Forbes, contributed
$50,000 to Abrams' 1986 campaign. Ten contributions of $5,000
each were made by McAndrews & Forbes and nine of its affiliated
corporate entities.

*

Benjamin Lambert gave $12,000 to Regan through three separate
corporations he controlled, on April 22, 1985. On March 5, 1987,
he contributed $15,000 through three related corporations, two of
which had not been involved in the 1985 contributions.

*

Three firms affiliated with Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. gave a total
of $15,000 to Regan on January 16, 1986, and another $15,000 on
January 26, 1987.

In many cases, only the recipient knows who is behind multiple or corporate
contributions. Under current law, the barest minimum of information is required on the official
disclosure form: the date, the name, some address (home or business), an indication whether it
is a corporate contribution, and some indication about prior contributions. 34 Investigators
seeking to track down the sources of contributions can, as Commission staff did, telephone outof-state contributors at home to learn that they are all employees of the same nationwide
financial institution, or travel to the single address listed for twenty corporate contributions in
different corporate names to find who has his office there. The ordinary citizen, however, is
left in the dark.
At the end of the campaign, everyone but the voters has been well-served: the
incumbent has retained his office he wants and the contributor has invested the money he

34 In some instances, the latter two items seem to be more frequently omitted than included by those filing
disclosure statements.
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deems effective for his purposes; whatever technicalities are necessary for compliance with the
law, and whatever rituals are deemed appropriate for improvement of the appearances of the
transaction, have been satisfied. No one has literally exchanged anything for anything, yet, to
the public, the whole process presents the appearance that money may influence government.

V. Everything Happens in the Dark:
The Board of Elections Cannot Effectively Police the Process
The Board of Elections, which is charged with enforcement of the current inadequate
disclosure laws and contribution limits, has failed to discharge its responsibilities in this area
effectively. The Commissions's investigations and hearings have revealed the agency's indifference to the need for vigorous enforcement and effective disclosure; on occasion, the evidence
has pointed to deliberate diversion of resources away from such efforts.
Enforcing contribution limits requires monitoring multiple contributions by a single
contributor. But the Board cannot do so. It has no way of tracing how much one contributor
has given, in the aggregate, to different candidates, PACs, and party committees. Each
candidate (sometimes with more than one committee), each party committee (state, legislative,
and local), and each of more than 400 PAC's, files separate statements anywhere from two to
seven times a year. The statements may be handwritten; in the case of major fund-raisers such
as Governor Cuomo's, they may be tens, even hundreds of pages long. 35 It is physically
impossible, without the aid of a computer, to cross-reference the contributions even within one
such candidate's records, much less to derive aggregate figures for particular contributors. The
Board of Elections has not only failed until now to attempt such computerization, but Board
officials also informed one employee who, on his own initiative, set up a modest computer
information system, that they "did not want that type of data leaving the agency." 36
The difficulty of tracing contributions is compounded by the fragmentation of the
enforcement responsibility among the state and local boards of elections. The State Board is

35 The Director of Governor Cuomo's campaign committee told Commission staff how, although the
committee itself kept track of contributions by computer, he copied the hundreds of pages himself by hand "in
order to be more accurate and pick up excessive contributions." Despite his vigilance, a $10,000 corporate
contribution (twice the legal maximum) was deposited and not refunded .
36 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 43.
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responsible for receiving disclosure statements of statewide officeholders, PACs, state legislators,
and state and legislative party committees. Fifty-seven county boards, plus one for New York
City's five counties, collect and record all filings which pertain to local elections, including filings
of local party committees. Yet party committees can make unlimited transfers to candidates or
to other party committees; the network of relationships is impossible to discern. Conversely,
contributions from individuals or companies with special interests can, for example, be routed to
local elections by way of party committees whose filings are deposited only at the State Board
of Elections; once again, those who have a vital interest in the process find it impossible to
track.37
Despite obvious weaknesses in the requirements for disclosure information concerning
contributors, the Board has failed to promulgate the simplest of regulations to facilitate review
and interpretation of disclosure statements. Statements do not have to be typed or, as a
practical matter, even legible. Furthermore, the Board believes it lacks power to require
disclosure of business affiliations and business addresses for individual contributors. The Board's
enforcement efforts are lacking in other areas as well. Even when contribution and disclosure
violations are called to its attention, the Board has not challenged the conduct of key party
officials in both parties.38
When asked to explain the lack of vigor in the Board's enforcement efforts, the Board's
Executive Director identified the central reason as budgetary. He went on to say:

"I think another thing that we have to recognize, too, is that in
effect, the Legislature is our clientele. We are asking them for more
auditors, more investigators, so that we can do a better job reviewing
the reports of legislators, and so forth. I think there is a reluctance
there. ,,3g

37 A Commission investigation revealed that this did occur with respect to 1985 Town Council races in
Poughkeepsie. Over $300,000 in contributions from individuals affiliated with the Pyramid Companies, which were
seeking to build a mall but required a controversial zoning variance to do so, was contributed to the State
Republican Party Committee, the New York Republican Federal Campaign Committee, and an "independent"
committee called "Building A Better New York," and then funneled into the local elections without the knowledge
of the local electorate. Additional expenditures were made directly by the Pyramid Companies, at least partially to
further their efforts to influence the election. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 2.
38 In the Poughkeepsie case referred to at note 37, although the State Board of Elections was alerted to the
possibility of Election Law violations, it conducted less than a complete investigation, which failed to uncover the
full extent of the moneys poured into the local races.
39 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 77-78.
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Expert testimony the Commission received at the outset of its inquiry into campaign
finance practices provided additional explanations for the ineffectiveness of the Board of
Elections. These experts were unanimous in their view that campaign finance enforcement
should not be the responsibility of the same agency that administers voter registration and the
ballot process. If these responsibilities are concentrated in a single agency, the agency will
inevitably devote more of its resources to resolution of immediate problems--such as which
candidates are to appear on the ballot--than to issues such as post-election review of the
adequacy of a candidate's financial disclosure statements. This is especially so where there has
been a failure to provide detailed statutory guidelines with respect to analyzing, auditing, and
disseminating publicly the campaign finance disclosure information.
Whatever the cause, the Board's failures subvert the underlying purposes of disclosure.
Even law enforcement officials with responsibility to oversee the integrity of governmental
processes do not have effective access to essential information about transactions at the very
heart of the electoral process. An attorney with the State Investigation Commission described
in detail how the fragmented record-keeping of the State and local boards of elections
hampered that agency's investigations, making virtually impossible enforcement of existing
contribution limits, investigation of allegations of coercive solicitation of campaign contributions,
and evaluation of the relative influence of various individual contributors. 40 There simply can
be no effective enforcement of the contribution limits unless meaningful disclosure is required
and computerized records developed.

VI. Fundamental Reforms Are Essential
Only sweeping, institutional reforms can break the cycle of increasing costs and constant
high-pressure fund-raising, and its corrosive effect on the electoral process and on citizens'
confidence in the integrity of their government. These reforms must address all elements of the
problem. Some of the essential reforms have been spelled out in detail in earlier Commission
reports; others are addressed for the first time in this report. In recent months all three
statewide officeholders, as well as Assembly Speaker Miller and Senate Majority Leader Marino,
have expressed support for some reform measures. The Assembly has already passed a bill with
many of the features that this Commission recommends. Adoption during this Legislative
session of the broad package of reform measures should be an absolute priority.

40 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 3-19.
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A. Limits on Contributions and Transfers. Among the reforms this Commission has
repeatedly called for are drastically reduced limits on the amounts that individual contributors
may give to candidates, to party committees, to PACs, and in the aggregate to all candidates.
For convenient reference, a summary of those recommendations is reproduced as Appendix
Two.
All statewide elected officials who have testified before us, as well as the majority
leaders of both legislative houses, have endorsed substantially lower limits on contributions. The
limits set forth in the recently passed Assembly bill are similar to the limits recommended by the
Commission. Senate Republicans have expressed concern that too drastic limits on party
committee support for legislative races will impair the important role those committees have in
maintaining a two-party or multi-party electoral system. No one questions the appropriateness
of this party role. But unlimited contributions to the party committees and unlimited transfers
of funds from party committees to candidates' committees, which the present arrangement
allows, are not essential to a strong party role. Nor is unlimited spending by party committees
on behalf of particular candidates. In effect, this lack of limits on party funding of individual
races permits circumvention of whatever contribution limits or expenditure limits might
otherwise apply. Adoption of the limits proposed, which will permit parties to perform their
vital role both unhindered and untainted, is an absolute must.
In addition, there should be a total ban on contributions from corporations, from unions,
and from individuals and firms doing business with the State. Everything learned through study
of the present campaign finance system supports these recommendations. This type of
contribution represents the prime situation in which there exists motivation, risk and the
appearance of a quid pro quo. This has been particularly evident in the examination of certain
fund-raising practices of the statewide officeholders, but has also been found to be true in our
review of fund -raising at every level of government in New York State.
Contributions from corporations are problematic on several levels. First, while
corporations are at the heart of economic activity in the State, they have no inherent right to
make political contributions. The citizens of this State are the constituents of the political
process, and it is important to encourage broad individual participation in providing funds for
campaign activity. Second, while it is perhaps not fully articulated by the contributor, a
contribution made through a corporate vehicle is in effect a business expense, made as a
business decision.41 The concept of political contributions as a business expense is consistent

41 This is in some ways more true in situations when individuals with small businesses do business through
(continued .. .)
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with, and supportive of, the possibility of a quid pro quo. Third, corporate contributions lend
themselves to evasion of disclosure requirements and contribution limits, at least for those
contributors who control a number of different corporate entities.
It is quite common for one individual, especially in the real estate business, to do
business through a large number of separately incorporated entities. Sometimes each property
owned by a real estate developer has its own corporate identity. In other businesses, such as
investment banking and brokerage, use of multiple corporations with common ownership and
control is also common. Under current law, while each of those corporations is restricted to
one $5,000 contribution annually, they can all make contributions to the same candidate, adding
up to more than the controlling individual could give as a individual. And under current
disclosure law, no one except the contributor and the candidate need know who is the individual
behind the contribution; the often unrevealing corporate name and address alone is all that is
required.

The Assembly has recently passed the Governor's reform bill, which would restrict the
aggregate contribution from an entire corporate family to the amount that could be given by a
single corporation. 42 Enforcement of this provision would require complete disclosure of the
extremely complex information necessary to determine whether there is common ownership or
some other relationship among corporate entities. Substantial enforcement difficulties will
accompany implementation of such an aggregation provision, and, as discussed above, there is
no compelling reason to continue to permit contributions from corporations at all. Not only the
federal government, but at least a dozen states, ban corporate contributions altogether. It is
preferable to ban corporate contributions outright and to direct scarce enforcement resources
toward implementation of the other essential reforms.
Contributions from individuals and organizations which have business dealings with the
State must also be prohibited. Although the Governor has pledged to sign any campaign
finance reform bill put before him, in his public testimony he also expressed reservations about
this recommendation, and none of the other statewide officeholders or legislative leaders has
endorsed it. All of them contend that reasonable and effectively enforced contribution limits
will suffice to address the problems discussed in this report.

41 (... continued)
a corporation . While these businesses do not represent the aggregation and concentration of wealth that was
one factor in support of the ban on corporate contributions to candidates for federal office at the turn of the
century, see Federal Election Commission vs. National Right to Worlr Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 207-08
(1982) , they instead represent individuals doing business in a corporate form. There is no justification for
permitting these individuals to make contributions through their corporations instead of individually.
42 A.189--B, §14 (March 13, 1989), amending N.Y. Election Law §14-116(2) (McKinney's 1989) .
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Such limits will indeed be a great improvement. But for government officials to solicit
contributions from those who come before them for decisions, even if the sums solicited are far
smaller than those now permitted, offends proper ethical standards. This issue was discussed at
length in an earlier report on campaign finance practices in New York City, 43 and an opinion of
the New York City Board of Ethics which was quoted there remains equally pertinent today:

"The solicitation of funds for political purposes by a public official
from those whose matters come before him or his agency for official
action is offensive to proper ethical standards...
[T]he solicitation and acceptance of political contributions by public
officers from persons, jinns or corporations doing business with
government with which these public officers and employees are
connected is against the public interest and should be prohibited...
It is our recommendation that appropriate legislation be enacted on
all levels of government to deal effectively with conduct that now is
contrary to proper standards but is not prohibited by law. •'44

A prohibition -- or restriction -- on contributions from those who have business dealings
with government is in effect in the federal government, the City of Chicago, New York City,
Kentucky and California.45 This Commission strongly recommends a two-pronged prohibition,
banning both the solicitation by candidates or their agents of contributions from those with
business with the government and the making of such contributions by individuals or
organizations having business with the government. 46 The implementation of such a ban was
discussed at length in the Unfinished Business report.

43 See,

Unfinished Business, at

27-32.

44 Opinion No. 35, New York City Board of Ethics, pp. 24-25 (Oct. 5, 1961).
45 See,

Unfinished Business, at 28 and fn. 27 above.

46 This ban on contributions from those doing business with the State would not encompass those whose
dealings are merely of a ministerial character. The prohibition should apply only to businesses and business
persons who are engaged in earning money through dealings with government entities, or are seeking the
necessary approvals to enable them to pursue income-producing ventures.
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Individuals associated with unions and corporations can and should still be permitted to
give through PACs, although there should be a limit of one PAC, using a single name, for each
union or "family group" of corporations, in order to prevent circumvention of the contribution
limits.
B. Public Funding and Expenditure Limits. To compensate for these drastic
reductions in private contributions, and to enable candidates to participate on an even footing in
the most expensive statewide races, a public funding system for statewide races should be
adopted. 47 Such a program would be financed by a modest check-off on individual tax returns,
and would substitute small contributions from a large number of citizens for the current system
of large contributions from the interested few. 4 8
Public funding is essential for another critically important reform, reduction of overall
spending on campaigns. Under a public funding system, spending limits, which cannot
constitutionally be imposed on candidates as a simple police power measure, can be imposed as
a condition of receiving public funds; candidates faced with opponents who refuse the public
funds and spending limits can be given generous bonuses in public funds to ensure that the
candidate accepting public funds would not be penalized. 49 It is vital that spending limits be
high enough to be realistic and to allow meaningful challenges to incumbent officeholders.

C. A Separate Campaign Finance Disclosure Agency. From the outset of its work in
this area, based on testimony received from a number of experts, this Commission has strongly
urged that the agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the campaign finance laws be
organizationally separate from the existing Board of Elections. Experience in other jurisdictions
strongly suggests that where a single agency is assigned the tasks of ballot administration
(including voter registration, candidate registration, petition challenges, administration of
elections, and the like) and also all the tasks of administering candidate financial disclosure,
enforcing contribution limits, and disseminating disclosure information publicly, there is an
inevitable diminution of resources allocated to the campaign finance functions.

47 For reasons discussed at length at pages 45-53 of the Commission report, The Albany Money Machine,
this Commission does not recommend public funding for legislative races at this time. Localities should be free
to adopt such programs if they desire, and this Commission strongly supports the new New York City program,
although the changes discussed in Unfinished Business remain imperative.
48 All the statewide officials have endorsed such public funding proposals, and the Assembly has passed a
bill providing such a system. Senator Marino has indicated that the Senate is willing to engage in discussions of
public funding for certain offices.
49 Details of Commission recommendations concerning spending limits are contained in the December 21 ,
1987 Preliminary Report at 43-48.
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Commission hearings, particularly the recent testimony of the Governor and Legislative
leaders, have revealed serious objections to the creation of a new government body in an era of
imperative fiscal restraint. If complete separation of functions is not feasible, certain other steps
can be taken which will do much to ensure effective enforcement of the campaign finance laws.
At a minimum, and only if an independent agency is entirely impossible, the Board of Elections
should be reorganized. 50
The Board itself should be made less subject to partisan influences, which, under the
current system, neutralize its ability to act effectively.51 This can be accomplished by providing
for a nominating commission patterned after the State Commission which nominates candidates
for the New York State Court of Appeals.52 The nominating commission should be comprised
of four appointees of the Governor, not more than two from any political party, and one
appointee each of the speaker of the Assembly, the temporary president of the Senate, and the
minority leaders of each house of the legislature. The nominating commission should include
representatives of leading civic groups and business and religious leaders. It should be charged
with nominating three candidates for each of the open commissioner positions on the Board.
The nominating commission should make nominations to the Board which will make the
agency independent of the statewide officials and the legislature. Ultimately, the Board should
be comprised of citizens who have demonstrated integrity and commitment to civic affairs,
representing a broad cross-section of the electorate. The chairman should be full-time and the
other commissioners part-time, and reimbursed for actual expenses.
The Board should be composed of five members, no more than three from either major
party. Appointments to the Board should be made by the Governor, from among those
nominated by the commission, and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. All
members should have fixed , overlapping terms. As the terms of present Board members expire,
and for all succeeding appointments, new members should be appointed through the
independent commission process.

50 If a public funding program of any scope is adopted, even closer consideration should be given to a
separate Campaign Finance Disclosure Agency structured in such a way as to be politically independent of those
whose conduct it must police, with resources clearly dedicated to the sole function of implementing and enforcing
the contribution and spending limits and disclosure requirements, and an undiluted mission to fulfill that function .

51 With two members of the four-member Board answering primarily to each major party, as is the case
currently, either deadlock or bartering of decisions is inevitable.
52 See New York Const., Art. VI , Section 2(c)-(f) .
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The agency itself should have three separate Offices, each with a Director reporting to
the Board of Elections and Campaign Finance. 53 One should be the Office of General
Counsel, which would interact with and support each of the other two. The other two should
be an Office of Election Administration, charged with all aspects of administration of elections,
and an Office of Campaign Finance, charged with all aspects of administration and enforcement
of the campaign finance and disclosure laws. All three Offices should be allocated, with
separate budget amounts for each, the full resources necessary to accomplish their missions.
The Office of General Counsel should work with the other two to formulate regulations and
advisory opinions, and should make determinations as to conflicts of interest, and the like.
The Office of Campaign Finance should be required by law to issue detailed but
workable disclosure forms, to computerize all information on the disclosure statements, to
monitor and enforce the contribution limits, to make periodic detailed public reports to the
Governor and Legislature, and to administer whatever public funding program is authorized by
law. It should have audit capability and, as authorized and directed by the Board, subpoena
power and the power to investigate and conduct enforcement proceedings. It should assist the
Board on rendering advisory opinions. In short, it should have all the duties and responsibilities
of the independent campaign finance enforcement agency described in the Commission's
Preliminary Report at pages 10-12.
These changes in the Board's structure and statutorily mandated responsibilities are
essential. Without them, the public is fated to suffer the same lack of enforcement that has
characterized the past decade.

D. Disclosure and Enforcement Mechanisms. Whether or not a public funding system
is adopted, effective reform of present campaign finance disclosure requirements is imperative,
including a far more effective system to record, publicize and disseminate the campaign finance
information.54 Specific statutory direction should be given to the Board of Elections, requiring
periodic public reports to the Legislature and the Governor, which would detail the information

53 Establishing a separate office whose director reports directly to the Board itself will help ensure the
autonomy and stature of the Office of Campaign Finance.

54 In response to Commission recommendations in this area, the Board of Elections has begun in recent
months to develop a computer system capable at least of recording and analyzing the data filed by campaign
committees. But the effort is being hampered by budget cuts. It cannot be emphasized enough that effective
computerization of these records is the barest of necessities, followed closely by sufficient audit and enforcement
staff to make contribution limits meaningful.
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on the disclosure forms, and also present tables and summaries interpreting that data.55 It is
essential that the Governor and Legislature appropriate the funds necessary to accomplish this
task.

In addition, local boards of elections require the resources and technical support to
computerize the disclosure statements that are filed locally. A portion of the initial
computerization effort of the State Board could effectively be dedicated to this purpose, at no
sacrifice to its mission. Uniformity of disclosure requirements and compatibility of computer
systems between the local and State Boards is essential. All statements filed at the State Board
which disclose contributions made to assist any candidate in a local election should be filed
locally as well. Contributors who give more than $1,000 in the aggregate should be required to
use the same name with each contribution, spelled the same way, for all contributions or unique
identifying numbers should be assigned.
The experience of this Commission in computerizing disclosure statements demonstrates
that it is neither technologically difficult nor prohibitively expensive to computerize the volume
of reports that local boards of elections receive. Commercial software and personal computers
lend themselves readily to the task. If technical support were provided by the State Board, a
smoothly functioning coordinated network of information throughout the State could easily be
accomplished within two years.
All the statewide elected officials and the legislative leaders spoke positively in their
testimony about mandatory computerization of records and public reports. The problem now is
to fund these improvements. The Board of Elections has already hired one highly qualified
person to design a computer system, and has invested in costly and sophisticated equipment.
Appropriations for the current fiscal year have not allocated nearly sufficient resources for the
Board to hire the minimum staff necessary to achieve these goals. But without such funds,
expressions of support, and statutory instructions to computerize disclosure information, are
completely meaningless.

55 The reports should be made annually, but a special three-month post-election report should be required
following each election. The reports should contain, for each candidate, a listing of each contribution, sorted
alphabetically by name of contributor; they should also present figures for total contributions received and
expenditures made, as well as analyses of the patterns of contributions, in terms of size of contributions from
various contributors, industry breakdowns and the like. Reports should cover incumbents and challengers, and
permit comparison of the information.
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E. Restrictions on the Use of Official Staff for Fund-raising. Commission
investigations indicate an urgent need to limit the use of official staff for political fund-raising,
even during leaves of absence, vacation days, or their off-duty hours.
The Commission strongly recommends a provision, comparable to one included in its
Proposed Draft Municipal Ethics Act, 56 that would prohibit a public officer or employee, or his
or her campaign committee, from soliciting contributions or participation in election campaigns 57
from non-elected public officers and employees or persons doing business with the state
government. If this recommendation is not adopted, state employees should simply not
participate at all in soliciting campaign contributions.
When government decision-makers act as fund-raisers, citizens--especially contributors-inevitably link big gifts to favorable official action. Moreover, it is virtually impossible under
such circumstances to eliminate a fear on the part of those solicited that a refusal might some
day work against their business interests. This subtle coercion is inescapable under the present
rules. People come to believe that government is for sale. The present occupants of elected
office may possess the ability to eliminate gratitude and any sense of obligation from their
decision-making when presented with matters involving contributors. But the inherent forces
which drive the world of fund-raising make at least occasional lapses virtually inevitable.
Contributors cannot be expected to sort out the various roles adopted by state
employees who revolve in and out of fund -raising and government positions. The history of
questionable fund-raising practices is too long, and has engendered too much cynicism, for
contributors or the general public to accept at face value the spoke n disclaimers that
contributions and government decisions are never linked at all. If present practices persist-allowing and even encouraging public employees to shift between official and fund-raising roles
several times during the tenure of an incumbent--the public will remain disillusioned about the
electoral system.
The best way to address this problem is to ban contributions from those who do business
with the government and to implement this ban by prohibiting solicitations of them by candidates or their committees or representatives, including public employees. If such a ban is not
adopted, at a bare minimum, public employees should be excluded completely from the fund-

56 See, Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need For A New Approach, Commission on Government
Integrity, December 26, 1988.
57 A limited exception should allow elected officers to solicit participation in election campaigns from their
appointees who are exempt or unclassified under the Civil Service Law and are directly subordinate to them.
There should also be language designed to assure that these prohibitions will not apply to general solicitations
which do not target public officers and employees, or people doing business with the government.
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raising process. Intimate knowledge of the workings of government, or of the candidate's office,
cannot be necessary for effective fund-raising, at least as long as there is no connection between
the business of the office and the contributions being solicited. To the extent that familiarity
with the candidate's positions and decisions is necessary for fund-raising, the campaign
committee may educate itself without being injected into the government process. And as a
practical matter, campaign committees spending in excess of $500,000 on a single race can well
afford to hire the professional fund-raising staff equal to the task.

Conclusion
In the end it is not decisive whether the maxim "those who give will get" is fact or
fiction. Appearances matter. Widespread cynicism destroys the basic faith in public institutions
and officials that is vital to our electoral system. Much of the general public believes--often
with good cause--that the system is biased in favor of wealthy special interests. The appearance
of impropriety itself has a pernicious effect on the level of confidence in the integrity of the
electoral and decision-making processes of government.
The State of New York is at a crossroads. For many years, some officeholders have
pressed for reform of the campaign fund-raising process. For many years, despite their efforts,
the status quo has been maintained, while the excesses of candidates and contributors have
become ever more extreme and public cynicism more pronounced. One problem is that until
now no one could credibly cry for reform without pointing accusing fingers at colleagues, rivals,
valued contributors and supporters. The consensus necessary to achieve reform depended too
much on concessions of wrongdoing, or at least wrong motives. Another problem was that the
current system worked too well for incumbents. Yet another problem was that proposed
reforms threatened to be used to the political advantage of one party or another.
By now, everyone should appreciate that the present system harms us all, and that
reforms are possible which will enhance everyone's ability to compete effectively in the
campaign arena. There can be no further debate about the need to limit campaign
contributions, provide for effective disclosure, and remove public employees from the fundraising process (at least in so far as contributions are sought from those doing business with the
offices in which they are employed). Effective disclosure only hurts those with something to
hide. Sane contribution limits only restrict special interests with private agendas.
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Our leaders must not hesitate to clean up campaign finance in New York State. It is
not this Commission's function to act as prosecutor, jury or judge of the conduct of any
individual. Instead, an examination of the entire system has shown it to be gravely wanting, and
the Commission strongly urges its reform.
Dated: New York, New York
June, 1989

STATE OF NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY

John D. Feerick
Chairman
Richard D. Emery
Patricia M. Hynes
James L. Magavem
Bernard S. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyms R. Vance
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Part 2

Individual Officeholders'
Fund-Raising Practices

Note

Commissioner Vance did not participate in the investigation and deliberations concerning
Part 2 of this report which deals with the campaign finance practices of individual officeholders.
Commissioner Magavern did not participate in the investigation and deliberations
concerning the portion of Part 2 of this report which deals with the campaign finance practices
of Comptroller Edward V. Regan.

I.
Fund-Raising Practices of
Governor Mario M. Cuomo

Introduction

The Governor's fund-raising effort is distinguishable from that of the other state-wide
candidates in that money more readily gravitates to him. Indeed, since he first received the
nomination for Governor, contributions have come so easily and in such large amounts that in
1986 and 1987 he decided that it was unnecessary to hold a fund-raising event. The Governor's
fund-raising organization is similar to those of other officeholders: his campaign committee,
Friends of Mario Cuomo ("FOMC"), is run on a day-to-day basis by few full-time employees,
and the fund-raising itself is centered around large, well-attended dinners organized by volunteer
members of a Dinner Committee.
The Governor, like the Comptroller and Attorney General, has frequently expressed his
support for campaign finance reform. He has repeatedly proposed such legislation, and has
communicated his commitment to reform in his appearances before this Commission. Most
recently, in his testimony on March 10, 1989, he pledged to sign any campaign finance reform
bill that was placed before him for signature, even one containing provisions with which he
might disagree.58 In addition, in connection with his 1988 fund-raising event, he chose to abide
by the restrictions contained in the Assembly's proposed campaign finance bill, although he said
that unless a comprehensive campaign finance reform law is passed he may not abide by these
voluntary restrictions in the future.59

58 One such provision might, for example, be a ban on contributions from lobbyists or those having
business dealings with government. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65.
59 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 51-53.
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I. The Governor as Fund-Raiser:
The Effect of Attaining High Office
Both the Governor and those who have worked with FOMC have stated that the task of
raising money has become vastly easier since the Governor assumed office. Before his primary
victory in 1982, raising money was, as he put it, "a seven-day, nearly twenty-four hour a day
effort" and "a great deal of trouble." 60 A FOMC fund-raising event in 1981 raised the
comparatively small sum of approximately $250,000. By contrast, since the Governor's primary
victory in 1982, his fund-raising has been primarily accomplished through hugely successful
dinners which have raised an average of approximately 2.0 million dollars per event.
According to both the Governor and his campaign finance chairman for the 1982 race,
William Stern, the change was immediate and dramatic after his primary victory. In the
Governor's words, Stern "didn't have room enough in his office to accommodate all the people
who came rushing in to make contributions to us." 61 Stern described how, while he had been
able to raise only about $1.2 million for then Lieutenant Governor Cuomo in the entire year
and a half preceding his victory in the 1982 gubernatorial primary, during the short four weeks
between the primary and the general election he raised some $3.5 million, largely from "people
trying to ingratiate themselves with somebody who was to be Governor."62
The gala events staged in 1983, 1984 and 1985 were each marked by greater receipts:
approximately $1.2 million in 1983; $2.4 million in 1984; and $3.5 million in 1985. Only in 1988
(when, at the Governor's direction, FOMC imposed voluntary contribution limits at the levels
prescribed in the Campaign Finance Reform bill passed that year by the New York State
Assembly63) did the total dip--to $1.15 million. Stern also testified that the rush of contributors
to Mario Cuomo's campaign after the primary in 1982 was led by those selling things to the
government and those regulated by government. 64 This has continued to be true. During an
interview with Commission staff, John Marino, the current Executive Director of the State
Democratic Committee and the organizer of the 1988 event, estimated that for the 1988 event,

60 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8.
61 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8.
62 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132.
63 A virtually identical bill, 189A, has again this year been passed by the Assembly. It imposes, among
other things, a limit of $4,000 on individual contributions for the primary and general election and an aggregate
limit of $5,000 on contributions from corporations and their subsidiaries.
64 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132-33.
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between thirty and fifty percent of contributors to FOMC were people or businesses having
dealings with the state.
The magnitude of such contributions is striking, and surely is one cause of the public's
troubling lack of confidence in the manner in which candidates for public office raise funds.
This Commission has been assessing whether this flow of funds from those doing business with
the State to those in the highest state offices occurs of its own accord, or if it is encouraged by
the candidates and those who raise money on their behalf. In the case of Governor Cuomo, it
is a mixture of both.

II. The Organization of Cuomo's Fund-Raising Effort
Governor Cuomo's political fund-raising is accomplished through his campaign
committee, to which he delegates responsibility for raising money for his campaigns. While the
Governor may not play as active a role as the other statewide elected officals, documents
obtained from FOMC and referred to during the Governor's testimony reflect the Governor's
approval of and input into fund-raising strategies, including the creation of a Board of Advisors,
the selection of Dinner Committee members, establishing fund-raising goals for their members,
and the drafting of solicitation form Ietters.65
FOMC has been sparsely staffed between election campaigns and fundraisers. During
campaigns the FOMC staff swells with state employees on leave from their official positions.
During the periods immediately preceding fund-raising events, volunteers and short-term
employees are added to the staff to meet the temporary need for personnel.
Following Governor Cuomo's election to office, FOMC's fund-raising efforts were
organized initially on a volunteer basis by Lucille Falcone, who was Counsel to FOMC from
1983 until 1988. Falcone assembled dinner committees for each fund-raising event, the
members of which were each asked to commit to selling ten tickets to the event. Tickets were
priced at $1,000.66 In addition, invitations were sent to individuals on the committee's
solicitation lists. Falcone would keep track of and encourage the efforts of the dinner

65 See Appendix Three, Exhibits 4 and 5.

66 In some years, a small number of "ringside" tickets sold for $2,500 each.
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committee members. Volunteers and temporary staff employees would make follow-up inquiries
to others.
In 1985, Richard Gordon was hired as a full-time Executive Director of FOMC. In that
position he assumed the organizational responsibilities Falcone had borne in 1983 and 1984. He
also took responsibility for the filing of the requisite financial disclosure statements with the
Board of Elections. Between 1985 and 1988, FOMC had only one other full-time, salaried
employee, who handled computer-related tasks. In 1988, Gordon resigned his full-time position
with FOMC and the fund-raising dinner staged in November of 1988 was organized by the
Executive Director of the State Democratic Committee, John Marino. Volunteers and part-time
employees assisted in the effort. A Dinner Committee was again assembled and its members
were each asked to attempt to sell ten tickets.
By his own account, the Governor has limited his personal involvement in the fundraising activities of FOMC because he dislikes both the appearance created by contributors
showering incumbent or potential public officials with money and the cynicism that such
contributions create. He testified that he has done everything he could to discourage the reality
and even the impression of conflict, and has avoided as much as possible even knowing who
contributes to his campaign. 67 His campaign committee, however, has approached its fundraising in a manner that, in certain respects, capitalized on the inclination of specific groups and
industries to contribute to the Governor, and played upon the illusion, which FOMC helped to
create, that the Governor was in fact aware of the contributions and efforts made and
undertaken on his behalf.
Despite the fact that contributors are most willing to shower a popular incumbent
Governor with large sums, FOMC operates in typical political fund-raising fashion. It aggressively pursues those most willing and able to contribute in large amounts, and targets groups of
people of means, as well as individuals and businesses identifiable by virtue of their dealings
with the State. The solicitation lists maintained and used by FOMC, the configuration of
Dinner Committees it has organized, and the affiliations of contributors to FOMC all reflect this
approach.

A.

The Solicitation Lists

In his testimony before the Commission, Stern identified the enormous givers to political
campaigns as "the usual suspects" - Wall Street, real estate developers and public employees'

67 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8·9.
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umons. Stem noted that these were groups which, in one way or the other, depended upon
"state capitalism" and therefore had an incentive to ingratiate themselves with government
officials. 68
FOMC developed and maintains solicitation lists, some of which target such industries.
Included in FOMC's records is an index of computerized solicitation lists identified by FOMC as
follows: Banking, Engineers, Insurance, Labor Leaders, Finance, Architects, Attorneys and
Brokerage Houses, among others.69
The contribution pattern with respect to individuals and companies on one of these lists,
labeled "Engineers," is revealing. A Commission comparison of that list with the list of
contributors to FOMC during the period between 1982 and 1987 revealed that 64 of the 68
engineering firms or individuals on the list made contributions to FOMC during that period.
Additionally, all but 11 of the 64 contributing engineering firms or individuals had, between
1984 and 1987, secured consulting contracts with either the New York State Thruway Authority
or the New York State Department of Transportation ("DOT").70
There is no evidence to suggest that FOMC fundraisers ever stated or implied that these
firms' business fortunes in New York State would be affected by their contributions. There is,
however, significant evidence suggesting that the firms were motivated to contribute by business
considerations. Commission staff interviewed over half of the contributing firms; these
interviews reflect that while no solicitors ever suggested a link between state business and
contributions, virtually all of the engineers thought it unwise "to take a chance and not contribute."71 The impact of this perception is reflected in the fact that over 90% of the
engineering firms doing business with the Thruway Authority and the DOT during the years
1984-87 contributed to either FOMC or the State Democratic Committee between 1982 and
1987. 72
One more illustration of the Committee's fund-raising approach is provided by another
list obtained and used for solicitation purposes by FOMC, the official (publicly available) list of

68 Tr. Mar.

15, 1988, at 133.

69 Hrg. Exh. 74, Mar. 10, 1989.
70 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 6. Under New York State Law, such contracts are neither publicly
advertised nor competitively bid.
71 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 24.
72 Commission analysis; Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 22.
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lobbyists registered with the New York State Temporary Commission on Lobbying. 73 It was
evidently secured by FOMC for the specific purpose of targeting firms and individuals whose
business it is to attempt to influence the processes of government to the benefit of their clients.
The actual copy of the list used by FOMC is replete with notations indicating FOMC's
methodical telephone solicitation of those registered lobbyists. While the Governor himself,
when he was Secretary of State in 1975, proposed legislation that would have prohibited
lobbyists from providing state office holders with gifts and dinner invitations,74 his campaign
committee has systematically solicited contributions from lobbyists.75 When questioned on this
point, the Governor responded that he saw no problem with FOMC practices as long as he was
unaware of contributions from the lobbyists.76 However, as with other issues raised during the
public hearing, the Governor stated that he would support a prohibition on contributions from
lobbyists if legislation to that effect were presented to him.77
It may very well be that lobbyists' contributions made on behalf of a particular client or
industry give them no influence over the operations of government, especially if the public
official is ignorant of their contributions. However, the perception persists among lobbyists that

73 This list was among the documents and materials made available to the Commission by FOMC upon the
Commission's request for all records relating to fund -raising activities.

74 The following is an excerpt from Robert S. McElvaine, Mario Cuomo: A Biography (New York : Charles
Scribner's Sons, McMillan Publishing Co., 1988) at 214:
The new secretary of state quickly moved on to a crusade against abuses by
lobbyists trying to influence state legislators. He said that the laws regulating
the conduct of lobbyists were inadeqate, but that he intended to start
enforcing those laws while he sought the enactment of stronger provisions.
The lobbying law then on the books, Cuomo noted, had been applied only
once in the sixty-nine years since its enactment. Cuomo proposed legislation
that would strictly prohibit lobbyists from giving any sort of gifts to legislators.
He would not permit lobbyists to buy lunch or drinks for legislators, or even to
give out such items as calendars and memo pads as Christmas presents.
"Why should any gift or payment be permissible?" Cuomo asked a stunned
Assembly Committee of Ethics. "Is it essential to our system that a lobbyist
have a cocktail party for legislators or others whom they seek to influence?
Will their opportunity to make an intelligent presentation be minimized if they
cannot take a legislator or agency head out to dinner? Are these things done
for any purpose other than to seek by the subtle workings of 'good will' or a
friendly predisposition to help produce a statute or rule or decision that will
affect large numbers of people, some of them no doubt adversely?"

75 Lucille Falcone estimated that Howard Rubinstein, a registered lobbyist, raised from his clients, associates
and contacts approximately $200,000 per dinner for the FOMC. Rubinstein also made contributions to FOMC in
his own name.
76 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67.
77 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67.
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by contributing, they may curry favor and good will--or at the very least will avoid the perceived
risk associated with not giving. This perception is fostered when, as is often the case, the same
public employees have a role in both fund-raising and government decision making.78
Particularly in that case, a public official who is ignorant of the lobbyists' contributions may be
unable to assess completely what factors may have influenced the staffs recommendations-including, perhaps, the campaign contributions of lobbyists and interest groups.

In his remarks to the Commission in September of 1987, Governor Cuomo himself
touched upon this phenomenon when he stated that while his campaign committee puts no
pressure on anyone to contribute, there is a feeling in the business community that says "You're
supposed to give money to the incumbent, it's expected of you." 79 Hence, while there is no
evidence that his committee puts pressure on business people to contribute out of fear of
adverse business effects or in anticipation of business benefits, current fund-raising practices give
rise to such expectations even in the absence of explicit pressure.

B.

The Composition of the Dinner Committee/
Industry Breakdowns of Contributors

The FOMC practice of targeting and actively pursuing contributions from the business
community is further reflected in the composition of the FOMC Dinner Committees during the
years 1983-1988. The Committees, assembled for the purposes of purchasing and/or selling
tables, consist of approximately one hundred members and include numerous representatives
from the industries Stem termed the "usual suspects." For example, the Dinner Committee in
1988 included leaders from the following firms and businesses:
Bear Steams
Brown and Wood
Citibank
Communication Workers of America
Debevoise and Plimpton
Dillon Reed and Company
Drexel Burnham Lambert
First Boston Corporation
Fleishman Management Company
Goldman Sachs and Company
Hawkins, Delafield & Wood

78 See discussion in Section II (C) below.
79 Sept. 9, 1987 public hearing of the Commission.
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Lazard Freres and Company
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae
Manuel Elken Co.
Merrill Lynch and Company
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Morgan Stanley and Company
Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander and Ferdon
Paine Webber
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison
Peat Marwick Mitchell and Company
Smith Barney Harris Upham and Co., Inc.
The International Longshoreman's Association
The Mack Company
The Mendik Company
The Savings Banks Association of New York State

The percentage of money raised through contributions from industries represented on
the Committee reflects the kind of financial support that such representatives have been able to
garner from their colleagues and business associates80:

Financial Community:
Legal Community:
Real Estate Business:
Employee Organizations:

10%

7%
8%
8%

(approximately
(approximately
(approximately
(approximately

$937,000)
$656,000)
$750,000)
$750,000)

As the comments of the representatives of the engineering firms confirmed in
Commission staff interviews, such businesses and individuals often perceive a risk in not contributing which they are unwilling to take. The Governor himself acknowledged that they might,
in fact, prefer not to contribute when he told the Commission in 1987 that "a lot of the
business community would feel relieved and saved by a campaign finance law that made it
impossible for them to contribute." 81 Nevertheless, FOMC capitalizes on the current inclination
of such business people. 82 By seeking their memberships on dinner committees and then
fueling their competitive instincts by fostering the impression that their efforts are known by the
Governor, FOMC has been able to raise enormous amounts of money.

80 Figures reflect percentages of the $9.37 million raised by FOMC between 1982 and 1989.
81 Governor's remarks to the Commission on September 9, 1987.
82 This is consistent with the Governor's position that, until fundamental reforms applicable to all candidates
are enacted, he should not handicap his own fund-raising efforts. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 52-53.
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During questioning by the Commission staff, Lucille Falcone acknowledged that it was a
desire to please the Governor which caused Dinner Committee members to be aggressive in
raising money for FOMC. She added that while the Governor was, in reality, unaware of both
the efforts of such people on his behalf and of the amounts contributed by individuals or
businesses, neither Dinner Committee members nor contributors were advised that the Governor
deliberately chooses to remain ignorant of the fund-raising process and its specifics. In fact,
Falcone stated that it would be "counter-productive" to let fundraisers and contributors know
that the Governor would never be informed of their efforts. If FOMC so informed them,
Falcone reasoned, "you'll never get any money."
Among contributors solicited by them, Dinner Committee members in turn also fostered
the illusion that the Governor would be aware of their contributions to FOMC. Lobbyist
Howard Rubenstein suggested as much in solicitation letters wherein he told his clients that
"the Governor will be pleased by your support."
Thus, even though unsolicited contributions poured into the Cuomo campaign after the
1982 primary victory, FOMC still stimulated contributors by cultivating the belief that the
Governor is himself personally gratified by the fund-raising efforts of "bundlers" and
contributors alike. This necessarily has the effect of undermining the Governor's personal
attempts to purge his own fund-raising process of misplaced notions that influence might be
gained through contributions.83

C.

Staff Participation in the Fund-raising Effort

The relationship between the Governor's official staff and his campaign and fund-raising
staff may also contribute to the belief that contributions and state business are in some way
linked.
Governor Cuomo has established a policy which prohibits his executive staff from either
soliciting contributions on his behalf or making contributions themselves to his campaign
committee. In addition, he has had memoranda circulated to all commissioners and agency
heads in state government each year explaining that a clear separation must be maintained by
state employees between political activities and the discharge of their official duties. The

83 Perhaps adding to these misimpressions is the fact that members of the business community attend
"businessmen's barbecues" hosted by the Governor at the Governor's Mansion. Although these barbecues are
official rather than political events, the names of the attendees are added to the FOMC solicitation list and the
attendees are thereafter solicited for contributions to the Governor's political campaign.
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memos also explain, however, that state employees are not otherwise discouraged from
participating in the political process.
Consistent with this policy, executive office personnel in the Cuomo administration do
not play a role in fund-raising while on state time. However, the Governor does not restrict
movement between his executive staff and his campaign staff by people who wish to work on his
campaign full-time. Some seven members of the executive staff took leaves of absence from
their state positions to work on the 1986 campaign. Following the election, all returned to state
government.
The movement of executive office personnel between the Governor's executive and
campaign staffs erodes the wall of separation between political and official matters which the
Governor has endorsed. His personal distance from the affairs of his campaign committee may
not be perceptible to potential contributors to the Governor's campaign when they are asked
for money by once and future executive staff members. John Marino, the Executive Director of
the State Democratic Committee, expressed the view to the Commission staff that the "better
practice" is to keep separate the executive and campaign staffs. The Governor disagreed with
Marino's assessment.84
The fact that the Cuomo campaign asked state workers to volunteer their time to work
on campaign matters has further blurred this division. While the Governor testified that he
prohibited his staff from contributing to his campaign because he feared that employees might
feel pressure to duplicate the contributions of their colleagues, he perceives no basis for
prohibiting state workers from volunteering their time for campaign work.85 Yet, a Commission
inquiry into such volunteering revealed precisely the same problems about which the Governor
expressed wariness in the area of contributions: some state employees stated that they felt
pressure to volunteer in the effort. Certainly the solicitation of employees to work on the
campaign by high level executive staff members on leave from their state positions does not
help to alleviate that feeling.

84 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 71-72.
85 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 74-76.
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D.

The Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority

The pressure which these state employees felt, however, is minimal when compared to
the pressure felt by employees of the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority ("NFTA")
when they were solicited for contributions to FOMC in 1985. The Temporary State
Commission of Investigation ("SIC") hearings held in 1987 disclosed that NFTA employees were
solicited by colleagues who, in their solicitations, referred to the fact that Raymond Gallagher,
the Chairman of the NFTA, was seeking their support for the Governor's campaign.B6 One
such employee testified recently at a hearing of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection BoardB 7 that
he had every reason to believe that his job was at stake when he was asked by the NFTA
purchasing manager to buy a $1,000 ticket to a 1985 fund-raising event for Governor Cuomo.BB
The perceived link between contributions and jobs may well have resulted in part from
actions of the Governor's Executive Office staff. In 1984, the Governor's Appointments Office
helped form what came to be known in Erie County as the "patronage committee." That
committee screened and helped select candidates for positions at the NFTA and elsewhere in
state government. Its members were chosen both by the Governor's Appointments Office and
the chairman of the committee, a Jong-time political supporter of the Governor. Virtually all
of the members of the committee were political supporters of the Governor and eight of the
twelve also served on a committee organized in Buffalo to aid in the staging of a Cuomo
fundraiser there in 1985.B9 Gallagher was a member of both committees, and it was in his role
as a member of the organizing committee that he encouraged the use of his name in the
solicitation of contributions from NFTA employees.
It is not surprising that where those with apparent authority to recommend who shall be
employed or promoted by an agency are also dispatched to raise money for the incumbent,
those solicited may feel compelled to contribute in order to obtain, protect or advance in their
jobs. The imperfections in the wall of separation between government and politics are nowhere
more evident than in this situation.

86 S.l.C. Hearing, Buffalo, N.Y. , July 1987, Tr. at 177.
87 The Federal Hatch Act prohibits such solicitations and NFTA employees fall under its purview because of
the partial federal funding which the NFTA receives. Under current New York state law, only solicitations on
public property are prohibited.
88 Testimony before Administrative Law Judge Edward J. Reidy, United States of America Merit Systems
Protection Board, March 2, 1989 in an action brought by the Special Counsel against Raymond F. Gallagher, Q!
~ · and the NFTA.
89 Among the "patronage committee" members, only Gallagher has been described as a later supporter of
the Governor. He supported Mayor Koch in the 1982 gubernatorial primary. He is, coincidentally, the Chairman
of NFTA to which the •patronage committee" made the lion's share of its recommendations.
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While the Governor testified before the Commission that he does not approve of,
encourage or allow9° such practices, it is clear that his personal efforts to prevent them have
not always been enough. Further, while distancing himself personally from the process may
absolve him of any direct culpability, it does not remove the appearance of all impropriety in
the fund-raising done by others on his behalf.

90 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 82.
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II.
Fund-Raising Practices Of
Attorney General Robert Abrams

Introduction

Robert Abrams' political fund-raising stresses direct contact with prospective contributors.
His fund-raising reflects the careful grooming of personal relationships with wealthy prospective
givers, an intimate involvement with the details of his own fund-raising operation and a constant
preoccupation with the need to raise money, even in non-election years.
The Attorney General's fund-raising effort for the 1986 election had three principal
components: the "one-on-one" program, the "give or get" program, and a large fund-raising
dinner. Each component raises appearances of conflicts of interest, many of which are similar
to those we have noted in our analysis of the other statewide elected officials. They are
inherent in a campaign fund-raising system that pushes candidates to rely on large contributions
from those who have an interest in the decisions of the office.
Like the Comptroller and the Governor, the Attorney General is an advocate of
campaign finance reform; he also has adopted several voluntary limits on his own fund-raising.
Notwithstanding his sensitivity to the issues discussed in this report, voluntary limits are not an
adequate solution to the vexing problems of New York's campaign finance system. A
meaningful solution can only be found in new laws that apply equally to all candidates.

I. The Attorney General's Personal Approach
to Fund-Raising
The "one-on-one" and "give or get" programs were the source of most of the Attorney
General's funds for his 1986 campaign. Both programs involved the Attorney General's direct
personal solicitation of financial support from wealthy potential contributors.
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This type of fund-raising guarantees that the officeholder is intimately aware of who is
contributing to his campaign; it also ensures that the contributor knows without doubt that the
public official is aware of his or her support. Coercion--however unintentional--is an inherent
danger in such an approach, especially when the potential giver has an economic interest in the
official decisions of the Attorney General's office.

A.

The One-on-One Program

Beginning in late 1984, the Attorney General scheduled a series of breakfast and
luncheon meetings with each of approximately 100 prospective contributors.91 The object of
the meetings, which were attended by the Attorney General, the prospective contributor, and
either Lawrence Buttenwieser (chairman of Abrams' campaign finance committee) or Leonard
Boxer (another member of the finance committee), was to secure a pledge of $15,000 if the
Attorney General chose to run for re-election, and $50,000 if he decided to run for Governor. 92
The finance committee kept close track of incoming pledges. 93 The Attorney General,
his long-time political advisor Ethan Geto, Buttenwieser, Boxer and John Burke, the Attorney
General's executive assistant, met periodically throughout 1985 and 1986 to review spreadsheets
prepared by Geto's political consulting firm which tallied incoming pledges and contributions and
noted any outstanding "balance due."94 The finance committee--including the Attorney
General--reviewed name by name the lists of those who had not redeemed their pledges, and
debated how best to follow up.

91 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 33.
92 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 42-44. At the Commission's hearing on March 15, 1988, the Attorney General's
finance committee chairman Lawrence Buttenwieser testified that the $15,000 figure was selected because "we felt
it was the right place to draw the line between the problem of the appearance of large influence and the problem
of raising enough money to pay for his campaign." Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 257-58; see also Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at
45-46.
Documents produced to the Commission by the campaign committee, however, reveal that, in connection
with the 1986 election, the campaign committee received in excess of $15,000 from a number of supporters,
including McAndrews & Forbes' chairman and chief executive officer, Ronald Perelman; John Kluge, chairman
and president of Metromedia; and Donald Trump. Hrg Exh. 14, Mar. 10, 1989.

93 Tr. Mar. 1O, 1989, at 46.
94 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 47-50; Hrg. Exh. 13 and 14, Mar. 10, 1989. In 1986, this core group was joined by
Laura Ross, a fund-raising consultant hired by the campaign committee to oversee and coordinate the "give or
get" program and the fund-raising dinner.
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Election Day found the Attorney General re-elected, his campaign in debt and more
than $140,000 in pledges outstanding. Geto, Buttenwieser, Boxer and the Attorney General
split up among themselves the responsibility for collecting these pledges. The Attorney General
was assigned, in several instances, to make one last effort to collect pledges which the campaign
committee had otherwise all but written off.9 5 The finance committee also considered going
back to loyal supporters, like Donald Trump, 96 to solicit additional funds. 97

B.

The "Give or Get" Program

The "give or get" program also involved direct solicitation by the Attorney General.
Over 80 individuals were approached and asked either to contribute between $5,000 and $10,000
or to raise that amount from their friends, acquaintances or business colleagues.98
Individuals in the "give or get" program were encouraged to host whatever type of
fundraiser they felt they could handle. In most instances, the initial contact with the prospective
host was made by the Attorney General himself. Functions ranged from a small buffet
luncheon at the host's home to cocktails and dinner at Tavern on the Green. Individual events
raised anywhere from $1,200 to over $25,000, for a total of approximately $400,000.

95 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 54; Hrg. Exh. 17, Mar. 10, 1989. At the Commission's hearing on March 10, 1989,
the Attorney General testified that he did not in fact make these assigned follow-up calls (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 5657) .
In any event, the committee's post-election solicitation efforts met with mixed success. George Klein, who
had pledged $15,000, made good in full on that pledge six months after the election.
Lewis Rudin, on the other hand, who pledged $5,000 at a one-on-one breakfast in September 1986, was
pursued with less success. Four months after the election, Buttenwieser wrote to Rudin to advise him that he
was free to contribute to the Attorney General since his "plan for 65 Central Park West has been accepted for
filing ." See Appendix Three, Exhibit 7 (letter from Lawrence Buttenwieser to Lewis Rudin, March 4, 1987).
As of September 1, 1987, Rudin's $5,000 pledge had been all but written off as uncollectible, although
the initials "RA" still appeared next to his name in the column captioned "person responsible for collection" on
the attachment to the Citizens for Abrams' September 1, 1987 balance sheet. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 8;
see also Appendix Three, Exhibit 9 (letter from Ethan Geto to Lawrence B. Buttenwieser, dated June 4, 1987,
advising Buttenwieser that Abrams "was going to follow-up personally" with Rudin) .

96 By December 1986, Trump had already contributed $20,000 to the Attorney General's 1986 campaign,
$5,000 more than the basic one-on-one pledge of $15,000 (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 59; Hrg. Exh. 14, Mar. 10, 1989) .
97 Tr. Mar. 1O, 1989, at 59.
98 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 93-95.
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II. Solicitation of Contributions
from Those with an Economic Interest
in the Decisions of the Attorney General's Office

A.

Solicitation and Acceptance of Campaign Contributions
from Sponsors of Condominimum and Cooperative
Apartment Conversion Plans

Decisions made by the Attorney General's office have a broad impact on various
members of the business community, particularly real estate developers and their lawyers. The
office oversees public offerings of real estate securities, including condominium and cooperative
apartments. It reviews each offering plan for compliance with detailed disclosure requirements,
and is vested with substantial investigative and prosecutorial powers.

In connection with the 1986 election, Citizens for Abrams voluntarily adopted a policy
banning certain contributions from the sponsors of co-op and condominium plans. A preprinted slip was sent out with each thank-you note,99 advising the contributor that:

The Citizens for Abrams committee has adopted a policy that it will
not accept any contributions from individuals who are sponsors of
co-op or condominium plans pending in the New York State
Department of Law ... If [this} polic[yj may affect your
contribution, please contact the committee at (212) 692-9440.
The Commission's investigation reveals that this voluntary policy is flawed in crucial
respects. First, the definition of when a plan is "pending" is too narrow. As the Attorney
General explained at the March 1989 hearing, a plan is considered "pending" for purposes of
his ban only during the period of review of the proposed offering statement known as the "red
herring." 100
There are no restrictions on the solicitation or acceptance of contributions after the red
herring has been accepted for filing, even though the Law Department continues to play a

99 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65-66, Hrg. Exh. 18, Mar. 10, 1989.
100 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65-67.

45

pivotal role in the conversion process once the red herring has been accepted for filing and the
offering statement or "black book" is distributed to tenants and prospective buyers. 101

Thus, for instance, when Donald Trump contributed
April

$7500 to the Attorney General on

10, 1986, five plans worth over $60 million in which Trump had an interest were still in

the black book stage and had not yet become effective.102
developer Lewis Rudin on March

When Buttenwieser advised

4, 1987 that he was "not hindered by the constraints of the
65 Central Park

Campaign from making a contribution to the C ampaign" since his plan for

West had been accepted for filing, 103 that plan was still in the black book phase and would not
become effective until July

1987.

Second, to pol ice its ban, the campaign committee relies on the contributor--the very
person who may be seeking to ingratiate himself with the officeholder--to come forward and
demand the return of his contribution.10 4

101 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67-76. The Commission can see no principled distinction between the red herring
and the black book phase of the Law Department's responsibilities. For instance, a closing cannot take place on
any units the sponsor sells until the Law Department reviews and accepts the effectiveness amendment, which
must be filed within 15 months of the issuance of the black book and which must state that the sponsor has sold
the requisite number of units to bona fide purchasers who intend to reside in the building. N.Y. General Bus. Law
section 352-eeee(2)(a) , 2(c)(i) and 2 (d)(i) . The Law Department is empowered to reject a plan at the black book
stage if, upon investigation, the Law Department determines that the sponsor has failed to comply with the
various statutory requirements involving the sale of units to bona fide purchasers. (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 74-75) .
A plan may also be rejected at the black book stage if the Law Department finds that the black book
contains material misrepresentations, i. e., if the condition of the building has been falsely portrayed, or if the
maintenance figure has been underestimated. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989 at 75. Complaints by tenants of harassment by
the sponsor may be grounds for seeking a stay of the sale of units which, in turn, may cause the sponsor to
miss the statutory 15-month time frame for filing the effectiveness amendment. N.Y. General Bus. Law section
352-eeee(4) .
102 Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989.
103 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 7 (letter from Lawrence Buttenwieser to Lewis Rudin dated March 4, 1987)
and footnote 95 above.
104 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 88. The Attorney General testifed that:
"the whole point of this process is to separate the fundraising and the
campaign from the Department of Law . . .. I don't want somebody in my
fundraising operation in the campaign headquarters to put in a call to
somebody in the real estate finance bureau about a contribution. That would
require contact, liaison, information. That is totally antithetical to the way we
have conducted ourselves and set up this program." (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8687) .

46

The inadequacy of this enforcement mechanism was illustrated at the Commission's
hearing in March 1989. On March 13, 1985, Donald Trump fulfilled the first installment of a
$15,000 pledge to the Attorney General: Shorehaven Apartments 1, 2 and 3--entities owned by
Donald Trump 105__ each contributed $2,500 to Abrams.106 On that same day, red herrings for
two co-op conversions plans in which Trump had an interest were pending in the Department
of Law. According to Abrams' rules, the contributor should have alerted the campaign
committee and requested a refund. Trump did not ask for his money back; the contributions
were not returned.107
Third, the Attorney General's voluntary ban does not address the problem of
contributions received shortly before an offering plan is filed with the Attorney General's
office. 108 From the standpoint of the sponsor, a plan may be in gestation for months and even
years before it is actually filed with the Law Department; the engineering report, which the
sponsor must file with the red herring, may alone take three or four months to prepare, to say
nothing of any repairs or renovations the sponsor may wish to make before offering units for
sale. Yet the Attorney General makes no provision for the return of a contribution when it is
followed in short order by the filing of a plan.
Finally, and most important, the Attorney General's voluntary rule does not prohibit the
candidate from meeting with and personally soliciting contributions from sponsors of plans with
pending red herrings. The campaign committee does not screen out from its one-on-one
program potential contributors with pending plans.
When, according to his calendar, the Attorney General was scheduled for breakfast with
Donald Trump on January 25, 1985, Trump had at least three plans in the red herring stage
pending in the Law Department. When Trump pledged $15,000 to the Attorney General on
February 22, 1985, he had four plans pending in the red herring stage. 109 Developer Arthur

105 Tr. Mar. 14, 1988, at 255-56.
106 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 84-85; Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989.
107 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 85, 88.
108 Thus, for instance, records of the Law Department reveal that Bernard Mendik, who contributed $15,000
to the Attorney General on January 16, 1985, had an interest in plans worth hundreds of millions of dollars that
were filed with the Law Department from April 1985 through August 1985. That contribution fell outside the
strictures of the Attorney General's voluntary policy; it was therefore not refunded.
109 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 79-82; Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989.
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Cohen had an interest in plans worth, collectively, over $150 million when the Attorney General
met with him on October 9, 1986 at the Harmonie Club and asked for his $15,000 pledge. 110
Inherent in a policy which permits solicitation of campaign contributions--but not the
acceptance of campaign contributions--while a plan is pending is the danger that the inference
will be created, however unintentionally, that payment will be expected for favorable action by
the officeholder. Soliciting campaign contributions while a plan is pending invites cynicism and,
in the Commission's view, is implicitly coercive.

B.

Solicitation and Acceptance of Campaign Contributions
from Attorneys with Matters Pending in the Law
Department

1.

Contributions From Sponsors' Attorneys

In the 1986 campaign, the Attorney General's voluntary ban did not apply to the
acceptance of campaign contributions from law firms whos.e attorneys represented sponsors of
condo and co-op plans pending in the Law Department, despite the fact that the sponsor's
attorney has more direct dealings with the Law Department than the sponsor itself.
For instance, Morton Certilman, one of the state's foremost sponsors' attorneys, was
invited to a one-on-one breakfast on January 23, 1986.111 His $15,000 pledge was fulfilled by
his law firm, Wofsey, Certilman, Haft, Lebow & Balin, in March 1986. In the two months
between Certilman's pledge and his firm's contribution, his firm represented sponsors in over
twenty plans submitted to the Law Department. Since January 1984, Certilman's firm has

110 The Attorney General testified that Arthur Cohen was:
"a success of our blue slip co-op policy. I solicited Arthur Cohen together with
Larry Buttenwieser for a $15,000 contribution. He made a commitment of
$15,000. We have never collected that $15,000 because he has had plans in
the office." (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 135.)
Nonetheless, Arthur Cohen's $15,000 pledge was carried forward on the September 1, 1987 balance sheet
of Citizens for Abrams as a viable pledge that had not yet been written off and which Ethan Geto was assigned
to collect. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 8.
111 Hrg. Exh. 14 & 32, Mar. 10, 1989.
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represented sponsors of over 500 condo and co-op plans submitted to the Law Department for
review.
Altogether, of approximately $150,000 contributed to the Attorney General's 1986
campaign by law firms in the name of the firm, approximately $90,000 was contributed by firms
that represented sponsors in at least one plan submitted to the Law Department since January
1984. Firms with ten or more plans accounted for a quarter of the law firms ' contributions.

2.

Contributions from Attorneys with Active Matters
Pending in the Law Department

During the 1986 election, the Attorney General had no restriction on contributions from
those who had an interest in matters other than real estate development pending before his
office. The following example illustrates the ethical dilemma which the Commission believes is
inherent in the solicitation of contributions from attorneys with matters actively pending in the
Law Department.

In May 1986, the Attorney General spoke with Ira Millstein, a prominent New York
City attorney, to ask him to help out in the campaign's fund-raising effort. Throughout the
summer of 1986, campaign staff tried unsuccessfully to contact him to follow-up on that initial
conversation. 112
On September 15, 1986, Abrams presided over a meeting at the Law Department at
which Millstein and another partner from his firm sought relief from the Attorney General's
office on behalf of one of their clients. 113 Shortly after that meeting, Abrams telephoned
Millstein, to ask him to raise $10,000 from his law firm for the campaign. 114

112 Tr. Mar. 1O, 1989, at 95; Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 1O, 1989. Campaign committee records indicate that
campaign staff tried to contact the prospective contributor four times from June 5 to September 10, 1986. (Hrg.
Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989).
113 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 96, 100-102.
114 The Attorney General had no specific recollection of that conversation {Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 96-97) ;
Millstein remembered getting a call in his office from the Attorney General sometime in the fall of 1986 but was
not sure when.
However, Millstein's partner, who was present in the office when the Attorney General called, remembers
that the call was made after the September 15 meeting at the Law Department. He remembers being surprised
that Abrams made the call personally, especially since he and Millstein had met with the Attorney General in his
office a few weeks earlier.
(continued ... )
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Millstein did not raise the $10,000 the Attorney General was looking for, but he, his
firm and his partner together contributed $2,000 in late October 1986. Geto called Millstein yet
again, on November 14, 1986, after the election was over. This time, according to Geto's notes
of the conversation, the lawyer requested that the campaign committee "stop pressuring him;"
he still had a matter in the Law Department and "shouldn't have sent (the] contribution in [the]
first place." 115
At the Commission's hearing, the Attorney General took issue with the suggestion that
the contributor was in any way pressured by his campaign staff and testified that he had stood
by the decision of his Law Department staff which was adverse to the contributor's client. 116

In an effort to address the ethical issues raised by contributions from attorneys, Abrams
announced at the close of the Commission's hearings in March 1989 that he would refer every
contribution over $2,500 from anyone with a "representational interest" in a matter involving his
office to the New York State Commission on Ethics and would refund any contribution which
"might create the appearance of a conflict."117
The Commission considers such a measure, commendable as it is, inadequate.
Contributions from those attorneys for condo and co-op plan sponsors, whose practice revolves
in a substantial way around the Department of Law and whose appeal to prospective clients
depends, in some measure, on their success in shepherding plans through the Law Department,
should be prohibited altogether. So too should contributions from attorneys with other matters
actively pending before the Law Department.

114 (... continued)
Campaign committee records indicate that other campaign staff members sought to contact Millstein six
times from September 17, 1986 to October 27, 1986. (Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989.)

115 Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989.
116 Tr. Mar. 1O, 1989, at 98-102. Millstein, who was interviewed by Commission staff, noted that the
Attorney General made no reference to his client's pending matter in the fund-raising call and stated that he
himself did not connect the two events in his own mind.
At the same time, he told the Commission that the continuing requests for money -- especially after he
had already raised $2000 and in light of the fact that the election was over -- made him "uncomfortable" and he
felt that the perception would not be right.

117 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 141 .

50

III. The Major Mailing List
Before the 1986 election, the Attorney General advised all his employees in writing that
" under no circumstances may any Department [of Law] employee engage in any political activity
during working hours or on state premises, or make use of state equipment or resources for
such activity."1 18 (emphasis added).
This is a rule the Commission supports wholeheartedly. State resources are for public
business, not campaigning. Using such resources for political purposes gives a significant and
unfair advantage to incumbents. The Commission's investigation reveals, however, a significant
breach of the Attorney General's policy which can be viewed as amounting to a public subsidy
to his campaign.
At some point in the Attorney General's first term of office, he began to compile at
state expense a mailing list which came to be known as the Major Mailing List or "MML" for
short. 119 Separate and distinct from other mailing lists maintained by the Department of
Law, 120 the MML included over 600 names by May 1986 and grew to over 1000 names in
1988.
Names were added to or deleted from the MML by De partment of Law staff at the
direction of the Attorney GeneraJ. 121 For each name on the MML, the Department of Law
computer in which the MML was stored included a separate field for the name of the
individual's spouse, business address, home address, office telephone number, home telephone
number, and an indication of any nickname by which he and his spouse were to be
addressed. 122 As the need arose, these separate fields were also corrected, updated and
proofread by Department of Law employees.123

118 Hrg. Exh. 26, Mar. 10, 1989.
119 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 107·108, 111·112; see Hrg. Exh. 11, Mar. 10, 1989.
120 Apart from the MML, the Department of Law maintained mailings lists for various constituencies of the
office, including press contacts, civil rights groups, religious groups, environmental groups, consumer rights
activists, and labor unions. Names on the MML were assigned a specific computer code which allowed them to
be retrieved without retrieving the names on the other mailing lists.
121 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 108·109.
122 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 110.
123 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 108.
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From time to time, those whose names appeared on the MML received a letter from
the Attorney General, typed on Department of Law letterhead, together with a package of
press clippings. 124 The letter did not, as one might expect, tout the recent legal victories scored
by his office. 125 Rather, the emphasis in the MML letters sent out by the Department of Law
from December 1984 through June 1987 was on the stance which the Attorney General himself
believed should be taken to fight crime and municipal corruption.126
Certainly, the issues raised in the MML letters are issues of concern to all New
Yorkers. 127 Yet, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the mailings served, at least in part, to
pique the interest of a select group of wealthy prospective supporters.128 The tone of the
letters was confiding and personal. The reader was addressed by his first name or nickname and
the letters, signed "Bob", were cordially concluded with "warmest personal regards." Time and
again, the reader was invited--"as a person of prominence who has a leadership role in the
cornrnunity" 129--to respond with their comments.
That the MML could be viewed as serving a campaign function is bolstered by a
comparison of the MML with the lists of Abrams' contributors filed with the state Board of

124 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 107.
125 For a brief period of time, the Law Department's Office of Public Information published and disseminated
a newsletter, Agenda which did precisely that: inform the reader of recent victories of the office in the area of
environmental protection, civil rights, consumer protection and the like. The Department of Law informed the
Commission that that newsletter has not been published since early 1985.

126 Documents provided to the Commission by the Law Department included eight MML letters dated,
respectively, December 12, 1984, May 10, 1985, September 13, 1985, December 27, 1985, April 18, 1986, May 16,
1986, February 6, 1987 and June 22, 1987. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10. The Commission was advised that
no MML letters were sent out in 1988.
127 The call for law enforcement reform was sounded in the December 1984 MML letter, mailed by the Law
Department just as Abrams was scheduling the first of his one-on-one breakfast meetings, and was taken up
again in the MML letters of May 1985, April 1986 and February 1987. The need for ethics reform legislation is set
forth in MML letters of May 1986, February 1987 and June 1987.
Other themes, such as the need to preserve the deductibility of state and local taxes, the recruitment
policies of the Law Department and the need for legislation to deal with toxic chemical spills are sounded in MML
letters of September 1985, December 1985, and February 1987 respectively. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10.

128 After the election, the tone is more in the nature of a "thank you." Before going on to reiterate the
Attorney General's stance on legislation needed in the areas of law enforcement, ethics reform and toxic
chemicals, the February 1987 MML letter -- the first to follow the November 1986 election -- reminds the reader
that the Attorney General 's " margin of victory was the biggest in the history of the office, 65.12°A." and that he
"carried 60 of 62 counties in New York State, losing the two by a combined total of only 191 votes." The
Attorney General also enclosed a sample of newspaper editorials supporting his candidacy, culled from daily
newspapers throughout the state. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10.
129 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10 (December 12, 1984 MML letter) .

52

Elections. Seventy-three percent of those on the MML as of December 1988 were
contributors.130 Of the $2,288,000 Abrams raised from January 1984 through January 1989,
over $1,900,000--83%--came from MML contributors.131
Over 400 names were added to the MML between May 1986 and December 1988; of
these, 94% were the names of contributors or those who were associated with firms or unions
which contributed to Abrams' 1986 campaign.132 As the Attorney General testified in
explaining why no mailings had been made since 1987, "the list became imbalanced .... it was
growing disproportionate in terms of financial contributors."133

If looked at from a campaign-related perspective, the MML allowed the Attorney
General to communicate at state expense with wealthy individuals who had supported his
campaign in the past or who might be encouraged to support his campaign in the future.
Beyond that, it also provided a valuable address and telephone directory for the campaign staff.
A copy of the Major Mailing List was brought from the Law Department to the campaign
headquarters in 1986 by a campaign staff member on leave of absence from the Law
Department and was openly available for consultation there not only by campaign staff but by
the Attorney General himself. 134 The 1986, 1987 and 1988 versions of the MML were also
sent by that Law Department staff member to the office of Abrams' campaign consultants, Geto
& DeMilly.
Interviews conducted by Commission staff reveal that the MML was useful to the
campaign in a variety of ways. It was used to place telephone calls for the Attorney General
from the campaign headquarters; to compile lists of people to invite to the major fund-raising
dinner in October 1986; to address invitations to other smaller fund-raising events; and to send
personal thank you notes to contributors where the incoming contribution check lacked an
address.

130 Hrg. Exh. 4, Mar. 10, 1989. A comparison of the MML with the list maintained by the campaign
committee of the approximately 100 people in the one-on-one program reveals that over 800,.{, of the names on
the one-on-one list appear on the May 1986 version of the MML. Compare Hrg. Exh. 11 and 14, Mar. 10, 1989.
Everyone on the one-on-one list who is not on the May 1986 version of the MML appears on a subsequent
version of the MML. Compare Hrg. Exh. 14 & 28, Mar. 10, 1989.
131 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 29; Hrg. Exh. 4, Mar. 10, 1989. MML contributors include all individuals named on
the MML who either contributed to Citizens for Abrams as individuals, or whose firm(s) or union contributed to
Citizens for Abrams.
132 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 29-30.
133 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 117-118.
134 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 113-114.

53

III.
Fund-Raising Practices of
Comptroller Edward V. Regan

Introduction
In many ways the political fund-raising of Comptroller Edward V. Regan has followed a
format typical of other candidates in New York State. He has one campaign committee, the
Ned Regan Support Committee ("Support Committee"); that committee forms a Dinner
Committee and, in some years, a Finance Committee, to spearhead a fund-raising drive centered
around an annual fund-raising dinner. The Support Committee has only one full-time paid
employee, but employs ancillary bookkeeping help and, during periods before the major fundraising events, a number of short-term paid campaign workers and volunteers.
However, unlike the other state-wide officeholders, Regan assigned a senior advisor on
his Comptroller's Office staff to serve as liaison to the Support Committee and to do work
related to fund-raising. That advisor, while a State employee, wrote a series of memoranda to
the Comptroller on Comptroller's Office letterhead, setting forth in detail a campaign fundraising agenda that appears to link campaign contributions with the award of lucrative
investment management contracts and other business by the Comptroller's Office.
This chapter will examine the operation of the Ned Regan Support Committee, including
both its fund-raising approach and the personnel (both paid employees and volunteers) it used
to solicit contributions during 1982 through 1988. It will review the many memoranda which
were written in connection with the Committee's fund-raising efforts, by Joseph Palumbo, the
Comptroller's Assistant, whose official duties included serving as liaison with the Support
Committee. It will also review the contribution patterns of those who contributed to the
Support Committee, including the identities of the contributors, the nature of their business
dealings with the Comptroller's Office, and the timing and amounts of their contributions.
The Commission is aware that some of these facts are presently being reviewed by the
District Attorney for New York County. It must be emphasized that this Commission is neither
a grand jury nor a prosecutor. It has no law enforcement functions. It does not seek to
establish whether in fact campaign contributions were solicited with the promise of state
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business; nor, if so, whether such conduct violated any criminal statute; nor, if it did, to
determine who should bear criminal responsibility, by virtue of having participated in, or
authorized, the deeds. In short, it is not this Commission's function to pinpoint liability, but to
review the facts, and to evaluate their implications for this State's current system of campaign
finance.

I. The Ned Regan Support Committee
The Ned Regan Support Committee handles the receipt and disclosure of all
contributions to Ned Regan, as well as all campaign expenditures. It also organizes Regan's
fund-raising efforts. The Support Committee is chaired on a volunteer basis by Lawrence
Huntington, a long-time friend of Regan's whose interest in politics dates back to his
participation in John Lindsay's mayoral campaign. The Treasurer of the Support Committee
(again, a volunteer) was, from 1978-1987, Wilfred S. Meckel, II, of Seligman Securities. In
1987, Meckel resigned, and was replaced by Carl Pforzheimer, III, of Petroleum Trading Corp.
Support Committee members, whose names are listed on the Committee's letterhead, consist of
individuals who demonstrate their support of Regan either by providing substantial services
(such as organizing the details of the fund-raising events) or by making substantial contributions,
or both. On rare occasion, a prominent individual may, in effect, lend his name to the Regan
campaign effort, by becoming a Support Committee member without either making a substantial
contribution or devoting effort to the cause.
The Support Committee raises funds in the efficient manner characteristic of the most
effective philanthropic fund-raising. William Hicks, the single full-time employee of the
Committee, was for a number of years before joining the Committee a successful professional
fund-raiser for charitable and cultural institutions. Under Huntington's leadership (assisted by
Hicks), volunteer Dinner Committee Chairs or Co-Chairs for the annual fund-raising dinner
(held by tradition in the Spring) are selected on the basis of their stature in the community and,
more specifically, their "outreach" or ability to buttonhole large numbers of friends, clients and
other contacts and to solicit pledges or purchases of tickets/tables. Dinner Committee members
are recruited from among the ranks of Support Committee members, or their contacts, and
asked to be responsible for buying, or selling, one or more tables at the annual gala event.
Follow-up calls are assiduously made by Support Committee staff and volunteers. In the 1986
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campaign year a second dinner was held, which entailed all the organizing effort of the Spring
dinner, though the fund-raising goal was lower.135

As Huntington explained in interviews with Commission staff, campaigns for State
Comptroller are expensive, even in years when the opposition is not strong. No candidate, even
an incumbent, can be confident that the opponent is not strong enough to prevail. The
consequence of underestimating the opponent's strength would be so great that even the strong
incumbent must mount, and finance, a full-force campaign. In order to raise the needed funds ,
a goal is set for each dinner (in Regan's case usually at least $1 million), and over the four
years an incumbent holds office he tries to amass enough money to fund his race for reelection. While efforts are made to keep actual costs of the campaign within the budgeted
amount, last minute expenses may cause overruns, and bank loans may be taken, guaranteed by
individual contributors with repayment promised after the election.136 Regan spent over $1.4
million on his 1982 campaign, and over $3.1 million in 1986. By contrast, his opponent in 1986,
Herman Badillo, spent less than $400,000.
Huntington stated that the greatest handicap Comptroller Regan faces in his fundraising is that "nobody knows who the Comptroller is and what his job is." 137 As he described
it, individuals and businesses in the financial community, who also do business with the
Comptroller's Office, figure prominently in his fund-raisin~ in part precisely because they know
the Comptroller and the work of his office, as well as because they are historically the most
generous contributors not only to political but also to philanthropic fund-raising events.
In fact, it is to prominent figures in the financial and sometimes real estate communities
that the Support Committee turns when selecting those key individuals with the quality of
"outreach" to serve as Dinner Committee Chairs and anchors of the annual fund-raising effort,
as well as to serve as Dinner Committee members.138 But the significance of this selection can
only be appreciated in the context of an understanding of the scope of the Comptroller's

135 The fundraising dinners were held on May 2, 1983; May 7, 1984; May 6, 1985; January 27, 1986;
October 6, 1986; June 8, 1987; and May 2, 1988.
136 Huntington described just such a scenario in Regan's 1986 campaign. In the waning days of the
campaign, the opponent's intensive radio campaign in Regan's home city caused the candidate " almost to
panic," and to decide to respond with his own costly media appeal. During the last two weeks of October 1986,
the Support Committee took out a $290,000 loan, guaranteed by thirteen of Regan's most reliable supporters.
The loans were repaid by September 1987.
137 Huntington Dep. Tr. Sept. 19, 1988, at 35-36; Hrg. Exh. 1, Sept. 24, 1988.
138 Memorandum from William Hicks to Lawrence Huntington, dated November 23, 1987. See Appendix
Three, Exhibit 11 .
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discretionary decision-making, especially as it affects those groups. This discretion is at its
greatest over investment decisions for assets of the Common Retirement Fund.

II. The Comptroller's Role in the Award
of Pension Fund Business
New York State's Common Retirement Fund, with assets of over $35.8 billion, 139 has
by law a sole trustee, the Comptroller of the State. While there are some statutory restraints
on the allowable investment of these assets, the Comptroller retains enormous discretion to
manage the funds: to invest directly in equities or liquid assets, with his office selecting brokers
and banks; to place the funds with active managers selected as he chooses; to diversify into high
risk ventures, including leveraged buyout deals and Certificates of Participation; to invest in real
estate or mortgage-backed securities. In all these transactions he can be guided, but is not
controlled, by committees composed of representatives of the financial and investment
communities, who sit on the Investment Advisory Committee and Mortgage Advisory
Committee. 140 Each of these investment decisions can, and does, generate enormous fees for
the brokers, fund managers, and banks who manage the investments, loan funds for recipients of
mortgages, and legal fees for attorneys who represent the individuals and firms involved in these
transactions. Between January, 1984 and August, 1988, direct commissions and fees paid by the
Comptroller to firms in the financial community totalled $271 million; to firms in the real estate
business, $7.9 million; and to lawyers and law firms, $871,000.1 4 1
Until recently, the existence of this enormous discretion to award financial benefits was
virtually unknown to anyone outside the financial and investment world. Even the Annual
Reports of the Common Retirement Fund, while they indicate that the Comptroller is the sole
Trustee, provide only general information about the Fund holdings and do not illuminate the
extent of his decision-making in this area.

139 These were the assets as of March 31, 1988, the most recent annual report before the Commission
hearing at which Regan testified.
140 See discussion, pages 60-61 below.
141 Other financial benefits were awarded indirectly, such as where the Comptroller's office engaged in a
real estate transaction where brokers' fees were paid by a third party.
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This exclusive (and obscure) discretion to award enormous benefits, unique among
statewide officeholders, has provided, and still provides today, the ingredients for potential abuse
of many kinds, but particularly in the area of campaign finance. The risk of abuse is all the
greater where there are links, whether formal or informal, between the fund-raising functions
and the official functions of the officeholder. In the Comptroller's case, there were a number
of such links.

III. Employees and Advisors as Links Between Two Offices
A.

Joseph Palumbo: State Employee
and Political Fund-raiser

From 1986 to 1988, Joseph Palumbo was employed in the Office of the State
Comptroller as Assistant to the Comptroller. 14 2 Witnesses variously described him as a liaison
to the financial community, an issues spotter, "the Comptroller's 'eyes and ears' in the financial
community," an assistant charged with developing position papers on somewhat peripheral
programs under consideration by the Comptroller's Office, someone who could call anyone in
the office to seek information or communicate the Comptroller's desires, and "not a substance
person."143 The professional staff in the Division of Cash Management, while minimizing
Palumbo's decision-making role in the business of their Division (to which he had once been
assigned), conceded that they would not feel free to withhold from him any substantive
information he might seek (as he did from time to time). They also described situations when
Palumbo attended substantive meetings, such as presentations in response to an RFP for an
investment manager. He also attended the meetings of the Investment Advisory Committee,
and prepared the minutes.
The descriptions of Palumbo's duties appeared always to include fund-raising in some
way, and to emphasize his role as liaison with the Support Committee. Huntington emphasized,
and William Hicks confirmed, that Palumbo was someone on the Comptroller's staff whom

142 Palumbo has held a number of positions in the Comptroller's Office, including one in the Division of
Cash Management, the Division charged with investing the assets of the Common Retirement Fund. He has now
resigned following the institution of grand jury proceedings.
143 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 69, 73, 162; Tr. Hull Dep. Sept. 16, 1988, at 63.
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either Huntington or Hicks could contact with information or questions concerning fund-raising.
And at the Commission's hearing, Regan testified that one part of Palumbo's official job
was to lay the foundation for fund-raising: to identify potential contributors to Regan and to
recommend opportunities to meet with them, for the express purpose of obtaining political
contributions. As Regan described it: 144

"[Tjhis is part of his job and, again, it is part of the environment to
get me to raise--to participate more actively in fund-raising, and that
I should go out and meet with people that contribute, are known
contributors to other candidates, that are wealthy, that are
involved....
... having to find out who the prominent people are in this City, be
they wealthy people who cont1ibute or civic leaders that I should
meet, or the academic community, prominent people, and providing
me with names under any mbric.... [I]f he came to me and said why
don't you try to meet, and named all those names, I would have to
say that undoubtedly over the course of a couple of years that could
easily have happened."
In addition, Palumbo routinely took leave from his government position to work full-time
as a salaried employee of the Support Committee during the weeks prior to a major fund-raising
event, or prior to an election. At those times he would assume responsibility for follow-up calls
to potential contributors who had made pledges but not yet given their checks, or to those who
had not yet made a commitment to give. Witnesses said that Palumbo was assigned a large
stack of the index cards naming contributors, some (though not all) of whom were assigned to
him because it was felt that (for reasons never specified by witnesses) he might be the most
effective solicitor.

144 Tr. Sept. 24, 1988, at 115, 116.
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B.

Lawrence Huntington: Support Committee Chair
and Member of Common Retirement Fund
Investment Advisory Committee

The Chairman of the Support Committee, Lawrence Huntington, is also the Chairman of
Fiduciary Trust International, an investment banking conglomerate. For a number of years
Huntington has served as a member of the Investment Advisory Committee which, pursuant to
statute, oversees investments of the Common Retirement Fund assets. In that capacity he
receives all the literature concerning investments which is distributed to IAC members on a
regular basis, attends the quarterly meetings of the IAC, and actively participates in shaping the
Comptroller's investment policy for the Common Retirement Fund. For example, Huntington
was a major proponent of a shift in investment strategy for the bond portfolio, away from
passive management and toward an active management approach. His firm, Fiduciary Trust, did
a series of consulting studies to assess the new strategy, for which it received some $25,000 in
investment-related fees in fiscal year 1986, $230,000 in fiscal year 1987 and $252,000 in fiscal
year 1988. 145 Fiduciary Trust also received income as a result of its equity trading for the
benefit of the Common Retirement Fund.

C.

Support and Dinner Committee Members as Members
of Common Retirement Fund Advisory Committees

Some nine members of the Support Committee, and an additional two members of the
Dinner Committee have been, at various times over the past five years, members of the
Investment Advisory Committee and Mortgage Advisory Committee ("MAC"). 146 The members
of the Mortgage Advisory Committee have veto power over any proposed investment in
mortgages or real estate; the members of the Investment Advisory Committee, although they
appoint the members of the MAC, have advisory oversight responsibility but no formal power
over the Comptroller's investment decisions. The Investment Advisory Committee meets
quarterly to review the investment decisions of the Comptroller and to receive detailed
accounting of the Fund's performance; the Mortgage Advisory Committee meets approximately

145 Tr. Huntington Dep. Sept. 12, 1988, at 12-16. Huntington testified that his firm did these studies as a
" loss-leader in the hope of receiving a share of the bond management business"; they were not selected. !fL
146 The members of the Support Committee who were also members of the Mortgage Advisory Committee
are Richard Bernstein, Benjamin Lambert, George Vadyak, and Louise Sunshine; those who were members of the
Investment Advisory Committee are Lawrence Huntington, Robert Irwin, Peter Sharp, Madelon Talley, and Leon
Levy. The members of the Dinner Committe who were also members of the Mortgage Advisory Committee are
Monroe Seifer and Alvin Dworman.
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every month. The Comptroller appoints their members, who serve at will, and the Comptroller
also decides which of the members of the MAC to summon to its monthly meetings.
In connection with their service on these Committees, members become privy to all the
major plans and policies of the Comptroller with respect to his investment of the Funds.
Indeed, they are clearly in a position to shape those policies, since they are selected by the
Comptroller himself, on the basis of their investment expertise, precisely so that he can consult
with them. The Comptroller has no formal policy against employing the services of these
advisors or their firms as investment managers, brokers, and the like, nor against investing the
Fund's assets in their ventures. (There is, however, a provision that no member of the Mortgage
Advisory Committee participate in the vote by which an investment which may benefit him or
his firm is authorized.)
In their capacity as Support or Dinner Committee members, several of these advisors
also serve as active fund-raisers for Regan. There is a clear appearance of conflict in their dual
roles; this appearance is not lessened by the fact that many of these firms have profited by the
investment decisions of the Comptroller, or by the fact that those from whom they solicit
contributions receive (or can receive) substantial business from the Retirement Fund investment
decisions. 147

IV. Palumbo's Central Fund-raising Role
Joseph Palumbo's activities as liaison between the Comptroller's Office and the Support
Committee were detailed in a number of memoranda which he authored. The first, which is
unsigned and on its face does not identify to whom it was sent, delineates in no uncertain terms
a proposed fund-raising strategy. 148 This memorandum was followed by a series of memoranda
from Palumbo to Regan, on official letterhead of the Office of the State Comptroller, which set
forth details of fund-raising plans over more than three years, and reflect both the level of

147 Commission staff identified approximately 108 individuals as having served on the Support Committee
during part or all of the period 1982 · 1988. Of these, four were known to be relatives of the Comptroller or staff
of the Committee. Of the remaining 104, the individuals were affiliated with some 70 different firms. 41 , or 59%,
of these firms, received direct business from the Comptroller's Office. 18 of the remaining firms are in either the
financial, real estate, or legal communities. Thus, 59 of the 70 firms represented on the Support Committee are in
businesses which receive substantial income from the Comptroller's investment decisions.
148 During his testimony on September 23, 1988, Regan acknowledged that this memorandum had been
authored by Palumbo, although he denied having seen it at the time or endorsing its philosophy. (Tr. Sept. 23,
1988, at 106.)
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Palumbo's involvement in the Comptroller's fund-raising operation, and the approach that
Palumbo, at least, espoused in soliciting contributions. 149

A.

The "Give to Get" Memorandum

On August 20, 1985, Palumbo traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with Government
Finance Officers Association officials. During that visit he met with Rod Smith of the National
Republican Senatorial Committee; 150 three days later he wrote a three-page memorandum
summarizing a fund-raising strategy for Regan's campaign committee which he had discussed in
detail with Smith. 151 Palumbo said Smith "made it clear" that Regan's "power and fund raising
base" should mean that the Support Committee "should not have a problem, rather, we should
have more money that we know what to do with." The fact that Regan was sole trustee of a
pension fund that amounted to $26 billion, and that grows by $2.5 billion annually, and that he
"was the final say on which firms receive commission business, etc." meant, Smith observed, that
Regan:

"... had more leverage than most elected officials since he provided
finns with actual dollars, while a senator or governor can only
provide a vague promise to assist with legislation or make a few
introductions and phone calls... "
Palumbo then repeated Smith's observation that any difficulties Regan might experience
in raising funds were the result of his being "too much of a nice guy," and that Regan must
now "make it clear that those who give will get." Palumbo set forth Smith's recommendation
that the Support Committee and the Comptroller set up an advisory board of investment firms
to help him make investment decisions, and obtain fixed, high amounts in contributions from the
members of those boards. In turn, the participants would receive most of the investment
business. While Palumbo said this "may be a bit too radical" he added that he thought it could
be modified:

149 Regan also testified that he could not recall having ever seen these memoranda, because of the volume
of memoranda he must read daily in the course of performing his official duties. (Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 104.)
150 The National Republican Senatorial Committee is composed of Republicans who pay a membership fee
of $10,000 to be used to support Republican candidates for the United States Senate.
151 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 12.
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"... a bit to relate to the Regan Support Committee.... The Committee
could be restructured to include only top CEOs such as William
Shryer of Menill Lynch. Each member could be made responsible
for a sizeable amount of money and in return, they or their fmn
would make a sizeable amount of money. While still not the most
subtle approach, it would send a clear message to the street.... "
Regan testified that he never saw this memorandum and never discussed with Palumbo
either his meeting with Rod Smith nor Smith's recommendations for a new approach to his
fund-raising. He said that he did not agree with this philosophy of fund-raising. 152 But a
number of additional memoranda, addressed to Regan himself and typed on official letterhead,
contain statements which appear designed to implement this strategy.

B.

Palumbo's Memoranda to Regan.

Memoranda about Fund-Raising in General.
A significant number of
memoranda from Palumbo to Regan discuss only fund-raising issues, and reflect that Palumbo
did, indeed, play a pivotal role in Regan's fund-raising planning, and in the implementation of
the fund-raising plans.
1.

On August 23, 1985, the date of Palumbo's "give to get" me morandum, Palumbo sent
the Comptroller a memorandum bearing the reference "Subject: William Shryer." 153 The
memorandum suggested naming William Schreye r, chairman of Merrill Lynch, to chair a fundraising event. 154 Although Regan does not recall reading the memorandum, Schreyer did in
fact serve as the Dinner Committee Chair for the next fund-raising gala.155
On November 25, 1985, Palumbo sent Regan a list of some twenty-two individuals who,
Palumbo suggested, could together contribute over $250,000, an average of more than $10,000
each. Although the memorandum did not spell this out, all twenty-two had some business

152 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 104.
153 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 13.
154 In the " give to get" memorandum Palumbo had commented that Schryer's selection to chair a major
fundraising event would be of immeasurable assistance in fund-raising .
155 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 14.
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dealings with the Comptroller's Office in connection with investments of the Common
Retirement Fund. 156
Throughout 1986 Palumbo communicated a wide range of campaign finance information
in a series of memoranda to the Comptroller that suggest that he spent a large portion of his
official time that year engaged in fund-raising activities. The memos document his frequent
meetings with Hicks to plan fund-raising strategies and opportunities for Regan. For instance, a
joint memorandum 157 dated March 11, 1986 from Palumbo and Hicks to Regan and
Huntington, describes in detail the individuals they targeted for contributions as well as the
strategies involved in soliciting them, including plans for Regan himself to contact a number of
proposed contributors and ask for money.
Another memorandum from Palumbo to Regan, dated May 19, 1986,158 is referenced:
"Subject: Fund-raising (various)." This memorandum lays out a series of fund-raising initiatives
to pursue in different regions, including Long Island, Westchester, Albany and Rochester. It
contains information about specific planning details, urges Regan to move quickly, and requests
prompt indications from him concerning the steps he wishes to take. It also contains Palumbo's
report to Regan on the progress of Palumbo's contacts with Drexel Burnham representatives:

"Drexel Burnham: I am meeting with Joel Mesznick tomon-ow

(5120) to discuss the October event in general and the corporate
angle in paHicular. Kathy Lacey has been given the list of holdings
and we'll begin there. Also, I am setting up a meeting with you, me,
Kathy Lacey and Bob Shiffer to get things moving. This meeting
will be after the Convention. Kathy, others from Drexel and I are
meeting with Bob Linton on Friday (5123)."
From this language, it seems evident that Palumbo had the authority to arrange meetings
with the chairman of a major investment bank, 159 as well as to initiate direct contact with
prospective contributors to solicit campaign funds.

156 Hrg. Exh. 6, Sept. 24, 1988.
157 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 15.
158 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 16.
159 Robert Linton was CEO of Drexel Burnham Lambert.
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On October 9, 1986, Palumbo routed another fund-raising directive to the
Comptroller, 160 with a level of detail that reflects Palumbo's substantial role in fund-raising:

"Lany Huntington et al have immediately begun to move on the
next fund-raising initiative with calls already placed to Peter Sharp,
Ronald Perelman and Ivan Boesky...
What you must do is call Henry Kravis, Carl Icahn, and Lawrence
Tisch. When you reach them you should explain that you had a
fund-raiser on Monday and while it was successful, the campaign
needs additional funds ... (with Henry Kravis it 's important that you
don't say you want him to contribute more personally. As you
know, we would like him to arrange a Forstmann-type luncheon)."
It is clear that a very large part of Palumbo's "official" role, on paid government time,
was to plan fund-raising. But the memoranda from Palumbo to Regan also reflect an effort on
Palumbo's part to seek information concerning official business to enhance the fund-raising
effort, and an intention to reward contributors with business.
2. Memoranda Linking Contributions to Business. The Jong May 19, 1986 planning
memorandum discussed above indicates a plan to go through files in the Comptroller's Office, in
order to develop information concerning prospective contributors:

"Martha and I also discussed the real estate developer/real estate
attorney [fund-raising] event ... Lenny Rizzolo is getting a list
together of all developers we deal with." (emphasis added)

Leonard Rizzolo heads the Mortgage Organization unit of the Comptroller's Division of
Investments and Cash Management. Although it is not clear that Rizzolo ever produced such a
list for Palumbo's or the Committee's use in fund-raising, it is clear that the Support Committee
solicited and received a number of contributions from real estate developers who had business
with the Common Retirement Fund.
A December 11, 1986 memorandum from Palumbo to Regan entitled "Spring
Borrowing-Related Contributions" separates those financial institutions that participated in the

160 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 17.
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under-writing of the 1986 Spring Borrowing 161 into two groups: those that made political
contributions to Comptroller Regan and those that did not.162 This memorandum was written
on a Thursday; four days later, according to Regan's scheduling diary, Regan met with four of
his assistants to discuss the planning for the 1987 spring borrowing.163 Selection of participants
in the Spring Borrowing, and planning for the Spring fund-raising event (held June 8, 1987)
went forward simultaneously.
Another memorandum from Palumbo to Regan highlights the premise that those who do
not contribute should not be rewarded. Dated November 24, 1987, 164 it discusses the
leadership of the First Boston Corporation's public finance area and then the history of the
firm's contributions to Regan. 165 The memo (using "we" to refer, interchangeably, to the
Comptroller's Office and the Campaign Committee) states:
"But while he [Mike Hernandez) does great things for First Boston,
he has done almost nothing for us.
During the last fund-raise1; the only thing First Boston did was buy
one table and we just received the final payment two days ago. He,
along with Shoemaker, was exJremely uncooperative and seemed to
feel the finn was doing us a favor by lending its name to the event.
We do an enonnous amount of business with the finn ($231,000 in
commissions for this fLScal year to date) yet they more or less refused
to return the favor. "166

161 Spring Borrowing is New York State's annual issuance of short term debt against anticipated tax
revenues.

162 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 18.
163 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 19. Regan explained that the memorandum highlighting who among the
participants in the underwriting had contributed to him was prepared in order to respond to press inquiries on the
subject. Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 156.
164 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 20.
165 This was not the first time Palumbo computed the dollar amount of business that the Comptroller
conducted with First Boston. On February 24, 1987, Palumbo sent a memorandum to Regan indicating that First
Boston received $597,419 in fees for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1986. Palumbo also noted that figure put
First Boston "in the number three slot out of the 67 firms with whom we do business." See Appendix Three,
Exhibit 21.
166 Another incident also suggests the possibility of retaliation for a refusal to contribute. One respected
attorney with a major New York City law firm told Commission staff how, at a time when his firm had submitted a
(continued ... )
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These memoranda provide a backdrop for the public testimony the Commission received
from one witness from the financial community. Michael Smith, formerly a Vice-President at
E.F. Hutton, testified that in October, 1986 the firm was under consideration to be retained to
act as financial advisor in a Certificate of Participation financing. The award of the contract was
to be made October 7, 1986. In connection with processing the request for proposals for that
contract, Palumbo served as the contact person at the Comptroller's Office from whom the firm
could pick up certain necessary documents. During the same week, the Support Committee was
holding a major fund-raising dinner; Palumbo made persistent requests to a member of the firm
to purchase a table. Although Smith testified that he never heard of a specific link between the
two transactions, he said that his fellow workers clearly understood that a message was being
communicated: it would be helpful to their cause in bidding for Comptroller's Office business if
they contributed to the Support Committee at that time.167

V. Contribution Patterns Reviewed
Analysis of the contribution patterns of firms doing business with the Comptroller's
Office, particularly those handling Pension Fund assets, suggests at the very least an extremely
effective fund-raising drive focused on firms that have business dealings with the Comptroller's
Office in connection with Common Retirement Fund investments. The fund-raising statistics
show that the overwhelming majority of contributions to the Comptroller's campaign committee
come from the financial, legal and real estate communities that do extensive business with his
office, that contributions rose dramatically in the period following Palumbo's "give-to-get"
memorandum, that particular firms who gave money to the Committee did, in fact, receive

166( ... continued)
proposal in an effort to be named as the Comptroller's Office permanent counsel for Certificate of Participation
financing, the firm also received a solicitation letter to contribute to the fundraising dinner scheduled in a few
days. The firm responded with a letter saying that they considered a contribution at that time inappropriate; they
did not receive the contract.
The firm's letter apparently did not reach the Support Committee quickly enough; before it arrived, the
attorney received one of the Support Committee's "follow-up calls" from an individual whose name he does not
recall ; the caller said that he was "astounded" at the reason the attorney gave for his firm's not purchasing a
table at the upcoming dinner. In a subsequent year, at the repeated request of a client which was a major
underwriting firm, the firm did buy a table, and the attorney became a member of the Dinner Committee.

167 Tr. Smith Dep. Sept. 20, 1988, at 48 et seq.
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substantial business from the Comptroller's Office, and that those involved in the fund-raising
effort also received substantial business from the Comptroller.

A.

Contributions Come Heavily from Those Receiving
Business from the Comptroller's Office.

During the period from January 1, 1983 through July 15, 1988, 63% of Regan's
contributions came from identifiable individuals and firms in the financial community; 16% came
from those in the real estate community; and 12% came from lawyers and law firms. This total
of 91 % from identified interest groups which receive substantial direct benefits as a result of
investment decisions of the officeholder stands in contrast to comparable figures for the other
statewide officeholders. 168 Comparison of total pre-1985 contributions with contributions
received after 1985 shows a dramatic improvement in the receipts of the Support Committee.
In the two full years following the 1982 election, the Support Committee had raised
approximately $614,000. In the two years following the 1986 election, the Committee raised
more than $1.7 million, nearly treble the post-1982 amount. And the election year comparisons
are almost as stark: in 1982, $1.2 million was raised; in 1986, $2 million. These overall figures
are explained in part by a closer look at individual contributions.
Analysis shows that very few firms doing business with the Comptroller's Office do not
contribute to his campaign committee. They frequently begin making such contributions within
the first year of being awarded the business; and in a number of cases, they make contributions
to no other candidate for New York office.

*

The California-based RREEF USA, an equity real estate
investment manager, received no financial benefit from the
Comptroller's office prior to 1986; nor did it make any political
contributions to the Comptroller (or any other statewide elected
official in New York). The Retirement Fund first invested in
RREEF equities in 1986; since then RREEF (and individuals
affiliated with the firm) have contributed nearly $50,000 to the
Support Committee (but still nothing to any other statewide
candidate); RREEF has received approximately $425,000 in
investment-related fees.

168 42°/o of the contributions to Governor Cuomo and 40% of those to Attorney General Abrams, during the
same time periods, came from readily identifiable interest groups. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 1.
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*

Forstmann Little and Company gave only $1,000 in political
contributions to the Support Committee prior to 1986 and its
earned fees were approximately $140,000. Since 1986, however,
Forstmann Little and individuals affiliated with the firm have
contributed nearly $64,000 to the Support Committee and the firm
has received approximately $3.4 million dollars in fees from the
Comptroller's office. The firm and its members do not contribute
to any other New York statewide elected official.

*

Lord Abbett and Company, an equity management firm,
contributed about $5,000 to Regan prior to 1986; the fees
received were about $500,000. From 1986 to the present,
however, Lord, Abbott and Company and affiliated individuals
have contributed over $75,000 to the Support Committee; during
the same period the firm's investment-related fees received from
the Comptroller's office exceeded one and a half million dollars.
The firm does not contribute to other statewide officeholders in
New York.

*

Corporate Property Investors, an equity real estate investment
manager, reflects the pattern on a more modest level. The firm
had contributed $5,000 to Regan's Support Committee for the first
time in 1985 and had as yet received no business; since then, CPI
has contributed $20,000 and earned nearly $300,000 in investmentrelated fees. The firm contributes exclusively to Regan in New
York.169

*

Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, Inc. has been a steady supporter of
Regan's campaigns, contributing over $80,000 from 1984-1988.
During the same period, the firm has received over $2 million in
investment related fees.170

169 Commissioner Meyer did not participate in discussions or deliberations concerning Corporate Property
Investors, Inc.
170 Chairman Feerick did not participate in discussions or deliberations concening Kolberg, Kravis, Roberts,
Inc.
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Other firms which contribute exclusively to Regan in New York, and all of whom receive
substantial business from the Comptroller's Office, include:
Alliance Capital Management Corporation
Capital Guardian Trust
Delaware Investment Advisors
Fiduciary Investment Corporation
Miller, Andersen & Sherred
Montgomery Securities
Seligman Securities
On occasion, strong contributors received business from the Comptroller's Office despite
statements in the Advisory Committee minutes suggesting a lack of qualifications, or poor
performance. The following are examples:
Equitable Investment Management. Equitable Investment Management, a Common
Retirement Fund portfolio manager, made only one $5,000 contribution to Regan, and received
no fees from the Comptroller's Office, prior to fiscal 1986. Since then, however, Equitable has
received approximately $2.l million in investment-related fees, and has contributed nearly
$30,000 to the Support Committee. During the February 28, 1986 Investment Advisory
Committee 171 meeting, Equitable was criticized as a "poor performer" and its possible dismissal
was debated. Nine months later, during a November 21, 1986 IAC meeting, the Comptroller's
staff disclosed that $100 million in additional funds were to be allocated for management by
Equitable. There had been no discussion of improved performance, but Equitable had
contributed $15,000 to the Support Committee on January 24, 1986 as well as $5,000 on
February 7, 1986 and $1,000 on March 14, 1986. The firm made contributions of $10,000 in
June, 1987, and another $9,000 in April, 1988. Although Equitable was again characterized as a
"poor performer" during a February 18, 1988 IAC meeting, the firm received $859,354 in
investment-related fees in fiscal 1988.
Alliance Capital Management Corp. Alliance Capital has been a steady and generous
contributor, giving $5,000 per year in 1982, 1983, and 1985; $20,000 in 1986, $12,000 in 1987,
and $10,000 in 1988. During that time the firm received millions in investment management
fees earned from managing pension fund assets. The fees rose steadily from just over $1 million
in fiscal year 1984 to almost $1.9 million in fiscal year 1987. Despite a negative performance

171 Minutes, Investment Advisory Committee, February 28, 1986 at 2.
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evaluation in early 1987, 172 the firm continued to give sizable sums ($12,000 and $10,000) and
to receive substantial business (over $600,000 in fiscal 1988).

B.

Fund-raisers Also Received Generous Business

Analysis of the contribution patterns of Support Committee members, as well as of the
business their firms received from the Comptroller's Office, reveals that nearly sixty percent of
Support Committee members or the firms with which they are affiliated receive discretionary
business totalling millions of dollars from the Office of the Comptroller. 173 The following are
the most prominent examples:

*

The former Treasurer of the Support Committee was Wilfred N.
Meckel, Chairman of Seligman Securities, who served as treasurer
until November, 1987. From 1982 to mid-1988 Seligman
contributed approximately $64,000 ($40,000 after the 1985
Palumbo memo) to the Regan campaign effort.
During fiscal years 1984 through 1988, the firm received more
than $4 million in investment-related fees from the Comptroller's
office. The minutes of the first Investment Advisory Committee
meeting (February 18, 1988) after Meckel's resignation as Support
Committee treasurer described Seligman's prior investment
management as poor.

*

Stephen Robert, a Support Committee member, is a principal of
the Oppenheimer Holding Company. Oppenheimer more than
doubled the investment-related fees it received from the
Comptroller's Office over a five-year period: from something over
$600,000 in fiscal '83-84 to nearly $1.6 million in fiscal '87-88; over
those years the total fees were approximately $6 million.
Oppenheimer's contributions over the same time period were in
excess of $46,000.

172 Minutes, Investment Advisory Committee, February 13, 1987.
173 See fn . 147 above.
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*

Frank Smeal, Robert N. Downey and Arthur B. Spector, all
members of the Support Committee, are also principals of
Goldman, Sachs and Company. Smeal has contributed $28,500 to
Regan since 1983; of that $23,000 was given after the Palumbo
memo. Spector has contributed $6,500 after and none before; and
Downey, $500 before, $6,000 after. Since 1982, Goldman has
received over $1 million in investment-related fees alone.17 4

*

On December 13, 1985, the Mortgage Advisory Committee
approved a $45 million mortgage to a limited partnership in a deal
brokered by Eastdil. Similarly, during a February 26, 1987
Mortgage Advisory Committee meeting, Deputy Comptroller John
Hull announced that Eastdil had been retained to "handle
problem loans" pursuant to a contract worth about $100,000 per
month. Benjamin V. Lambert, through his Eastdil-affiliated
companies, is a steady supporter of the Comptroller; since 1984 he
has contributed over $75,000 to the Committee, and the
memoranda of Palumbo and Hicks reflect his active involvement in
efforts to solicit funds from other members of the real estate
community.

VI. The Comptroller's Policies
Concerning Fund-raising and the Award of Business

The Comptroller has repeatedly stated that no relationship exists between governmental
decisions and political contributions. Testifying before this Commission 175, he responded to a
question regarding his fund-raising credo:

174 Goldman, Sachs also receives substantial fees as a broker-dealer for the Common Retirement Fund.
175 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 100.
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"It is, as I stated, to have the funds raised by an independent
outside committee and to conduct our office, in the decisions, on the
merits, and to keep these two activities separate."
Regan was unable to articulate any specific policies which he had adopted, or
communicated to his Comptroller's Office or fund-raising staffs to implement this philosophy.
He referred only to verbal instructions to his professional investment staff, to the effect that
they must make all investment decisions strictly "on the merits."
In addition, Regan emphasized his own aversion to fund-raising in all its forms , especially
as it necessitated his own involvement. He pointed to the many memoranda he received as
expressing his staffs frustration with his detachment from the process, and his own unwillingness
to solicit funds with the energy they wished. In effect, he said, the fund-raising was done by
others, and he was not involved in directing their efforts.
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Appendix One

Public Hearings, Commission Reports, and
Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements
Concerning Campaign Finance

Commission Reports, Public Hearings and
Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements
Concerning Campaign Finance

The following is a listing of reports, public hearings and computer printouts
which comprise the publicly available work of the Commission, thus far, in the area of
Campaign Finance. Copies of the reports, transcripts and computer printouts are available from
the Commission.

Commission Reports
1.

Campaign Financing: Preliminary Report, issued December 21, 1987.

2.

Campaign Finance Reform: The Public Perspective, issued July 1988. (Results of a
poll conducted for the Commission by Dresner, Sykes, Jordan & Townsend, Inc.)

3.

The Albany Money Machine: Campaign Financing for New York Legislative Races, issued
August 1988.

4.

Unfinished Business: Campaign Finance Reform in New York City, issued September 28,
1988.

Public Hearings
1.

October 21-23, 1987 in New York City and Buffalo. Forums on campaign financing with
expert witnesses, including Dr. Herbert Alexander.

2.

January 26, 1988 in Albany. Hearing on the Poughkeepsie Town Board election of
1985.

3.

March 14-15, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Focusing on fund-raising
practices of statewide and New York Citywide officeholders; received testimony from
their fund-raisers and from large contributors.

4.

June 20, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing, New York City: including
testimony of Mayor Edward I. Koch, City Council President Andrew J. Stein, and
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin.

5.

September 23, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: New York State
Comptroller Edward V. Regan's fund-raising practices.

6.

October 25, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Continuation of January 26,
1988 hearing into the 1985 Poughkeepsie Town Board Election -- emphasis on New
York State Board of Elections investigation.

7.

March 10, 1989, in Albany. Campaign Financing: New York Statewide Elected
Officials' fund -raising practices; including testimony of Governor Mario M. Cuomo and
Attorney General Robert Abrams.

8.

March 17, 1989, in Albany. Campaign Financing: Fundraising Practices of New York
State Legislators and Legislative Party Committees; including testimony of Senate
Majority Leader Ralph Marino and Assembly Speaker Mel Miller.

Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements
1.

Statewide Officeholders New York State: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor
or alphabetically by contributor address.

2.

Citywide Officeholders New York City: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor or
alphabetically by contributor address.

3.

State Party Committees (Democratic) New York State: 1/1/81-1/1/88. Sorted
alphabetically by contributor.

4.

State Party Committees (Republican) New York State: 12/7/81-1/1 /88. Sorted
alphabetically by contributor.

5.

Legislative Party Committees (Senate Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82-2/11/88.
Sorted alphabetically by contributor.

6.

Legislative Party Committees (Senate Republican) New York State: 11/29/82-1/1/88. Sorted
alphabetically by contributor.

7.

Legislative Party Committees (Assembly Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82-3/4/88.
Sorted alphabetically by contributor.

8.

Legislative Party Committees (Assembly Republican) New York State: 11/30/82-3/11/88.
Sorted alphabetically by contributor.

9.

Citywide Officelwlders - New York City, Update: 1/88-7/88. Sorted alphabetically by
contributor.

10.

Borough Presidents - New York City: 1/83-7/88. Sorted by Borough President,
alphabetically by contributor.

11.

Legislators - New York State Senators and Assemblymen: 1/85-7/88. Individual reports
on each, sorted alphabetically by contributor.

Appendix Two

Commission's Recommended
Contribution Limits

Commission's
Recommended Contribution Limits

Category of Contributor
[Proposed Aggregate Limit]*

1. Corporations, unions
and anyone doing
business with
government.

2. Individual
[$25,000 per year]

Recipient of
Contribution

TOTALLY

Proposed Limit

PROHIBITED

Candidate for
Statewide Office

$2,500 - $4,000 per
election

Candidate for
Senate/Assembly

$1,500 - $2,000 per
election

Candidate for
Local Office

Citywide Office, New
York City: $2,500 4,000 per election
All other city/
county: $1,000 $2,000 per election
TownNillage/other:
$500 - $1,000 per
election

PAC

$1,500 - $2,000
per year

Party Committee

$2,500 - $4,000
per year

* Aggregate limit is the maximum any contributor can give per year for political purposes to all candidates, party
committees and PACs.

Catergory of Contributor
[Proposed Aggregate Limit]

Recipient of
Contribution

Proposed Limit

3. PAC

Candidate for
Statewide Office

$2,500 - $4,000
per election

Candidate for
Senate/Assembly

$1,500 - $2,000
per election

Candidate for
Local Office

Citywide Office, New
York City: $2,500 $4,000 per election

[$10,000 - $15,000
per year]

All other city/
county: $1,000 $2,000 per election
TownNillage/other:
$500 - $1,000 per
election

4. Party Committee
[No aggregate limit]

5. Individual Candidates'
Committees
[No aggregate limit]

Party Committee

$5,000 per year

Any Candidate

5 times limit on
contribution from
an individual

Another Party
Committee

Same as contribution
from an individual to
party committee

Other Candidates

Same as contribution
from an individual to
that candidate

Party Committees

Same as contribution
from an individual to
party committees

Appendix Three

Exhibits

Mario M. Cuomo, Gove-rnor

1/15/83 ~ 1/15/89
Total Monetary Contributions
and Transfers In:·

$ 9,377,000

OTHER (:&)

FNANC~L (10%)

REAL EST ATE (8%)
UNONS (8%)
ERNG, CONSTRUCTON &CONTRACTNG (9%)

LEGAL (7%)

ransfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included

Robert Abrams, Attorne General

1/12/83 ~ 1/11 89
Total Monetary Contributions
and Transfers In:·

$ 2,527,000

LEGAL (11 %)
FINANCIAL (5%)
UNIONS (10%)

OTHER (60%)

* Transfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included

REAL EST ATE (14%)

Edward V. Regan, Comptroller

1/10/83 ~ 1/15/89
Total Monetary Contributions
and Transfers In:·

$ 3,801,000

FINANCIAL (63%)

REAL ESTATE (163)

LEGAL (12%)

OTHER (9%) ·

ransfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included

Pyramid - Related Contributions and Expenditures for

the 1905 Town Board Elections and the Poughkeepsie Galleria

Total Contributions
and Expenditures
$776,967.

Campaign Contributions

Expenditures by

from 18 Pyramid-Related
Individuals

Pyramid-Related..__ __
Companies

$475,967.

$301,000.
$75,000

$226 ,000.

+

~
N.Y. Republic an

$126,000.

State Cammi ttee
N.Y. Republica n $100,000.
111

'-$31 ,500 _.

Federal Camp aign
Committee
Total
$226,000.

l

Town of

Building a

Poughkeepsie
Republican

Better
New York

Committee
$31,500

Committee

I
$31 ,500.

$166,045.

$75,000.
/
$69,700.

$386,892 .

Campaign Strategies, Inc. and Various Vendors

Campaign

Engaged in Consulting, Polling, Research, Mailing,

Strategies, Inc.

$49,000.

$4 0, 075 .

Attorneys'

Polling and

Fees

Research Fees

I

Printing and Other Election Related Work

$386,892.

$49,000.

$40,075.

$267,245.

Total Expenditures Related to

Additional Expenditures Related to

the Town Board Elections:$ 26 7,245.

Either the Town Board Elections or
the Poughkeepsie ·Galleria: $ 4 75, 967.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
(1986 and 1988 Election Campaigns)

RALPH MARINO

PERCENTAGE
VOTE
IN ELECTION

DATES*

AMOUNT

1986 Election Campaign Cycle
Contributions received
1/15/86 - 1/11/87

$ 63,900

62%

1988 Election Campaign Cycle
Contributions received
1/12/88 - 1/11/89

$209,200

65%

CATEGORIES OF
CONTRIBUTORS

1988 CYCLE

1986 CYCLE

PACs

$22,527

35%

$106,454

50%

Corporations &
Associations
(other than PACs)

$15,900

24%

$ 20,740

9%

Employee
Organizations
(other than P ACs)

$

400

0%

640

0%

Other

$25,073

41%

$ 81,366

41 %

TOTAL

$63,900

100%

$209,200

100%

$

* In June 1988, Majority Leader Warren Anderson announced his intention to retire at the end of the legislative
session.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
(1984 and 1986 Election Campaigns)

MELVIN MILLER

PERCENTAGE
VOTE
IN ELECTION

DATES*

AMOUNT

1984 Election Campaign Cycle
Contributions received
1/14/84 - 7/12/85

$ 40,700

76%

1986 Election Campaign Cycle
Contributions received
1/14/86 - 7/15/87

$ 82,700

83%

CATEGORIES OF
CONTRIBUTORS

1984 CYCLE

--

1986 CYCLE

PACs

$13,900

34%

$32,805

39%

Corporations &
Associations
(other than PACs)

$ 7,050

17%

$13,650

16%

Employee
Organizations
(other than PACs)

$ 4,100

10%

$ 3,050

3%

Other

$15,650

39%

$33,195

42%

TOTAL

$40,700

100%

$82,700

100%

* In May 1986, Speaker of the Assembly Stanley Fink announced his intention to retire from the Assembly at the
end of the legislative session.
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To

Governor Cuomo

From:

Lucille Falcone .

Re

November 20, 1984 Second Ariniversary Celebr.ation
. I

In preparation for the next Celebration, I would like
to proceed to form a Board of Advisors and a Dinner Committee.
In addition, I suggest a General Mailing as soon as the computer
printout is completed.

---

Board of Advisors of The Friends of -Mario Cuomo
Attached ·is a list of prospective members and a copy
of the proposed letter for your review. - The "Board of Advisors"
is actually a Finance Committee. I think that the type of
people we are trying to attract will be more eager to serve if
they feel that they are serving in an advisory, as well as a
fundraising capacity. The Board will be a permanent group consisting of approximately 30-50 members meeting periodically. I
have attempted to organize the Board on both a regional and .
industry basis. They will be encouraged to organize their
industry or region as the case may be into sub-committees.
Board members will be asked to raise a minimum of $30,000.00
(three tables) for the November dinner.
Dinner Committee
Attached is a list of prospective members and . a copy .
of the proposed letter. The Dinner Committee will consist of
approximately 100 .members organized solely for purposes of
purchasing and/or selling tables for the November dinner.
They will each be .asked to commit to raising $1,000.00 (one
table) for the dinner. ' ·
:.-~"~
- · ·. ···.
... ·;. ~ -

.

\

.

.;. .

-2-

Memo to:
From
Re

:

Governor Cuomo ·
Lucille Falcone
November 20, 1984 Second Anniversary Celebration

..

General Mailing

Attached - ls a copy of the proposed solicitation letter
to be sent to all persons on our mailing list, except for those
invited to join either the Board of A'dvisors or Finance Committee.
All letters will be on "The Friends of Mario Cuomo
Committee" letterhead under your signature, unless you suggest
otherwise. I cleared this with Fabian. I would follow up after
the mailing to provide details and explain the commitment requested
of Board and Dinner members. I did not think it appropriate to
provide these details in your letter.
-

'

advise if I should proceed.

Lucille Falcone
cc:

Andrew Cuomo
Michael DelGiudice

August 7, 1984

.

..

"

Board of Advisors Letter
FOMC Letterhead

Dear (name) :

.

guber~torial campaign 4 ~e

In the 1982 New York
cc;I!.c!fdate .spent $13. 9 million•

I

you

-f

e
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-Oil t.:..med ptiblic serv±Ci::: IS ±.£ Li.... L--l

t

i;?:h~:U!t:'"!.rr~h~t

>·~~}"'respond

yop.;ill

~ur a~abil{~y

regarding
serve to Lucille Falcone at (212) 686-1000.
your continued support.

-

.j:;r;.,;;.r;..;eam.
to
Thank you for

Sincerely,

\\

~IJ,,J,AA'1'~ _J

l~LJV/

~~

I
Mario M. Cuomo

h-'-e-c..AoN""..,..,..

..µ,,'~
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7!~~.fo
k~fo~-/,~~ 4~,.,..~~w,
~ ~' ~a.~7-fv~fl,.,~&j

~ ~~ ~. lo A ·n~

...
Dinner Committee Letter
FOMC Letterhead

Dear {name} :
In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign, the
Republican candidate . spent $13.9 million, while my· campaign
spent $4.8 million which means that we were outspent by more
than three to one. We believe that the Republicans intend
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with
some estimates ranging as high as $25 million.
In order to enable me to continue to serve the
people of the State of New York, we ·must be prepared to meet
this challenge. Of course, we can only accomplish this with
the assistance of friends and supporters and we must begin
to prepare now.
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November 20, 1984.
I invite you to join the Dinner Committee for this Celebration. If you feel that my continued public service is in
the best interests of the State, I hope that you will join
our team.
Kindly contact Lucille Falcone at (212} 686-1000
to advise of your availability to serve.
Thank you for your continued support.
Sincerely,

Mario M. Cuomo

•

CODE

AA
ABM
J AIA
AN
AN2
ART
ASS
J ATT
Bel
J BBQ
JI BBS 5
./ BNK
BOA
JEROK

JBuF
BZL
./CAR
CBC
CCH
CEL

.JcoNT
.../cpc
CUM

cuo
DNC
DOC
jjDS85

· EDU
/ENG

ENT
./FIN
FOR

~~N

JGOL
./HEN
INA
./INS
ITL
K85
KG
KOC
LL
LEW
JLUC

DESCRIPTION

Bill Stefn's list of $5000+ givers
Robert Abrams list of $500+
Architects
1st Anniversary
2nd Anniversary
Art
Assembly - $500+ contribution to Assembly Campaign Cornn
Attorneys
Carol Bellamy - $500~
Business Bar-be-que 1984
Business Bar-be-que 1985
Banking
Board of Advisors
Brokerage Houses
Buffalo Area Contributors
Basil Patterson - $500+
Hugh Carey - $500+
CBC Board (Bankers & RE)
County Chairs
Celebrities
Contractors
~
€ity Pl.:Hning 0 2H1111.:usionCd,,J.Sc,.~r'
/o C .c)
Cuomo Contributors (General)
Mrs. Cuomo's Luncheons
Democratic National Committee (Members & Committees)
Doctors
Dinner Committee So!icitation 1985
Education
Engineers
Entertainment
Finance
Fortune 500 Companies
General Givers - $500+ contribution to 1982 General
General Business
Harrison Goldin $500+
Hennessey - List provided/ ~I Bill Hennessey
Inauguration fc.-f 0..1 v."1'-( .:f)dv
Insurance
Italians
Koch 85 - $500+ to Mayor's race
1983 Koch Dinner $500+
pre-1985 Koch $500+ givers
Labor Leaders
Lew Lehrman - $500+ givers to 1982 campaign
Lucille Falcone - list

* +w

ME MO R A N D UM

To

.

From :
Re

.

Governor Cuomo
Lucille Falcone
Board of Advisors and Dinner Committee
of the Friends of Mario Cuomo .

After discussion with Michael DelGiudice and Phyliss
Wagner, I suggest the following changes in the Board of Advisors
and Dinner Co~~tte~ .lists previously submitted to you, copies
of which are enclosed:
Transfer to Board of Advisors from Dinner Committee
(t1D recommended)
/Albert Shanker
/John Gu tfreund
/'Penny Kaniclides
/Alfred Taubman
/A. Robert Towbin
/Edmund Pratt
,_A,ewis Rudin
Letters to the foregoing are enclosed for your
signature, if you think that they are appropriate.
Add to Board of Advisors
VMarvin Traub
-/'~r. Fink7lstein
al'Mrs. Irwin Kramer

~hornton

Bradshaw
al"..,z!hillip Robinson
V Arthur Hauspurg

(Bloomingdale's - PCW recommended)
(Macy's · - PCW recommended)
(Daughter of Charles Allen, substitute
in place of Ir:win Krcimer - PCW
recommended) .
(LF)
(LF)
(LF) .

Remove from Board of Advisors
hoseph Murphy
~win Kramer

(MD)
(PCW)

Memo to:
From
Re

Governor Cuomo
Lucille Falcone
Board of Advisors and Dinner Committee
of the Friends of Mario Cuomo

Transfer to Dinner Committee from Board of Advisors
(MD recommended and PCW concurred)

.JG enneth

C. Nichols
homas M. Macioce
al Ge~b?~i
ames Murphy
ohn Sweeny
Stella Saltonstall

Remove from Dinner Committee
Francis Barry
James Ruth
Jorge Battista
Ronald Lauder

(MD recommended - he's being dropped
from a commission)
(MD recommended)
(MD recommended)
(PCW recommended)

Please note that Leon Hess, · William Shea and George
Klein are on the proposed Board of Advisors list and advise
whether they are appropriate.
I also suggest that we invite everyone who attended
the Business Barbecue to be on the Dinner Committee. A copy of
the list is enclosed.
I would suggest that the Board of Advisors mailing and
the General mailing be done immediately. Once the Board has been
formed, I would do the Dinner Committee mailing. I would also
suggest that the first meeting of the Board be a dinner meeting
scheduled after Labor Day.
·
Also enclosed are copies of the revised letters for the
Dinner Committee solicitation and the General mailing. I would
recommend that you not sign the General mailing letter inasmuch as
it will~ be sent to approximately 15,000 people. A decision must
be made as to who should sign the letter.
Please advise whether the above is acceptable.

~~

Lucille Falcone
cc·:

Andrew Cuomo
Michael DelGiudice

August 21, 1984

-2-

-.

Dinner Committee Letter
FOMC letterhead

In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign .we were
outspent by more than three to one: the Republican candidate
spent $13.9 million. We are told that-the Republicans intend
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with
some estimates -ranging as high as $25 million.
We believe we have already made a strong record of
accomplishment for the State. There are more than 200,000
people at work in our State than in 1982 and crime is down by
9\_ Those figures are striking evidence that our program of
"Jbbs and Justice" is working well.
In order to be able to continue to serve and to
build on this record, we must somehow find a way to meet the
challenge of our opponents' wealth. To do that we need the
assistance of friends and supporters who believe in our cause.
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November
, 1984.
I invite you to join the Dinner Committee for this Celebration. If you feel that my continued public service is in
the best interests of the ·State, I hope that you will join
our team.
Kindly contact Lucille Falcone at (212) . 686-1000
to advise of your avail~bility to serve .

•

Thank you for your continued support.
- Sincerely / ·

Mario M. Cuomo

General Mailing

Dear Friend:
In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign we were
outspent by more than three to one: the Republican candidate
spent $13.9 million. We are told that the Republicans intend
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with
s~me estimates ranging as high as $25 million.
We believe we have already made a strong record of
accomplishment for the State. There ·are more than 200,000
people at work in our State than in 1982 and crime is down by
9%. Those figures are striking evidence that our program of
"Jobs and Justice" is working well.
·
In order to be able to continue to serve and to
build on this record, we must somehow find a way to meet the
challenge of our opponents' wealth. To do that we need the
assistance of friends and supporters who believe in our cause.
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November 20, 1984. I
hope that you will be able to join us . . You will receive a
formal invitation shortly, however, if you would like to make
a reservation, you may do so now.
Thank you ·for your continued support.
Sincerely,

Enclosure: RSVP card
.'!

·-'

BOARD OF ADVISORS

1.
2.
3.
4.

s.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

is:.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44:
45.

Sol Chaikin
Morton Bahr
Edward Cleary
Abraham Schraeder
Maurice Greenberg
Kenneth Nichols
Edgar Bronfrnan
H.I. Merinoff
Robert Milano
Peggy Kurnble
William Beinecke
John C. Bierwirth
William Ferguson
William Shea
Robert Wagner
Richard Albosta
Harry Helrnsley
Irving Schneider
Milton Petrie
Irwin Winkler
James Nederlander
Gerald Schoenfeld
.George Weissman
Alan Greenberg
John Heimann
John Creedon
1'1artin Segal
John Kluge
Robin Farkas
Robert Karnarro
Jack Rudin
Robert Tisch
Leon Hess
Arthur Krim
Nate Landow
Sal Gerbasi
Bernie Picotte
Robert Gioia
Torn Wilmot
Herbert Allen
Arthur Emil
George Klein
John Sweeny
Thomas Murphy
Donald Trump

Union
..Pnion
Union
Garment {has raised money for 'Koch)
Insurance
Insurance Liquor
Liquor
Racing
Racing
Environmentalist & Business (Sperry)
Defense Contractors
Communications
Attorney
Attorney
Engineer (Ebasco)
Real Estate
Real Estate
Retailers
Entertainment
Theatre
Theatre
Business
Brokerage
Brokerage
Insurance
Cultural
Business
Retailer (Alexander's}
Retailer (A & ·s)
Real Estate
Business
Business
Nassau
Albany
Buffalo
Rochester
Business
Real Estate
. Real Estate
Union
Communications
Real Estate

Board of Advisors
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46. Leonard Lauder
47. D~vid Mahoney
48. John Brademas
49. Cyrus Vance .
SO. James Murphy - Sl. Peter Kiernan
S2. - John McGillicuddy
S3. John Reed
54. Sanford Weill .. ..
SS. Walter Shipley
56. Donald Kendall
S7. Hicks Waldron
S8. Thomas M. Macioce
s~: .
Irwin Kramer
60. John Tishman
61. Stella Saltonstall
62. David A. Werbliri
63. William Kanaga
64. Joseph Murphy

.,

Cosmetics
· Business ,
Univ'ersi ties
Attorney
Bank
Bank (Albany)
· B~k

Bank
Broker
Bank
Beverage (Pepsico)
Cosmetics (Avon)
Retailers
Real Estate
.

Accountant (Arthur
Universities

Y~u~g

& Co.)

DINNER COMMITTEE

Vincent Albanese
· Robert Arnow
Henry Benach
Arnold Biegen
Otto Bonadonna
Peter M• . Brant
Victor Condello
Angelo :Costanza
Lawrence Costiglio
Robert N. Downey .
Frank Drozak
Robert Ferdon
Bertram Firestone.
Robert Fernan
Joseph Giglio
Sheldon S. Goldstein
Victor Gotbaum
Donald J. Greene
John Gutfreund
Charles Harris
Gedale Horowitz
Michael Johnston
Penny Kaniclides
Mary Wells . Lawrence
William A. Levin
Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Matthew Lifflander
David S. Mack
Earl I. Mack
William L. Mack
Richard Manney
John F.X. Mannion
Barry Marcus
William Mattison
William McGowan
William s. Mcspedon
John Michaelson
Paul Milstein
Seymour Milstein
William Modell
Barney Monte
Joseph Monti
William Mulro
Matthew Nirnetz
William O'Shaughnessy
Robert Parker
Leone Peters
Tony Peters
Lester Petracca

Dinner Corrunittee
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Joseph Pinto
Vito J. Pitta
Lee Rizutto
Donald J. Robinson
J. Rousseau
Howard Rubenstein
Robert E. Rubin
Lewis Rudin .
Bernard J. Ruggi~r~
James N. Ruth, Jr.
Jack Scheinkrnan
Melvin L. Schweitzer
Albert Shanker
James Sinclair __ _
Richard Sirota .
Larry Silverstein
Jam es F. Srni th
Mjchael P. Smith
Robert Spitzer
Gordon Stewart
Chester Straub
Joseph Talarico
Alf red Taubman
A. Robert Towbin
Harry VanArsdale
Dr. Howard Wagner
David Walentas
Alan Weiler
Jack Weiler
Jerry A. Weiss
Dale Scutti
Paul Westerkarnp
John Zuccotti
Morton Kornreich
Daniel Rose
Ross Pepe
Stanley Steingut
Donald Blinken
-- Charles Montanti
Dick Fisher

.,

Dinner Conunittee
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Leo Fallon
Harry Jacobs
Sam Le Frak
David Peirez
Marty Steadman
Ronald Stanton
Robert Brennan - - Maurice Sonenberg
Torn _Young ·
Lewis Glucksman
Angelo Giordani __
Joseph Loveci
Al Roth
Michael Marx
Stephen Swid
Andrew Rosen
Ea: Downes
Lou ·Rena Hammond
Joseph Flom . ·
Michael Lazar
Edmund Pratt
Donald Platten
Abe Margolies
Evan Debell
Frank Wilde
David Rubenstein
Miles Ruben .
John.Pomerantz
Gene Eidenberg
Malcolm Forbes
Louis Wolf son
Robert A. Farmer
William Ellinghaus
Sheldon Solow
Denny Phipps and Bancroft (NYRA)

•

Dinner Committee
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*
*

*

*

*
*
*
*
*
.** *

*
*
*
*
*

·"*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*
*

*
*
**
*
*
*

*

Mrs. Walter Shorenstein
Nina Rosenwald
Averill and Pamela Harriman
Martin Barell
Percy Sutton
:Richard LeFrak
Jim Stanton
John Rosenwald
Ed Arrigoni-Francis Barry
Wellington Mara
George Steinbrenner
William -Paley ·
Carter Burden
Edward Bennett Williams
Richard Gidrin
Alan Felinger
Joel Gersky
Hannan Komanof f
Sam Fredman .
Neil Norry
Sam Edelman
Dick Wilson
Stanley Cohn
Laura Bonvigiani
Lou Swyer
John Trif aletti
Bernie Conners
Robert Milonzi
Leonard Stern
John Barry
Christina Tusi
Dr. Hugo Morales
Jorge Battista
Earl Graves
John Procoppe
Bruce Llwellyn
J'ohn Torres
Carlos Correa
Ron Brown
Bill Woodward
Tony Vallella

~

Recommended by Tony Burgos and Ellen Conovitz

.,

.. .
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**
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**
**
**
**
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·.."**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
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**
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**
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**
**
**
**
**
**
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Neil Austrian
Richard Bliss
Coy Eklund
Joseph Delario
Andrew Gurley
Daniel }j~rman .
Michael Hernandez
Richard Kezer
Andrew Lanyi ..
Natalie Lipman
Morgan Murray
Robert Rose
Eryk Spektor
Ed Steinberg
C. G. Tharp
James Wolf ensohn
Marion Ascoli
Mr. and Mrs. Donald Everett Axinn .
Stuart Beck
Louis Bernard
John Forma
Marif e Hernandez
Judith Hernstadt
Stephen Hopkins
Peter Kalikow
Jeffrey Koopersmith
Isabelle Leeds
Leland . Maphail
George McNamee
Morton Olshan
Ben Palumpo
Louis Resnick
Edwin Roer
Stanley Smith
Robert Sterling
Joseph Watts
Lawrence Wien
Joan Axinn
DNC

"

1 Hr. William C. Ferguson
NY Bell

P. 0. Box 2945
New York, New York

10185

8 Hr. William A. Shea &. Guest
Shea and Gould
330 Hadison Avenue
New York, New York 10017

2 Hr. Delbert C. Staley
NYNEX

1095 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

.

3 Hr. Robin Farkas
Alexanders
4 World Trade Center
New York, New York 10048

10 Hr. Gordon Stewart & Guest
American Stock Exchange
86 Trinity Plaza
New York, New York 10006

5 Hr. Earl I. Mack & Guest
370 West Passaic Street
Rochelle Park, NJ 07662

· ~11Mr.
Mrs. ~·ncent Tese
130 ast 74t Avenue
New Yo , New
rk 1 21

6 Mr. William L. Mack & Guest .
370 West Passaic Street
Rochelle Park, NJ 07662

12 Mr. Al Roth
Al Roth Bonds
50 West 34tb Street
New York, New York 10001

7 Hr. and Hrs. Raymond Schuler
152 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12210

13 Ms. Ruth S. Elliott
One Park Avenue, Rm. 837
New York, New York 10016
GUEST: her son

-.;..

14 tts. Margaret C. ttcGarry
360 Lexington. Avenue ··
·
New York, New York 10017

. ·.

20 Hr. Gerald Shoenfeld
225 West 44th Street ,
New York, New York 10036

.. .

15 Hs. Lillian Giden
Suite 1515
230 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10169
GUEST: Dr. Penelope Russianoff

21 ~ Mr. Arthur Hauspurg
Con Edison
4 Irving Place

· New York, New York .:· 10003 .-· · ··

16 Hr. Manuel Bustelo
Publisher
El Diario-La Prensa
Gannett Company, Inc.
143 Varick Street
New York, New York 10013

22 Hr. Eugene "Luntey
195 Montogue Street
Brooklyn, New York 11201
GUESTS: Mr. & Mrs. Robert Cattell

17 Hr. and Hrs. George B; Cox
Sr. Vice President
General Electric
One River Road
Schenectady, New York 12345

23 Mr. David A. \.lerblin
Madison Square Garden
2 Pennsylvania Plaza
New York, New York 10121

18 Mr. James Gifford
200 Madison Avenue, 3rd Floor
New York, New York 10016

24 Mr. Thornton Bradshaw
RCA
Rockefeller Plaza
New York~ New York 10020

19 Mr. Edmund Pratt
Pfizer, Inc.
·
235 East 42nd Street
.
New York, New York 10017

25 Mr. Phillip Robinson
Procter & Gamble
5 Corporate Park Drive
·· White Plains, New York 10604

. ...

.,

:

26 Hr. George HcNamee, Jr.
President
.
First Albany Corporation
90 State Street
Albany, New York 12207

33 Mr. William Mu!rou
Donaldson, Lufkin
& Jenrette, Inc • .
140 Broadway
New York, New York 10005 .
GUEST: · Teddy Strane

27 Mr. Joseph Allen & Guest
P. 0. Box 3443
Greenwich, CT 06830

34: Mr. George Weissman & Guest
Philip Morris
120 Park Avenue
New York, ~ew York 10017

28 Mr. and Mrs. Donald Bachmann
Bachmann, Scwartz & Abrams-on
2 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016
GUEST: Harriet

36 Mr. & Mrs. A. Costenza
275 Hibiscus Drive
Rochester, New York 14618

...

..
..
29 Mr. Jack Carroll
Grumman Corp.
1111 Stewart Avenue
Betbpage, New York 11714
GUEST: Maura Carroll

38 Mr. & Mrs. Barney Monte
245-20 Grand Central Parkway
Bellerose, New York 11426

30 Mr. Robert N. Downey
Goldman Sachs
85 Broad Street, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10004
GUEST: John Melvin

39 Mr. & Mrs. Lester Petracca
18 Borglum Road
Manhassett, New York 11030

31 Mr. & Mrs. Sheldon S. Goldstein
17 Bon Aire Circle
Suffern, New York 10901

40 Mr. Joseph Pinto & Guest
Manuel, Elken Company
419 Park Avenue, South
New York, New York 10016

....

CUUMU~

tile

•

- -~--

~ All~NU~U nn~

. .

43 Hr~ & Hrs. ·Melvin Schw~itzer '
Rogers and Wells
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016

49 Hr. Victor Condello
and Guest
27 Woodland Drive
Huntington Bay, NY '11713

44 Hr. & Mrs. Richard Sirota
Xwik International Color Ltd.
11 8th Avenue
New York, New York 10011

50 Ms. Alice Byrne
Ambassador Investigations Inc.
554 Argyle -Road
Brooklyn, New York 11230 .

45 Mr. Robert Spitzer -&--Guest .
1700 Broadway
.
New York, New York 10019

51 Ms. Phyllis Linn
Fine Art Advisory Services
165 East 66th Street
New York, New York 10021

46 Hr. Lou Rena Hammond
39 East Slst Street
New York, New York 10022

52 , Ms. Jill Feldman
Jill Feldman, CPA
Apt. 1403
270 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10016

47 Ms. Peg Sweazy
JFK International Airport

Jamaica, New York

11432

48 Hr. Angelo Giordani
210 East 86th Street
New York, New York 10028

53 Ms. Lillian Firestone
Firestone Associates
1365 York Avenue
New York, New York 10021 ·
GUEST: Frances Smedberg

54 Ms. Lisa Kolb Liebert
Attorney-at-Law
277 Broadway, Suite 1506
New York, New York 10007
GUEST: Solomon Levine

'I

55 Hs. Cecile C. Weich
Atto::-ney-at-Law
One Riverdale Avenue
Bronx, New York 10463

61 Hs. Joan Lipton
485 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017
GUEST: Norton Wolf

56 Ms. Doris Gilman
Fingerprints Design
77 West 15th Street
New York, New York 10011
GUEST: Belina Caulfield

62a Hr. Robert Wagner, Sr.
Finley, Kwnble, Wagner,
Heine and Underberg
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

57 Ms. Carol Bensky
Women Business Owners
of New York
322 Eighth Avenue, 12th Flr.
New York, New York 10001
GUEST: Terri
.. Bensley

63 Hr. Robert Gioia
36 Ramsey Road
Buffalo, New York 14029

58 Ms. Tamara K. Homer
485 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017

65 President David Campbell
Computer Task Group, Inc.
800 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, New York 14209
GUEST: Gay Campbell

59 Ms. Phyllis F. Schwebel
First Vice President ·
Time Magazine
Room 11-30
Time & Life Building
New York, New York 10020

66 Ms. Susan Deutsch & Guest
Paine Webber
140 Broadway
New York, New
York ' 10005
.

60 Ms. Anne P. Collins
41 East 42nd Street, Rm. 400
New York, New York 10017

67 Ms. Sandra Kurtin
369 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017

..

.....

-- -··-... ---- · 68 Hs. Marybeth Lareau
875 Third Avenue
·
New York, New York 10022

70 Hr. & Mrs; Malcolm Forbes
Forbes Magazine
60 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

72 Mr. &. Mrs. Bernard _Pjcotte
Picotte Realty
120 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12210

73 Mr. Michael Picotte

& Guest

Picotte Realty
120 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12210

74 Mr. John Picotte
Picotte Realty
120 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12210

76 Mr. & Mrs. Edmond Safra
Republic National Bank
452 5th Ave., 9th Floor
New York, New York 10018

. ..:.

... . . . - ·· --- - -

"\,

77 Hr. & Mrs. Paul Lai ·
Jack's Chinese Restaurant
1881 Central Avenue
Albany, New York 12205

82 -:: Hr. Robert Greenba~

& Guest
Breed Abbott & Morgan : . . .
153 East 53rd Street ··
New York, New York · 10022

83 Hr. Robert Cammara & Guest
420 Fulton Street
Brooklyn, New York 11201

84 Dr. Robert Matrisiano
133-55 . Lefferts Blvd.
S. Ozone Park, NY 11420

85 Hr. Peter M. Brant
· White Birch Farm
Taconic Road
Greenwich, Connecticut 06030

86 Hr. and Mrs. James Conway
American Express Company
American Express Plaza
New York, New York 10004

•

BJ Hr~ Dale Horowitz
Salomon Brothers, Inc.
One New York Plaza
New York, New York 10004

·~

94 · Hr. Bernand Jacobs ·
225 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036

89 Ms. Jewel Jackson McCabe
10 East 87th Street
New York, New York 10028

95~ Ms. Jewel Jackson McCabe
President
·
National Coalition of
100 Black Women
10 East 87th Street
New York, New York 10028

90 Mr. Peter M. Brant & Guest
White Birch Farm
Taconic Road
Greenwich, CT 06830

96 Mr. Jolm Michaelson & Guest
First Boston Corp.
Park Avenue Plaza
New York, New York 10007

91 Mr. Edward K. Flynn & Guest
E. F. Hutton Group, Inc.
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, New York 10015

97 Mr. William O'Sbaughnessy & Guest
c/o WVOX - Return Radio
One Broadcast Forum
New Rochelle, New York 10801

92 Hr. Patrick Foley
American International Group
70 Pine Street
New York, New York 10004

98 Mr . & Mrs. James Conway
American Express Company
American Express Plaza
New York, New York 10004

93 Hr. Gedale Horowitz & Guest
Salomon Brothers, Inc.
One New York Plaza
New York, New York 10009

99 Mr. Harvey Sabinson
226 West 47th Street
New York, New York 10036

.·
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LAWRENCE

B.

BuTTENWIESER

575 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK 10022

March 4, 1987
Mr. Lewis Rudin
345 Park Avenue
New York, New York

10054

Dear Lew:
As a supplement to our recent telephone conversation:
1. I enclose with this Jetter a copy of the financial
Disclosure Statement of Citizens for Abrams for the period
ended January 14, 1987, which shows a cash balance at the
end of that period of $22,500 and loans outstanding at the
end of that period of $113,000. The present "deficit" has
been reduced by $5,000 and is now about $85,000.

2. The policy of the Campaign about contributions
from individuals with an interest In a Plan within the office
of the Attorney General is not to accept a contribution from
any individual with an interest in a Plan which has not been
accepted for filing. I am informed that the Plan for 65
Central Park West has been accepted for filing and
accordingly you are not hindered by the constraints of the
Campaign from making a contribution to the Campaign.
I hope that this enclosure and this information may be a
useful supplement to our conversation.

Best regards,

fordia:
Lawrenc~~Buttenwleser

finance Chairman
Citizens for Abrams
LBB:btb
Encls.
bee:

Hon. Robert Abrams
Leonard Boxer, Esq.
Mr. Ethan Geto
Ms. Laura Ross

September
From

87

1

.

,19--

the desk of:

LAWREN CE B. BUTTENWIESER
To:

RA

LB
EG
LR
Here is my version
of the "Balance Sheet"
of Citizens for Abrams
as at September 1,
1 987.

=

CITIZENS FOR ABRAMS

September 1, 1987

I.

Liabilities
Sterling National Bank
Guarantors:

$58,000

1•

Howard Schulder

44,000

2.

Jacob Schulder

14,000
58,000

II.

Assets:
(a)

Cash on hand

( b)

Labor

10,000

( c)

Pledges (net)

52,500

( d)

Contemplations

1, 000

5,000
68,500

.

-~

Amount
Pledged

Pledgor
Henry Benach
Arthur G. Cohen

Haircut

Person responsible
for collection

8,000

RA

1 5, 00 0

EG

7,500

Jerry Finklestein

5,000

EG

Peter Fischbein

6,000

EG

Abraham Hirschfeld

5,000

Jones, Day
(Arthur D. Emil)

5,000

Norman Levy

5,000

2,500

EG

Alexander Parker

10,000

5,000

EG

Lester Pollack

10,000

7,500

RA

Lewis Rudin

5,000

5,000

RA

Melvin L. Schweitzer

1 , 000
82,500

Gross

5,000

EG

Samuel M. Eisenstat

5,000

RA
EG

EG
30,000

82,500
-30,000

Net

Contemplator prospect
William Zeckendorf

52,500

Amount anticipated
5,000
5,000

Person responsible
for collection
LB

.Geto&deMilly Inc ..
Public Relations
Governmental Affairs
Political Consulting
I

:·

June 4, 1987

I

1

Mr. Lawrence B. Buttenwieser
Rosenman Colin Freund
Lewis & Cohen
575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Larry:
In your memo of May 28, 1987 you designated me as the person
responsible for following up with Lew Rudin. This is not the
case--Bob was going to follow-up personally.
With warmest regards.

dl
bee:

Hon. Robert Abrams
Laura Ross

2.19/buttenwieser
130 East 40th Street

ST.ATE OF NEW YORK

ROBERT ABRAMS
ATTORNEY GENERAL..

DEPARTME~T OF L-\.W
Two WORLD TRADE CE:NTER
NEW YORK . N . Y. 100--'7

December 12, 1984
Mr. Frank Wilkinson
Managing Director
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
140 Broadway 36th floor
New York, NY 10005
·· -.~--

Dear Frank:
Rather than discuss with you a wide range of topics and
send clippings relating to those subjects, I thought I would
focus on a single important subject: crime. As you know, I have
made a major commitment over the past two years to working with
my colleagues in the law enforcement community to develop responsible reforms in our flawed criminal justice system. We have
been successful beyond our most optimistic expectations in
gaining support for and implementation .of many of these critical
changes.
I want to take this opportunity to share the story of
this success with you and to get your comments and advice -especially regarding the important adjustments which still need
to be made.
Two years ago, I exercised leadership in forming a
unique organization, the New York State Law Enforcement Council.
The LEC is made up of the Attorney General's Office, the New York
State District Attorneys Association, the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police, the New York State Sheriffs Association, The City of New York's Criminal Justice Coordinator and the
Citizens Crime Commission of New York City. We agreed on major
initiatives to strengthen the criminal justice system and to help
reduce crime in New York State. Because they represented a
consensus of the state's entire law enforcement community, our
initiatives offered a cogent and broadly acceptable plan of
action in an area where programmatic, jurisdictional and ideological differences had frequently stymied efforts to achieve badly
needed reforms. As a result, during 1983 and 1984, the Legislature and the Governor adopted major components of the LEC
program. These included:

* A tough asset forfeiture law, under which the state
can seize property used to commit felony crimes, the proceeds of
such crimes, and other assets exchanged for the ill-gotten fruits
of such crimes.
This is a powerful new tool in the fight against
sophisticated organized crime -- in particular narcotics
trafficking -- and white collar crime.

Exhibit
10

~

Mr. Frank Wilkinson
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* A change in the insanity defense. The revised law
now places the burden of proving a lack of criminal responsibility on the defendant in a criminal trial.

* The establishment of determinate sentencing. The
Legislature created a special State Sentencing Guidelines Committee to propose a system whereby sentences will be fixed by the
courts and not by the Parole Board.
* A reclassification of certain less serious misdemeanor crimes to permit non-jury trials in such matters. This
will help clear up the near-disastrous calendar backlogs in our
criminal courts.
- --·-· - -..
:

-:'"'

* Tougher handling of drunk drivers who cause injury or
death and are found criminally negligent.
Among other LEC proposals adopted were those which
raise the penalties for bail jumping; increase the maximum time
in prison that can be served by a person convicted of more than
one unrelated felony and sentenced to consecutive terms; permit
for the first time the indictment and trial together of defendants who participated in the same criminal incident but committed different crimes; bar frivolous appeals of sentences that
were based on a guilty plea; and allow a prosecutor to seek a
court order to force submission to a chemical blood alcohol test
in certain cases of driving while intoxicated.
In addition, I am especially gratified that longstanding concerns of mine to enhance the rights of crime victims
were put forward by the LEC and adopted. One such measure provides that courts consider restitution to victims as an alternative punishment in appropriate circumstances. Another liberalizes the amounts victims can ask a court to award for property
losses or medical expenses.
Taken together, these changes constitute a serious
effort to deal comprehensively with many of the problems of the
criminal justice system.
But these breakthroughs, however salutary, are still
only a beginning. The proposals which the Law Enforcement Council has made which remain to be acted upon include: an Organized
Crime Control Act that would give state and local prosecutors
critical weapons in the fight against organized crime; a major
expansion and revamping of probation services that will give new
life to this essential but long-neglected element of the system;
a switch to the federal system of selection of jurors by judges,
eliminating the dilatory and hugely expensive voir dire system
now used in the state courts, under which the lawyers-5°elect the

!tr.

Frank Wilkinson
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jurors; increased capacity for local jails which are literally
bursting at the seams; and further assistance to crime victims.
I am greatly encouraged by the results that have been
obtained through the spirit of cooperation and collaboration
generated by the Law Enforcement Council. Further success in
creating the best possible criminal justice system in which the
public can have the highest degree of confidence will depend on
continuing broad support from the public.
As a person of prominence who has a leadership role in the community, I want to keep
you informed of these crucial developments and hope that I will
have the benefit of your counsel and your help in building and
maintaining that all-important support.
I look forward to hearing your comments and reactions.
For your added information, I am enclosing a few recent articles
and commentaries which of fer greater detail about certain aspects
of this subject.
With best personal regards.

ST.A.TE OF
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May 10, 1985
Hon. Albert N. Abgott
Kenmore, New York 14217
(

.

Dear Al:
Traditionally, on Law Day, May 1st, the Attorney
General addresses the Court of Appeals and an audience of
top public officials and leaders of the bar. This year, I
devoted my Law Day remarks to the urgent needs of the criminal
justice system. Pointing to the importance of a long-overdue
comprehensive approach to fighting serious•crime, I called
for a major increase in law enforcement resources for police
and prosecutors, supported in part by new state fundingi
encouragement of innovative programs to improve the effectiveness
of police and prosecutors; and statewide consolidation of
the court system to promote improved court: management.
/
In combination with the development of a new system
of tougher, determinate sentences, which I support, this program
would give us the appropriate resources to respond vigorously
to the challenge of widespread criminality. With three-quarters
of a million major crimes reported in New York State last year,
we must be prepared to make responsible changes and reforms
and to devote additional funds to making our communities safer.
I am enclo§ing a copy of my Law Day remarks as
they appeared in the New York Law Journal.
As always, I
would very much appreciate your comments and reactions. As I
shape concepts outlined in the address into more detailed
proposals for the consideration of the law enforcement
' ·
community and the Governor and Legislature, your suggestions
will be espe. cially helpful.
With warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,

.
ROBERT ' ABRJl.!1S

.'

'.

ARV

last-name, first-name,

title, companyl, company2, street,

STATE OF

NEW

YORK

DEPARTMENT OF LAW
ROBERT

ABRAMS

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Two WoRLD TRADE CENTER

NEW

YoHK.

N. Y.

10047

September 13, 1985
&mr& &first-name& &last-name&
&title/a&
&companyl/o&
&company2/o&
&street& &suite-apt&
&city&, &state& &zip&
Dear &dear&:
Recently, I took the initiative to .organize a group of
state attorneys general to oppose elimination of deductibility
of state and local taxes as part of any tax reform program.
Twenty of my colleagues joined me in a statement to the
President and leaders of Congress expressing our unanimous view
that the scheme to allow double taxation would undermine the
essential role of states and localities in our federal system.
The twenty-one attorneys general involved are of
different parties and philosophies and represent every region of
the country, including both larger and smaller states. ·rt is
especially noteworthy that they come from both relatively highand low-tax states.
Moreover, we are a group with widely differing views
on tax reform. Personally, I strongly favor genuine tax reform
along the lines of the Treasury Department's first plan
("Treasury I") or the Bradley-Gephardt plan, ·sponsored by New
Jersey Senator Bill Bradley and Missouri Representative Richard
A. Gephardt. The nation's tax system has become not only
unfair, but also a burden to economic growth, as political
favoritism to special interests and not the markets has
increasingly become a decisive force in allocating capital.

Hon. Albert N. Abgott

- 2 -

September 13, 1985

But, despite the long-overdue need for comprehensive
change, double taxation is no reform. Since the income tax
began in 1913, the tremendous responsibilities of state and
local governments for public services such as education, police
and sanitation have been recognized, and the deductibility
provision has been taken for granted. As of last year -excluding defense and interest on the debt -- the federal budget
was $542 billion, while aggregate spending of state and local
governments was $470.7 billion. This makes it abundantly clear
that the major revenue streams available to state and local
governments for the past 72 years are needed, and that any
disruption of this system will wreak havoc. It is estimated,
for example, that if deductibility is disallowed, the nation's
15,000 school districts will be forced to cut back by twenty
percent. This would cause a major crisis in public education.
Elimination of the deductibility of state and local
taxes would also be a terrible blow to New York City. It would
send a devastating signal to the business coilllllunity. Major
coroprations would find that their well-paid executives would
rather live in Connecticut or some other state. For many, this
would be an inducement to locate or relocate beyond the borders
of New York State. Middle income homeowners who pay hefty real
estate taxes would also seriously suffer under such a plan.
It's important, therefore, that we continue to mount a vigorous
fight on this serious issue.
·
I am enclosing for your information a copy of the
statement to the President from the 21 attorneys general .. ·· As
always, I am eager to get your reactions and comments on this
issue of critical importance, especially to New Yorkers. I look
forward to hearing any advice or input you may have.
With warmest personal regards.
Sincerely' ·

ROBERT ABRAMS

ST.a.TE 01" NEW' YORK

DEP_'\.RT)<!E::fT OF
ROBERT ABRAMS
A'n"ORNEY GENERAL.
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December 27, 1985

&mr& &first-name& &last-name&
&title/o&
&companyl/o&
&company2/o&
&street& &suite-apt&
&city&, &state& &zip&
Dear &dear&:
In seven years as Attorney General, few achievements of
my office have been more gratifying personally than our success
in attracting the best and brightest men and women in the legal
profession. Public service always has had an appeal to
attorneys, and we have sought to maximize that appeal by working
hard to give the Office of Attorney General the highest
.'
professional quality.
The New York Law Journal recently focused on our
considerable success in recruiting excellent, experienced
attorneys -- often at a substantial financial sacrifice -- from
many of the major law firms. This is just one aspect of our
recruitment of a first-rate staff from the non-profit sector,
government and the private bar, but it is an especially
satisfying part of that larger story. A copy of the Law Journal
article is enclosed for your information.
---Quality recruitment is the foundation of all our other
initiatives in the office. We have supplemented this effort with
training programs and seminars for our lawyers. It is part of
the program we have established to make the Attorney General's
office a professionally run, quality law office. As always, I
would very much appreciate hearing any cotmnents or ideas you may
have concerning this or any other phase of the office's mission.
With warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,
ROBERT ABRAMS

STATE OF NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

Two

ROBERT ABRAMS

WORLD TRADE CE::-.TER

NEW YORK,N .

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Y.

10047

April

Mr. Edward R.
l!ew York,

Downe,

18,

1986

Jr.

NY 10022

Dear Ed:
This is a crucial year for law enforcement in New York State in its
with the mob, corrupt public officials and politicians, and
white cC\llar cr_iminals.
Law enforcement has taken on sC\me formidable
challenges, forcefully, diligently and responsibly. - But these challenges
have spotlighted major weaknesses in our state l~w enforcement
capability that must be corrected.
strug~les

As allegations of criminal wrongdoing by high public officials and
powerful party leaders :In New York City have unfolded, the close
coope=ation among federal, state and local prosecutors has been notable.
For example, the investigations focusing on collections contracts in the
city's Parking Violations Bureau were handled primarily by U.S. Attorney
~dolph Giuliani, while investigations of alleged fraud by Citisocrce,
Inc. in obtaining a contract for a hand-held summons-issuing computer
were handled mainly by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau and
by my office.
The dramatic series of indictments of major mob figures
has been possible because of the same kind of coop~ration at work.
One
federal case -- the indictment of leading mob figures on charges that
they constituted a 11 CC\Tl'mission" that directed gangster enterprises
was made possible by investip,ative work done by the New York State
Organized Crime Task Force, an arm of my office.
This close cooperation on matters involving highly organized
criminal conspiracies is not only desirable; it is essential.
Federal
action is not only helpful because :It brings vast investigative
resources to bear on important cases; it is indispensable to successful
indictment ant! prosecution of some serious crimes.
Federal la\.·~ are
better designed to de.al with certain modern sophisticated crimes and to
bring violators to .i ustice.
The comparahle New York State laws arP
disturh5.ngly out of tlate. .
First ana foremost, New York State needs an Organiz~d C~ime Control
Act, pci.t:erned after the federal Racketeer Influenced iinci Corrupt
Org:!nizations Act (RICO).
l' r:der RICO, federal pro o ecutors ;ire able to
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represent the profits of crime.
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Second, we need to extend the reach of state bribery laws.
Under
present state law, payments to party officiAls to influence public
officials cannot be prosecuted as bribery.
Also, a public official
cannot now be prusecute<l for accepting bribes unless he is actually able
to bring about personally the result desired by thP. briber.
Wt need a
law which holds party officialR accountable for corrupt influencepeddling and which define~ brihPrv to include any acceptance of a
pnyment by a public official to influence an official act.
Third, we need to revise the present unnecessarily restrictive
state requirement for corroboration of testimony given by criminal
accomplices.
In most cases of public corruption and organized crime,
accomplices' agreeing to testify is the only way to prosecute anyone at
all.
Not only the federal government hut also most other states permit
the use of accomplice testiruony alone to convict defendants.
With its
special burdens of powerful crime syndicates, hir,h-volume narcotics
trafficking, public corruption and the potential for large-scale
economic crimes ·· of mAny kinds, New York State badly needs this important
criminal justice reform.
These three chan~es are critical.
They are being pressed
vigorously by the Law Enforcement Council -- a statewide alliance which
I was instrumental in organizjn~ and whicl1 .is made up of the Attorney
General, djstrict attorneys, police chiefs, sheriffs, the Citizens'
Crime Commission and New York Cit y 's Criminal Justice Coordinator.
State prosecutors should have every appropriate strong weapon necessary
to combat the grave threat to society posed by organized crime and the
special <lan~er to honest, democraric government presented by
unscrupulous public figures who violate their oaths u11d sell their
trust.
These proposals are now pending in the Legislature, and we need the
help of every citizen in securing approval of these and other longoverdue reform~ in the state's criminal justice system.
Federal
officials will always have certain advantages in investigating matters
that involve interstate or international activiticB or are covered by
some uniquely federal jurisdjction.
But we in the Empire State should
stand <is equal partners with the federal government and play a full part
in defending the interests of our own state's citizens.
For additional information about these vitnJ jssuea, I uw enclosing
a few recent new articl~s and comments.
I ~rge you to contact members
of the Legislature to let them know your views, an<l, cis always, I would
appreciate heari11g any comments nnd suggestions you may have.
With warmest
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May 16, 1986

Mr. an<l Mrs. Paul Milstein
1271 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020

42ncl floor

Dear Paul and Irma:
"Honest politician" may appear to be an oxymoron to some
cynicr,, but not to me. Having spent decades working with
thousands of hard-Horking, dP.dicated and honest people who hold
important elective public office, work in the halls of
governrnerit and lead our great political parties at every level, I
knew that most public servants are, like me, deeply 2ngered by
any act of corruption involving the public's interest. The
recent, shocking spectacle of high public and p2rty officials
abusing the public trust placed in their hands disturbs us
profoundly. It makes us determined not only to punish any who
may be guilty of crimes but also to adopt strict reforms to
prevent the recurrence of such abuses.
That is why Governor Cuomo and Mayor Koch appointed a
special commission headed by Columbia President Michael I. Sovern
-- a p~mel that has begun to issue reports and make
recommendations for strong 2ction. That is also why both
Goverm>r Cuomo and I have independently proposed tough and farreaching reforms that are very similar in approach. We both want
to es tab U sh an independent S tatc F. thics \.cYr:::mis s ion with strong
enforcement authority; to require cletCJiled financial disclosure
by public officials and candidates; and to limit political party
officers from lobbying or doing business with government. He
hope the Ler,islature will act favorably on these and other longoverdue ethics-in-government reforms. 0nly sweeping changes like
these will restore b~dly shaken public confidence in our
governmental and political institutions.

Mr. and Mrs. Paul Milstein
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May 16! 1986

As you may know, I have also urged my own party to act
decisively, regardless of how speedily the Legislature takes up
these issues.
In a letter to the Democratic State Chair and to
county leaders and state committee members, I have proposed that
the Party adopt rules at the upcoming State Convention that would
bar certain major party leaders from holding elective party
office and prohibit these same leaders from doing business with
government. These were, in fact, the two sets of circumstances
in which many of the serious corrupt acts that have been alleged
recently were nurtured.
In my view, this kind of bold,
unilateral action by one of the major parties will press the
other parties to take similar steps and will make comprehensive
legislative reform inevitable.
For your information, I am enclosing a copy of my Law Day
statement on the need for ethics reforms and some recent articles
about my proposals for the party rules changes. As always, I
value your views as a leader in the community and would
appreciate any reactions or comments you may have.
With warmest personal regards.
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February 6, 1987

Mr. and Mrs. Meshulam Riklis
Rapid American Corp.
725 Fifth Avenue 18th floor
New York, NY 10022
Dear Rick and Pia:
With the hectic holiday and inaugural period behind me, I
wanted to take a moment and share briefly with you my reflections on
the past few months and the period ahead. My re-election to the
office of Attorney General was both exciting and gratifying. The
margin of victory was the biggest in the history of the office,
65.12%. I carried 60 of the 62 counties in New York State, losing
the two by a combined total of only 191 votes.
Also deeply gratifying was the fact that my candidacy was
supported by every daily newspaper in the state that editorialized
on the election. A sample of these editorials is enclosed.
As I begin my new term of office, I will continue to press
for reforms in the ethics and conflict of interest laws of our
state. The scandals that have been uncovered in New York City and
the abuses elsewhere in the state have undermined the credibility of
our political system. We urgently need to adopt stringent new
reforms in order to restore public confidence in government.
My proposals include creating a powerful state ethics
commission, imposing new restrictions on the outside activities of
current and former public officials, prohibiting top-level party
officials from being paid for representing private clients before
government agencies, preventing an individual from being both a
party and public official at the same time, requiring financial
disclosure from all elected, and top-level appointed, officials and
reforming our campaign finance laws. I used this theme in my
Inaugural Address in Buffalo. I'm enclosing a copy of a Buffalo
News editorial on these initiatives.

Mr. and Mrs. Meshulam Riklis
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February 6, 1987

Another issue critical to the State of New York is the
adoption of legislation dealing with the very serious dangers posed
by the accidental release of toxic chemicals into the air or water.
While the tragedy in Bhopal and the spill last year into the Rhine
River have made the public aware of the enormous risks we run, there
have been many smaller leaks of toxic chemicals in New York State
over the years. Preventing a Bhopal tragedy in New York is a must.
I introduced a bill that would require industrial plants which have
toxic chemicals on site to take steps to prevent accidental
releases, to prepare plans to respond to an emergency, to work in
cooperation with the communities in which they are located and to
report any toxic releases to government agencies. My office has
been working closely with the Governor's office, the Legislature and
business community representatives on the bill, and I believe that
there is a good chance of passage before the 1987 session ends.
Finally, since becoming Attorney General, I have spent a
substantial amount of time advocating reforms to aid in the
enforcement of our criminal statutes. Much of this work has been
done through the Law Enforcement Council, which I helped form five
years ago with the District Attorneys, Sheriffs, Police, the Mayor
of the City of New York and the Citizens Crime Commission. Last
year, the Council achieved the passage of a State Organized Crime
Control Act, a measure which I had first introduced in 1982. I
continue to belie9e that there is ~ critical need for increased
funding of the various elements of the criminal justice system,
including the police, prosecutors, courts, sheriffs, probation and
parole offices and correctional system. In 1987, I expect to be
joining with the other members of the Law Enforcement Council in
proposing additional funding of identifiable programs which have
proven to be effective in the fight against crime.
As always, I am eager to get your reactions, which in the
past have helped to guide my efforts in important ways. I'll keep
you posted periodically on our major initiatives.
With warmest personal regards.
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June 22, 1987

Mr. Jeffrey S. Silverman
President
Ply-Gem Industries
919 Third Avenue 6th floor
New York, NY 10022
Dear Jeff:
- Since January of 1986, scandal and corruption have
dominated the news of state and local government.
The daily deluge
of revelations of self-dealing by government officials and the
resulting wave of public indignation present us with an historic
opportunity to recast the way the public's business is done.
Of particular interest to me in the past few months have
been the efforts to adopt new rules of ethical conduct for
governmental and party officials.
I have called for action on two
fronts:
the State Legislature and the major political parties in
the State.
I have sent a package of bills to the Legislature
detailing specific reforms which I regard as essential if public
confidence in government is to be restored.
As part of the effort
to secure these reforms, I counseled and supported Governor Cuomo's
veto of the ethics bill initially passed by the Legislature.
(My
memorandum to the Governor as reprinted by the New York Times is
enclosed.)
Agreement on a more comprehensive bill has not, as of
this moment, been reached, though negotiations are continuing.
Recognizing the difficulty of achieving bipartisan,
bicameral agreement on such complex and sensitive issues, I decided
to open the second front and I called upon the four major parties
to reform how they conduct their business.
I felt that my own party
should provide leadership in this crucial struggle and could
immediately do so by revising its own rules rather than waiting
passively for the actions of the Legislature.
As a result of my
efforts, the 1986 convention of the Democratic State Committee
created a Special Committee on Ethics to draft comprehensive rules
covering Democratic party leaders.

- 2 U~fortunately, in my opinion, the report adopted by the
Committee majority missed the mark. The majority proposals are much
weaker than what the current crisis of confidence demands. Just as
Governor Cuomo recognized that the public deserves better than half~
hearted and porous efforts on the legislative front, I have called
for the rejection of the majority recommendation in favor of the
superior minority report. I have included my detailed statements on
this matter.
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I would be delighted to get your reaction to these
efforts. At the very least, I feel it is important to let you know
that many of us are involved daily in the painstaking work of
reordering the machinery of government so that it can be honest,
effective and worthy of the trust of its citizens.
With warmest personal regards.
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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
Lawrence S. Hunt1ngron

-:

COMMITTEE TI1EASURER

To: LSH
From: Bill Hicks

Wlllled J. Meckel II

COMMITTEE SECRETAJN

n

PollV weoei

Date: November 23, 1987

VICE CHAJRf'fRSONS
Rlcl'lotd A. Berrutetn
John C. Blelwirft1
lw:Jrew M Slum
Samad R. Bobel'
Thomas A. Bolon
Jomes E. Corey
Jomes E. Cayne

Having made a thorough review of our files in search
of a possible Chairman for next May's Dinner Dance,
I have narrowed my list of candidates for the job to
the following: ,
.. .

Cornier
Peter J. CostiOOl'J
May S. Cronson
!homos W. Evans
Enid K. Feist
Raf L Furman
!homos J. Gochbefg

Jua-.(

"A" List (in alphabetical

'

't

.

Ovistlne Gooc::1win
.Josepn Harcum

Rita E. HouMlcl'loe4 Hemondez
Ridiord 0 . Hooicins
G.ldo1e B. Horowitz
Etic M. Jovin
Howard T. Koneff
Rooert M. Kaufman
l<attlleen Locey
Benjamin V. Lambert
Janet A Luhrs
Eo1e 1. Mock
.Joel R. Mesznik
William W. IV\oore
!homos E. o·eonnor
C Kevin O'Donoghue
~orcvonte G. Perrotta
Co~ H Pfooneimer Ill
Howard W. Phillips
Jonn R. Price
!homos L Pulling
il'ootord J. Race. Jr.
William J. Regan. Jr.
Sleonen Roberf
William A Schreye<
Fronk P. Smeal
Chones F. Smithers. Jr.
'Miiiam I. Spencer
Monanne Sorooo1ns
Mocelon D. Tolley
Ectword L Tirrell
Ph1lloA Toio
;oM Truo1n
Chones J. Urstoat
;omes M. woosworrn
;onn F. Wolloce Ill

-.;

COMMlnEE IN FORMATION
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;

·~

.

o~der)

Jam~s E.· Cayne, Co-President, Bear, Stearns & Co ... . . · ·
If the Wa 11 St . rumor mi 11 proves true , Cayne · wi 1 1 ~·soon be named sole President, his Co-President,·-<~> :: ..
E. John Rosenwald, having been asked t~ step down .
In the '86 campaign, Cayne, with the help of ·Rita
Ha u s e r , r ai s ·e d o v e r $ 6 O, OoO wi t h i n t he .f i rm .,. . t_o_w a rd
EVR's re-election. · · In 1 87, . Cayne,:made ·a solo effort
and raised nearly $70,000 from wi~hin the firm. ·
Clearly, he wants the job and can do the job within
his firm. We do not know if he has · any outreach. :
Will Cayne be so ticked off if .he is not asked ~o - be
Chairman that we 1-dll lose a minimum of $50,000? <.
Would Cayne be ticked off if we asked Chairman Ace
Greenberg in his stead?
·.
Peter A. Cohen, Chairman, Shearson Lehman. Brothers
Shearson has never taken the lead for one of our
events~ unlike Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Bros.,
Drexel and First Boston, because they've never been
asked. Perhcrps we would be turned down if we asked.
I hesitate to explore the matter with T. Pulling
because I suspect that Pulling would try to get off
the hook if I bring up the suggestion, whereas if .lE..!:!
explore the idea with him, he might have to take it
up with Cohen.
Richard Jenrette, Chairman, Equitable Life
As you know, the firm is composed of Equitable
,
Investment Corp. (Benjamin D. Holloway, President).
Donaldson, Lufkin &·Jenrett2, and Alliance ' Capital
Management. All three entities ar~ regular contribute ·
to the Support Committee. Personally, I doubt if
Jenrette would accept. Would Holloway carry sufficien ..,., e i g ht wi th i n t h e i n ve s t :i1 e !l t c : mm l.! ri i"t y ?
·
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"A" List (continued)
COMMIITTE CHAIRMAN

·- -.. .

LCW!'ence S. Hunttnoton

COMMITTCE TREASURER
Wlltted J. Mecxel II

COMMITTCE SECRETARY
Polly Weber

VICE CHAIRP£RSONS
Richard A Bernstein

.Jenn C Bietwirtn
AnOrew M. Blum
Bemord R. Bober
Thomas A Bolon
Jomes E. Corey .
Jomes E. Coyne
Judy Cornier
Pefe< J. CostiQOI'!
Mory S. Donson

,.

'

Thomas W. Evans
Enid K f'.eist
Rov L Furman
Thomas J. Gochbefg
ChriSfine Goodwin
Joseo/'l Harcum
Rita E. Howe<
: Mlctioe4 Hemcndez
Richard 0. Hopkins
Gedcle B. Horo.vitz
Enc M. ..Jcvits
Howard l Koneff
Rooert M. Kaufman
KCTtlleen lccey
BenJCmrn V. Lambert
Joner A Luhrs
Eo1e I. Mock
Joel R. Mesznrk
'Mlliom w MOO<e
Thomes E. O 'Connor
C Kevin O'Donoonue
Fiorovonre G Perrotta
Cort H P!orznetme< 111
Hovvord W Phillips
Jonn R. Price
Thomes L Pulling
Broatord J. Race. Jr.
William J. Reqon. Jr.
Steonen Rooerr
William A Scnreyet'
Ffonk P. Smeal
C:iorles F. Smrtners. Jr.
William I. Soencer
Mononne Sorogo1ns
Madelon 0. Tolley
EO'NCrO L nrrell
Phrllo A Toio
Jann Trubrn
Chones J. umacrt
Jomes M Woaswonn
.:onn F. Wallace 111
COMMITTEE IN FOllMATION

Gerald Tsai, Chairman, Primerica Corp.
Now that Primerica is ·realizing its goal of becoming
a full-fledged financial services corporation throu ~
its acquisition of Smith Barney, do you think that
Tsai might be receptive? Or would he suggest that~
approach either John Orb or George Yonder Linden ofSmith Barney? Smith Barney has given every indicati1
that it wants to do much more business with the
Comptroller's office.
l
John Weinberg, Chairman, Goldman Sachs
I will e~plore the notion with Arthur Spector who is
a new member of the Support Committee, if you want.
I don't know Weinberg's politics, although I do know
that his two newly-named Vice Chairmen, Stephen ·· Frieo
and Robert Rubin, are major Democratic fundraisers.
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Theodore Forstmann; Chairman,

cc
LO'\

Forstman~

Little

Ricno
Gdd·
Enc r
HQo.M

He raised nearly $60,0GO for '86 re-election hosting.
luncheon with L. Lehrman at "21".
.. ·
David T. Kearns, Chairman, Xerox Corp.
Neither he nor the corporation has ever contributed
to EVR, but the corp. purchased Furman, Selz ... this
past summer. Perhaps, Roy Furman would approach him
on our behalf.

ROOE
Kartl l

Ben1c

Jene
EC1le
Joel I
Willia

Thom

C

K&

FiO<O\I
Cert~

Howe

Jonn
Henry Kravis, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
Thom<
He has contrfbuted nearly Sl00,000 over the past five Bro ate
years. As you know, he is a new member of the FORBES 'Miiiar
Steen•
400 and with his wife, Carolyn Roehm, appears to be
'Mlliar
underwriting/chairing half the major charitiable even t Ffonic .
i n the City , ( an ex a g g er at ion , of course , but you kn ow C1'10r1E
'Miiien
what I mean.)

Lewis T. Preston, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
Und e r T . Oe n n i s Su l l i v a n , t he - b a nk be c am e · f r i e n d l y

.Viener
Mooel·
E~erc

Ph•tio ;.

..;onn Tr

w i t h EVR . t h e p a s t t \v o y e :i r s •
Un f o r t u n a t e l y , _ s. u l l i v an
h a s mo v e d o n t o h e a d Pr i nc et o n U. ' s e nd o wme nt . Am I
c o r r e c t i n a s s u mi n g t h a t P r e s t o n c a r r i e s c 1 o t o f 1-1 e i g

.:onn F.

in the financial community?
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COMMIITTE CHAIRMAN
LOWl'ence S. Huntington
Wlltr8cl J. Mecl<el II

COMMIITTE SECRETARY
Polly Weber

1e

on

VICE CHAJl!f'£RSONS
Richard A Bernstein
Jonn C. Blefwirtti
/>ndrew M. Blum
8emord R. Bober
Thol'TI03 A Bolon
Jomes E. Carey
Jomes E. Covne

Comief
. Peter J. Costioo11
Mary S. Oonson
Thol'TI03 W. Evans
Enid K. Feist
R"f L Furman
Thorne$ J. Goct\be<g

Others

Judy

drn

List (continued)

Leonard Lauder, President, Estee Lauder Inc.
As you know, the Lauder family is very generous to the
Republican Party. Estee L. is co-chair of upcoming
Conservative Party Dinner. Eric Javits could appro~~~
L. Lauder.

COMMIITTE TREASURER

1
jh

8 11

'

Ovisttne Gooawin

.Joseol"t Harcum
Rlto E. Houser
Mict\oe4 Hernandez
Ricl"lOTd 0 . Hool<ins
Gddale 8. HOl"owitz
Eric M. .Jovits
Howard T. Kaneff
Robert M. Kautmon
Kamteen Lacey
Ben1amin V. Lambert
.Jcnet A Luhr3

EO'\e I. Moo:
Joel R. Mesznik
William W Moore
Thomas E. O'Connor
C Kevin O'Donoghue
fiotavanre G . Perrotta
Con H Pforzne1mer Ill
Howard W Phillips
Jol1n R. Pnce
fhomas L Pulling
etcC10<d J. Race. Jr.
W1lllom J. Recan. Jr.
Sleorien Robert
'Mlliom A Scnrever
ffcn~ P Smeal
w C!"lones F. Sm1tt1en. Jr.
'Miiiam I. Soencer
Mononne Soraoo1ns
Mooeton 0 . Talley
bard L TirreH
Fl11iiO A To1a
.:onn Trub1n
Chcries J. Urstaat
;omes M. waaswortn
gr. :onn F. Wollace 111

Willard Butcher, Chairman, Chase Manhattan
Thomas Labrecaue, President, Chase Manhattan
Chase is the only one of the Senior Managers of Sprin~
·· Borrowing that has never chaired one of our eve.a.ts.
11

11

John Reed, Chairman, Citibank
Walter V. Shipley, Jr., Chairman, Chemical

~ank

Summary
,
I don 1 t believe that 1988 will be an easy year for
us with regard to fundraising, given the competition of .
the Presidential race and the NYS Senatorial election .
Therefore, · I do not think \'le should settle for a caretaki;;
chairman - my mind still reels over the 1984 debacle when
E. Javits, 8. Lambert and the Hon. W. Rogers served as cochairs - but must agressively seek someone (or two) who,\'lill
take the ball and run with it on our behalf. It could mean
a $50,000 - $100,000 difference for us:
11

11

11
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8/23/85
MEETING WITH ROD SMITH
In

discussing

our

fund

raising

problems,

goals

and

operation with Rod Smith of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee,

Rod made

raising base,

it

clear

that with Ned's

we should not have a problem,

power and fund

rather, we should

have more money than we know what to do with.
I explained to Rod that Ned was the sole trustee of
$26 billion (an amount that grows by a minimum of $2.5 billion
a year) and was the final say on which firms receive commission
business, etc.
Rod commented that Ned had more leverage than most elected
officials since he provided firms with actual dollars, while a
senator or governor can only provide a vague promise to assist
with legislation or make a few introductions and phone calls.
Rod

felt

the

major

problem

was

with

Ned.

He

assumed

(rightfully so) that Ned was too much of a nice guy, that the
firms were aware of this and knew he would not
into coming up with large political donations.
has to change.

~ressure

them

This, he said,

He must make it clear that those who give will

get.
He felt the best way to get this
a

board

for

(equity,

each

fixed

s~gment

income,

of

the

mortgages,

, ~essage

Common

out was to create

Fund's

venture

asset

capital,

base

cash).

These boards would be make up of top people from each of the
firms

and

decisions.

would

assist

Ned

in

making

the

proper

investment

In order to get on these boards, members would be

invited to pay $20,000 a year, and of cburse, Ned would end up
doing most of the investment business with these people.

I~I
~~~i2H

-

2 -

While that idea may be a bit too radical, I feel it could
be boiled down a bit to relate to the Regan Support Committee.
As you are well aware, that Committee currently is made up of
a few people who deliver and many people who want to see their
name on an invitation.

The Committee could be restructured to

include only top CEOs such as William Shryer of Merrill Lynch.
Each member could be made responsible for a sizeable amount of
money and in return, they or their firm would make a sizeable
amount of money.

While still not the most subtle approach, it

would send a clear message to the street.
Rod pointed out that a strong, elite committee also would
provide

an

Washington.

attractive

forum

for

He could not think of

the

on~

powers

that

be

in

senator, cabinet member,

etc., who would not jump at the chance to talk to the people
Ned deals with.

Ned could be the leader and point man rather

than one of the followers.
Rod also felt that Ned,

in order to make himself better

known in Washington, should join the Senatorial Trust.

While

the price tag is high ($10,000 a year) it is a very high level,
well connected group who could be of great assistance to Ned.
Concerning our fund raising operat±on in general, Rod felt
that

we

need

follow-up.

more

of

an

organization

the

ability

to

A staff of one, regardless of how good the person

was, certainly was not enough.
be a

with

cheap proposition,

He admitted that this would not

but felt

the return would more than

justify the creation of this organization.

-

During

a

discussion

on

3 -

PA Cs,

Rod

felt

we

had

no

real

reason to start a campaign of that nature and should stick with
our natural constituency (underwriters, investment bankers).

I

explained to him that the Common Fund with an equity portfolio
of $11 billion, was a major stockholder in every corporation in
the

U.S.

and

that

extremely important.

our

vote

on a

particular proxy issue was

I added that we had never received funds

from any of the PACs of these corporations.

In reply, he said

we should try to get the CEos of these corporations involved in
our fundraising efforts, not the PACs.
At the end of our meeting, Rod said he would be happy to
come to New York and discuss fund raising with Ned.

AC IOS..A (R ... l/81)

OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Regan

From:

Joe

August 23, ·1 985

Date:

Palumto

Subject:

Larry Hunt.in:Jton rret
t.~

william Shryer to chair

Williar:\ Shryer

with Jean P.ousseau regard.in::J ask.i.n3'
ne.tt furrl rais.in::J event.

Rousseau asked Shryer how he felt al:out it airl Shryer has
agreed.
The next step is for ya..i to call Shryer's office arrl set up an

afP:)intrre.nt for the week of

Septeml::;er

3

(tre

2.n:i l:ein; Lal:or Day) arrl

make the fomal request.
Larry feels that it is very irnpxtant that
with ycu prior to ycur IIEetin; to
I will call

~

discuss~

.ta::orrow to

re

get t:o:Jether

approach with

~o

~ a i c:;o1ss ~ matter

with

.

yc:u.
~e,

I will ask :1ary Grace to set up tie rreeti.n:;s l:eb.een

yc:u arrl Shryer arrl ycu airl Larry.

:

~
~
200205
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Lincoln Center Dinner Dance - SEATING BY TABLE

iable #1
Turry Newman & Guest
· John & Joanne Baranello
'Bonnie Graham
~ary Gr Mee Mullen.
Marion , urphv
-- Cunn l ngnam \
'Pat
-.....;::_;___
Deoorail Grarrato
Jeanette Mil ione

----

Jay Manas
Bruce Bent
Dina Needleman
Shaun Benet
M/M Morton Ego l

M/M Bernard R. Bober
M/M Edward Dimon
M/M Donald Dunn
M/M Burtt Ehrlich
Bill Hudson
Ramona Adams

· Robert & Joan Pen:; · rigton
Leslie Maebe
Table

M/M C. Kevin 0' Donoghue
M/M Joseph J. Larkin
M/M Kenneth Horner
~bert W. Bouchard (KEY BANK)
~nnis S. Buchan (KEY BANK)

#3
Walter Kicinski
Beth de Harne l
Ruben Madina
Jerry Selitto
Paul Ladd
Kr istin Mannion
4 Guests

Maraaret Carey
~cl: Lop°S'-

~ll~
Ste•1e 5e:nria rdt

vcq!:>

.Jiaraaret Vo9!)
Cynthia Crispen & Guest
2 Guests

#5
Edward L. fi rre 11 & Guest
M/M Robert Battle
M/M Bernard Meldrum
:M/M Morgan Morrav
Tifton ::i1mi.1ons & Guest

#6
· Hans C. Mau:; .-2r
M/M Warren G. Harner
M/M J. Mic!:ael Maionev
•Ffl Ii am I. Soenar
Victoria Biancni

#7

Table #16

·- - - ··-

#2

'Aii;:e r

Table #8

·· #Q

& Joe

Table #17
Cashin

Dennis Sullivan
Frances Miley
Karen Eisenstadt
Clay Meye:s
Richard Taube:
Davia S. Scna1man
Andrew Cooper
Tom Mooney
Table #10
M/M Howard Lim, Jr.
William Newmark & Guest
James E. O'Doherty
Jerry Kassar
Frances vella
'. : 2~2:; Gay
Jim Rutherford
Robert Ryan
Jerr·1 Boehm

V; ,,~,._~ )J"";',i:...S

Table #11

,, M/M Harry W. Albright. Jr.~
"----....

-

- --~-.,---------

Richard F. Kezer
Steohen A. Hopkins
John Wetzler
Valerie Lancaster
John Young
M/M James P. Murphy
Patricia K. Perlman
Ann F. Walsh
Richard D. Parsons

#18
Thomas Y. Hobart, Jr.
Dan Sanders
·SOnara Fi;! dman~
·Pa1~~a Stryk0
Irwin 011snook
Nuala Drescher
W11l1am Dougnerty
Nancy Berger

#19

-------

.--M/M John McCarthy

..__':+f+i'-'f~'=""~~.~rle~n1rderson

M/M John Walsh
M/M Paul \.Jhi 1:e
John Suther 1and _
Rona 1d Lynch

M/ M Roger S. PhelD'

#20
M/M Victor J. Melone
M/M PAter M. Tocze~

Table #12
M/M Steonen Mittel
M/M Scott ~~arsh
M/M Cliff Henry
M/M Charles Ringle
Steve Kaufman
Bi 11 Jonnson
Table ::15

M/M Al Der: A. Wa 1sh
E'...!oene Sout:iern
Blaise G. A. Pas:torv
~ ·Jwar'J GiJbS
Mary Huntington
•
.. C:- Thomas Kunz
Roger:~. Zaitz2ss

MJM_5he!don c51egel
-~/M ~ono=_:nGen:ial
M/M ~ooer: Mar:1n
M/M ?~illip Rcdilosso
~A/:~ ·~:?0r2e

~anc

John F. Wallace III
Herman Charbonneau
Elaine Brennan
Denise Finney
M/M Robert Zirkle
Jeanette Brummell
Elizabeth Condon
Frederick de la Vega
#21

------

Josenh Sano·& Warren DietPhi 1 Caruso
-~
_Bar!"'! :.::i,n'"-"-b"L

.

· ·Ja mes Fe::oe:s:onh;o ugw
C1fforo Kic:"o
J~ic:-iael

Long

·page 2
#22

Janet A. Luhrs
Stuart Wershub
Chris Ring
Marian Granowitz & Guest
Patricia Briggs &
Vincent Brana
Margaret Soter
Carol Sunderland
#23

Raymond S. Jackson
M/M Joseoh Forte
M/M Lawrence Swenson
M/M Orner Williams
Diana Browne
Lauri s Raw 1
1 Guest

#34

#28

Robert 0' Nei 11
~ ./
Rooert Lamo
M/M David Kirschenbaum
M/M Robert St eves
- Steonen Kovacs '\
.

#29

Theodore Forstrnann
Nicholas Forstmann
William Brian Little
Judith Little
John Sprague
Dorothy Whitmarsh
Steven Kl i nsky
Pamela Connolly
Peter Lusk
1 Guest

#24.

Thomas W. Evans
Lo i s L. Ev ans
Arthur & Myra Mahon
Robert Peduzzi
Diane Smoak
Lance & Dee Wilson
Leon & Mabel Weil
Rooert Nisely
Robert El leiib:: r g
#25

Eric & Margaretta Javi t s
Howard ~ooper & Guest

' #30

M/M Philip A. Toia
Jane Sinatra
Blair Mitchell
M/M Palmer Turnheim
.Wolfgang Schoellkopf

Satoishi ~

Gue1

#35

James M. Wadsworth
M/M John C. Barber
M/M Garv Schober
M/M Francesco Galesi
Anthony Delorenzo
David Buicko
Robert Amdursky
#36

M/M
M/M
M/M
M/M
M/M

Thomas E. O'Connor
Joseph McManus, Jr.
Thomas F. Meade
John Sietes, Jr.
Gregory Verini

#37

Richard Cooper
Gene Crowley
Tom Meade
Jann 0' Brier~
re ,in Pot:nan __.,

Susan Fi sher &
Robert Greenwood

Edward V. Regan
M/M Wi 11 i am A. S-chreyer ···
-Ml[""Antnony J. (Jilav i t3:Earle I. Mack & Carol Di d
Andrew & Fliss Blum
Patricia Patterson
Charles F. Smithers, Jr.

Marianne Spraggins

#39

#26

Ned Flynn & Gues t
M/M Ric har d Hel mbrec ht
M/M Richard Loc ke
~~o n i ca M
ac Ada ms
Mi chae 1 Sm 1t h
Ci ndy Cobb s & Gues:

& 2

#38

M/M Patric J. Foley

#27

M/M Lawrence Quinn

\n 11 i am W. Cobbs

M/M
M/M
M/M
#31
( M/M
Richard ~ Amelia Bernstein 'MLM
C. Au st i n Fi t t s

M/M Richard LeFrak

M/M Wil l iam J. Regan, Jr.
M/M Ric hard 0. Hookins
M/M Peter C. Regan
Caroline Lassoe
Al 1 i son Lassoe
Ward Lassoe
William Hopkins

Jann Hyland & Frieda Wal

~·
2 Guests

Muriel Siebert
Douglas Luke & Jess Belser

'-..J.:1/M Victor P. Greene=--:::
Jocelyn Javits

Jennifer Regan
_J. Daniel Mahoney
'Wi_l l i am D. FUCiazy;;

M/M Daniel P. Tully
Jean & Georgann Rousseau
M/ M John Trubin
M/ M John G. Heimann
Fl ora Schnal l & John Nel son M/M James E. Murp hy
M/M John B. Sprung
J ose~~ l IrQne M
attone
Ri ta & Gustave Hauser
:1:a.o
E! i nor S ac h r~c~--M/ M Rebert Linton
·"Cou1s J. Lefk ow1_:s;;
M/ M Fred Joseph
James Balog
#33
Joel
Meszn1k
~o n ~ a io r a na & ~a ureen
~o oer: Sc:: i ff er
~.::;n n el ly
:.::f fr~ y Aofel
~/ M Ser: hi n ~ a ! :2 s2
Ka t h1e:: n i.. acey
'-.i:l!_M Guv Ve e ia
.· es ..~ es ser
Jam
M/M ~ narew
~c ur K e
#32

' ,1 ~ .,... ~I

:: .-. "" """ , ,

PAGE #3
#41

da Wall1
2 Guest

M/M Samuel J. Abate. Jr.
~nnis Radigan & Dee Forrester
~orge & Rosemarie Bucci
John & Marilyn LaSpaiui:.u

#42
, 1te~ DeMatteis

i

~~

. ~nua L. Mu-ss & Gues~

#48

#55

Fioravate Perrotta
Hon. & Mrs. Wm. P. Rogers
Paul M. Hook ins
Lewis B. Stone
Ellen L. Tayl:JrFrank E. Sisson II
Lee M. Smith & Valerie
Kilhenney

Jack Carroll

i

Irving Shatz & William Valet
~rry
& Robert Anderson

, Jr.

M/M Robert Foran
M/M Morris Goodwin
M/M Raymond Lyles
M/M Dennis Santo
Carol Bellamy

#44
Gerald Liooes & Guest
'W! 111 am Hu as on & GL:re-s-t-.

.- .

M/M Jay Joseph
M/M Ken Zarrilli
M/M Leonard Rizzolo

#50

#43

1nor

& Guest

}1JM Joel Goldfran[ - -,

---

Thomas Pu 11 i ng
~~Duke Chapman
'Jack Gault
Scott Higgins
Keith Thomas
Ronald Stack
Nancy Henze
Stanley Pardo

#51

EJcharn Rq,oqpi0b
, M/M Richard C. F~t,

Robert B. ~c:_ye_r._____,,
#45

·eyer

vita:.
·ol Dicke

• Jr.

sseau

Carl & Betty Pforzheimer
M/M L. Guthart
M/M G. Frelinghuysen
M/M H. Blodget

#46
Larry & Caroline Huntington
Charles & Nancy Beck
M/M Al an Medaugh
M/M Henry Thompson
Christian & Anson Nolan

#47
Frank P. Smea 1
Robert Cenci
David Cl aop
' Robert Oownev- ,

M/M Homer D. Sch aaf
~ E. Micnael Sndl?"V
M/M Joseph Armbrust, Jr.
4 Guests

#52
M/M Daniel Harman III
Frank & Linda Sullivan
Ann Hagan
William McCarthy
Zenaida Chinloy
Steve Kantor
Gail Gordon & Joseph
Mc Cale

Howard
~r_i.[l ur

& Cherry

~aneff

Hug, ~

#56
Frank Bass
Patrick J. Callan
Thomas A. Caputo
Steve Cordes
Joe Flanagan
Frank Gunsberg
Philip Iglenart
Peter Steil
Mi chae 1 Scadron
Bi·uce Surrey

#58
Louise M. Sunshine
M/M Jim West
~M /M Gregory L1egey ,,.}
Harian 8atrus 1'"""Guest
John Kabacki
M/M Paul Matlow
#59

M/M Charles Urstadt
M/M Henry Pearce
M/M Fred B. Morrfson
Martin Gallagher
M/M Fred Salomon

#60
Lea & Tom Gochberg
M/M William Hamma
M/M Alan Levine
M/M Anthony O'Connor

#53
Sharon & Steve Portnoy
Paul & Mary Gojkovich
JQM Wi l I 1 am P! uok '"':-- 7

Jo~

#5'1

Mi chael McCar:hv
Judah Sommer
Arthur Soec::::ir
2 Guests

10 GUESTS

Ryan

Harry Levine & Edw. Connors

John V. Scaduto
John & Jean O'Leary

#49
Benjamin Lambert

&Desmond

#61
Ian Bruce Eichner
Howard Hornstein
Enid K. Feist
Ro nal d Alt:7ian
Henry S. Miller
Conrad J. Gunther, Jr.
David H. Berman
~·1urray r. \1ascis
Pete: 2. ShulGioer
~poer: ::<.. Hunt

•

. I

•

PAGE #4
#62

John ~Lindsay
M/M Donald Elliott
M/M Eugene W. Harper
Louis R. Tomson
Betsy Tomson
John E. Hull
kny 8. Kuhn
#63

Wilfred J. Meckel II
M/M David Banta
M/M William Hazen
Mac & Madelon Talley
John Lynch
Polly Weber
#64

Michael D. Hernandez
Jonathan Plutzik
Ronald Gault
Thomas Jacoos
Eva Hassett
Claire Goodman Pellegrini
Paolo Pellegrini
Rona Packer
Richard Tilghman
Mrs. Richard Tilghman
#65

Leon Levy
Shelby White
'J1/M Jon
rosse-b
Mary S.ronson & Guest
.:.111cnae§ F1neston~
Alexan er Cortesi
Mrs. Norman Peck

e·

#66

Norman L. Peck
M/M John Emmanuel
M/M William Stern
Linda Wooldridge
Kurt Dean
Donal Murphy
2 Guests
#67

William Hicks
Ky 1e De Benham
Judy & Miene! Cornier
Joseoh P3lumbo
Chris & Gerry Goodwin
Irene R. Halliaan
Jerry & Lelia Raibourn
Scott Malfitano

~
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AC 809-A (Rev. 1/81)

OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER

~- . .

.

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To:
.

~ '

•'.-

...

·Date:

Comptroller Regan
. J.arry Huntington
From: Bill Hicks
Joe Palumbo .

March 11, 1986
Subject:

Fundraising

The following are names and firms that may be contained
elsewhere in this memo but should be highlighted for various
reasons.
Dale Horowitz - Must become more involved, particularly for
September event.
Jerome Goldstein/Bear Stearns - Must become more involved
Alan Greenberg
Robert Linton - EVR to ask him to Chair September Event but
must discuss with L.H. before March 19
dinner.
Lauder Family - EVR is having lunch with Leonard Lauder and
Dan Davidson on March 28.
P.e must talk to
L.H. before luncheon.

Frank Smeal

EVR to meet for breakfast.
- Who is partner in charge?
- Ask for support.

. :: ....i...... _,_,_.:..._7·

..._·.·~-•

'. ;.. · _.. L-=- ·

Eli Jacobs - Arranged Drew Lewis lunch for March 21.
Dick O'Connor - Offered to help but someone (undecided) has
to get back to him.
~1h~~·~! _:. .~ ;_..i:~_~{n_L~eJ[. _
;_()Shoemaker - Offered to get corporate types
~ !~
,
together.
EVR. feels Larry
should talk directly to them.

fV

Ben Lambert - EVR & J.P. to meet with him and bring a list
of one or two dozen names of real estate
types.
(Hicks and Palumbo to compile list).
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Forbes 400 (Minimum Net Worth: $150 mi I I ion.)
Edgar Bronfman (Seagrams) - EVR to v.i sit Ri

t~

Hauser.

C. Douglas Dillon - Andv Blum to contact Pat Patterson who will
then set up meeting with EVR.
Semour Durst (Developer) - To be arranged.
Thomas M. Evans (Crane Co.) - Seymour Knox to introduce EVR to
him. Knox also is a friend of L.H.
Larry~

Zachary Fisher - Eric Javits to bring EVR to their
offices.

Halcolm Forbes - Pulling to Robinson to Forbes.
Francesco Galesi - Wadsworth.
~~urice

Greenberg - EVR to ask Louise Sunshine.

Harry Helmsley - Pul I ing to set up a meeting.
Peter Kalikow - To be arranged.
Lauder Family - EVR is having lunch with Leonard Lauder and Dan
Davidson on March 28. He must talk to L.H.
·before the luncheon.
Samuel LeFrak - To be arranged.
John Loeb - Nothing more to be done.

~

t.iack Fami I y - EVR to c I ean-up prob I em.
Paul Mi I stein - To be arranged.
Jack Parker - To be arranged.
Mi

I ton Petrie - EVR to talk to Eric Javits.

Phipps_Fami ly - Andy Blum to contact Dinny Phipps.
Jack & Burton Resnick - To be arranged.
Robert Rich Sr. & Jr.

Wadsworth.

David Rockefeller - Hold off.
Laurence Rockefeller - Hold off.
Happy Rockefeller - Hold off.
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OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To:

Comptro I I er

Date:

May 1 9, . 1 9 8 6

From:

Joe Pa I umbo

Subject:

Fundraising
(Various)

ROCHESTER:

We should begin to get organized now that the Buffalo
event is over.
Possibly we should get a pre I iminary
Rochester Support Comnittee together to discuss date,
time, amount of ticket, etc.

SYRACUSE:

We have an excel lent I ist and now should attempt to
find a Chairman for the event.
I think Dr. Malfitano
would be a good choice.

LONG ISLAND:

We should try to get moving as soon as possible.
Please let me know what you want me to do.

WESTCHESTER:

Again, if we are going to try anything, we should
move quickly.

ALBANY:

The envelopes have been addressed and the invitations
sho~ld be printed today, but we're running a couple of
days behind schedule. Also, you said to remind you to
contact labor leaders regarding this event .

...
BEN LAMBERT:
I spoke with Martha Wallau late Friday (5/16) and
she assured me that the people would be contacted. Martha
and I also discussed the real estate developer/real estate
attorney event and feel it should take place late sumner.
Lenny Rizzolo is getting a I ist together of al I developers
we deal with. The I ist wi I I be ready this week.
LEONE PETERS: When you have a I ittle more time after the
ccnvention, Mr. Peters should be contacted and taken up on
his offer to host a dinner.
TED FORSTMANN:
spoke with his office on Thursday and they
asked to change the date to June 25. Once firmed up, I wi 11
contact Eric Javits and Larry Huntington to make certain one
or both wi 11 attend.

lG
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MANUFACTURERS HANOVER: . 1 met with John Price about 10 days ago.
He assures me the meeting between you and the executive
conmittee wi I I take place but wants to make certain Mr.
McGi I I icudy is in attendance. John also agreed to join our
Support Corrrnittee.
(This could mean a larger contribution
than the bank's usual $2,000).
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Bob Bott (you met at the breakfast)
expressed a "very strong" wi 11 ingness to participate in
your October Fundraiser.
I wi I I continue to keep in contact
with Metropolitan.
'
DREXEL BURNHAM:
I am meeting with Joel Mesznik tomorrow (5/20)
to discuss the October event in general and the corporate
angle in particular, Kathy Lacey has been given the I ist of
holdings and we' I I begin there. Also, I am setting up a
meeting with you, · me, Kathy Lacey and Bob Shiffer to get .
things moving. This meeting wi I I be after the Convention.
Kathy, others from Drexel and I are meeting with Bob Linton.
on Friday (S/23) .
PROPOSED "OTHER NEW YORK EVENT" :
I would appreciate it if at the
Friday Support Corrrnittee meeting you would strongly express
your desire to hold such an event.
I feel we could raise a
substantial amount of money. Jo~elyn Javits would I ike John
Cast I e (her boss) . to chair such an event.
RONALD PERELMAN: Jocelyn said "he' 11 do anything I want".
expects to get a large donation from him .

She

.·.·
:
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TO:
FROM:

Comptroller Regan
Joe Pa 1umb.o

DATE:
SUBJECT:

October 9, 1986
Fund Raising

Larry Huntington et al have immediately begun to move on the
next fund raising initiative with calls already placed to Peter Shar~.
Ronald Perelman and Ivan Boesky.
Larry and Eric will now v1s1t
them and we' 11 see what happens ..
What you must do is call I;lenry Kravis, Carl Icahn and
Lawrence Tisch. When you reach them you should explain that you
had a fundraiser on Monday and while it was successful, the
campaign needs additional funds.
You should then say you would.
like to have Larry Huntington, Chairman of Fiduciary Trust and
the head of your committee along with Eric Javits meet with them
to discuss fundraising ideas.
(With Henry Kravis it's important
that you don't say you want him to contribute more personally.
As you know, we would like him to arrange a Forstman-type
luncheon).
The phone number for l\lessrs. Kravis,
follows:

Icahn and Tisch are as

Henry Kravis
- 212/750-8300
Carl Icahn
- 212/957-6303
Lawrence Tisch - 212/841-1000
The calls to these three people are just the beginning.
will have additional people in a day or so.

We

On a related manner, Bill Hicks and I are designing a letter
to be sent to about 200 wealthy individuals asking them to make a
contribution.
Bill Shreyer will be asked to sign about 20
letters and the remainder will be signed by Larry and Eric. We
will }h~n follow up.
Also,
called Martha Wallau and explained that while we
appreciated the breakfast, it bore no resemblance to our initial
a1scussion.
I explained that we needed additional ·help and that
Larry Huntington would like to meet with Ben to discuss
approaching people such as ~~-~~E~~~Jl• ~£~~-~JJE~~ and ~~£tY
~~y~~~She said she would set up the appointment immediately.
That

Larry mentioned one other phone call he feels you must make.
is, to Bob Linton to thank him for his help on the event.

.·
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To:

E.V.R.

From:

J. Palumbo

Date:

December 11, 1986

Subjec~:

Spring Borrowing-Related
Contributions

From the management group of 17 firms, 16 contributed.
Trust did not contribute and . Mani Rani did very little.

Bankers

Firms contributing from the management group were: Merrill Lynch;
Salomon Brothers; Citicorp; Chase Manhattan; Chemical Bank; Horgan
Guaranty; Manufacturers Hanover; First Boston; Ehrlich-Bober;
Goldman, Sachs: Norstar Bank; Prudential Bache; Bear, Stears;
Shearson Lehman; Smith Barney; and Drexel Burnham.
From the lower bracket of 124 firms, only 17 contributed.
The 17 contributing firms were: Hutton; Kidder; Marine Midland
Bank; .Morgan Stanley; Paine Webber; L.F. Rothschild; Wertheim;
Dillon, Read; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette~ First Albany; Lazard
Freres; Dean Witter; Chase Lincoln; Key Bank; Oppenheimer & Co.;
Daniels & Bell; Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co.

~
~
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MOllDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1986

------------------------------------7:15 AM
9:00 AM

Depart by car from Katonah for
Albany.
Arrive Albany.
ALBANY OFFICE

.
.

10:30 AM

Meeting w/ Messrs. Dunn, Tomson,
:: /
Hull, Healy, Hadley and Ms.
·"'
:
Gr i d l e y • Re : S ta t e d e b t .
,... d (:.iL-/'_;(-<0·
t

11:30 AM

(

I

f

~-

•

-

Meeting w/ Mr. Bob Doherty of the · . \.-(~
NYS Federation of Police.
Re: pension supplementation.

·

.. / .
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12:00 N" · Interview w/ Mr. Jay Gallagher of :

Gannett News. (Claudia)
1 : 00

PM

2:45 PM
6:00 PM

Me e t i n g wI Me s s r ·S • Dun n , To ms o n , ·
Hull and Ms. Gridley.
Re: Spring borrowing.
Deoart by car for New York City.
(Rosie)
Gala Supper at the Parker
:·1 e r i d i e n . 118 W. 5 6 t h S t . a t 6 t h
.C..ve. 212/245-5000. BLACK TIE.

8:00 PM

Gala Reopening of Carnegie Hall.
57th St. at 7th Ave. 212/247-7800. ·
o/n - New York City

· Rosi~·-

212/581-8100

Mark · - 518/449-7345

I~I
L-J'~i9H

·'

To: EVR
From: J. Palumbo
Subject: Mike Hernandez
~Date: November 24, 1987
Currently, First Boston, like many other firms, is in the process of
re-thinking its priorities and it seems likely that public finance will
not be on the top of the list.
Several weeks ago, it was announced that First Boston would be
promoting a subordinate of Mike Hernandez's to help him co-manage the
public finance area. While many people think this means a demotion for
Mike, I think he's being groomed to take over other areas of First Boston
such as corporate finance. He is considered very valuable by the firm
and has done a great deal for its bottom line.
But while he does great things for First Boston, he has done almost
nothing for us.
During the last fundraiser, the only thing First Boston did was buy
one table, and we just received the final payment two days ago. He,
along with Shoemaker, was extremely uncooperative and seemed to feel the
firm was doing us a favor by lending its name to the event.
We do an enormous amount of business with the firm ($231,000 in
commissions for··this fiscal year to date) yet they more or less refused to
return the favor.

I' .··
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First Boston

':':"1e :::illowing is business con:iuc~"'d wi t.°'1 Fi.!:"st
Eos---::::i for the fiscal year l::eginni..r:g Ap::-il 1, 1986
t."-:::"cr.lq:i Janua.ry 31, 1987.

·.. : .

E-:~~J Carrni.ssicns
·S.::Or--Te=n <:=e::its
·Fi.xe::-~ cre::its

$ 97,246
289,913
210,250

Total

$597,419

T.:-..o -:..::..... "', puts Fi=st BoS-.....on in t.~ n~ t:-.ree _
s2.ot CAit of the 67 fi:=:ns w"ith who:n w= do l::u.siness.
', ,I.
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